Leila S. al-Imad

The Fatimid Vizierate, 969–1172

Leila S. al-Imad

The Fatimid Vizierate,
969 – 1172

Leila S. al-Imad

The Fatimid Vizierate, 969–1172

To the memory of my father,

Sami Nassif al-Imad,

and for Karl and Sami

PREFACE

The Fatimid state was the logical outcome of the Ismāʿīlī da'wah. The da'wah called for the formation of a state based on the political principle of wiping out injustice and oppression. As perceived by theoreticians, the Fatimid state was to liberate its subjects from political and social chaos and from moral and economic disorder.

The Fatimids had to reconcile their government institutions with their political ideology. They wanted to create a system which would be non-discriminatory and which would benefit the ummah as a whole. They perceived their bureaucracy to be a service-oriented one.

Although the Fatimid caliphate was the product of the Ismāʿīlī da'wah, it is argued here that the Fatimids practiced a form of separation of state and religion whereby government institutions, although parallel in organization to the da'wah, functioned independently of it. The success of their system depended upon their ability to balance the two parallel institutions without compromising either. Thus they avoided having one

iii

institution dominate the other, which would have crippled their administration.

The vizier of the Fatimids was the primary individual responsible for the administration. He asserted what one could call the "temporal sovereignty" of the caliph through the different branches of government. The vizier was supposed to see that the bureaucracy functioned as it should, although the bulk of the work fell on government personnel, such as the heads and scribes of the dīwāns, who were responsible for continuity in the system. The viziers were initiators of policies which the dīwāns implemented. It was those policies, initiated by a few select viziers (three of whom are discussed in detail in Chapter Three), which had long-reaching effects on the system and were responsible for its ability to function even when many viziers did not last in office even one year. The Fatimid bureaucracy functioned, if not perfectly, without major interruptions, because it was stratified; lines of authority were clearly delimited and the scribes and bureau heads functioned according to principles of competence that helped the government to function even when viziers came and went in rapid succession.

A study of the vizierate would not be meaningful without an understanding of both the structure of the bureaucracy and of the Ismāʻīlī element (the da'wah) and its relationship to the state. For this reason, the first chapter of this book examines both these elements; and the second chapter deals with the theoretical foundations of the vizierate in Ismāʻīlī theology. The third chapter considers the broad characteristics of the sixty individuals who served as viziers, from the conquest of Egypt to the fall of the caliphate and the rise of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī. Three outstanding viziers are chosen as case studies in the delicate interplay between Ismāʻīlī theory and Fatimid practice. A concluding chapter attempts to compare the Fatimid vizierate with its Islamic contemporaries in the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk state.

*****

I would like to express my appreciation to the following libraries, which allowed me access to their collections: Topkapi Saray Library (Istanbul), Leiden University Library, Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), the British Library (London), Jafet Library of the American

University of Beirut, and Firestone Library (Princeton University).

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who helped me realize this work. For comments, suggestions, and encouragement, my thanks to Richard Bulliet, Martin Dickson, Axel Havemann, Robert McChesney, and the late R.B. Winder and S.D. Goitein.

I must also acknowledge the counsel, advice, and encouragement of Professor F.E. Peters during the research and writing of this work, which began as a doctoral dissertation under his supervision at New York University.

Finally, my thanks to my husband, Karl Barbir, who set this book on computer; to my colleague, Dale Royalty, for his expert assistance with Word Perfect; to Dale Hilliard, Director of Computer Services at East Tennessee State University, and to his staff for their assistance with preparing the manuscript for publication; to Lattie Collins for assistance with the index; and to the late Klaus Schwarz for his interest and encouragement.

Leila S. al-Imad

Johnson City, Tennessee

30 June 1990

vii

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

THE FATIMID ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS

AND ITS FUNCTIONS

As was the case with other empires, the Fatimid bureaucratic system was created out of necessity. With the expansion of Fatimid boundaries, administering the newly-acquired territories became an urgent task. A bureaucratic apparatus was created by Ibn Killis with the help of Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī, the commander-in-chief of the caliph al-Mu'izz and the architect of the city of Cairo. It was conceived when the empire's headquarters were moved to Egypt.

The Fatimids had started their empire in the Maghrib in 297/909; their first capital had been at Qayrawān in Tunisia. 'Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī moved it to Mahdiyyah on the Tunisian coast in 308/920; it remained the capital until the occupation of Egypt and the building of Cairo after 359/969. During the empire's early phases, the caliph's priority was to conquer more land and to spread the faith; this policy was changed when the caliphs moved to Cairo. Administrative personnel in the early years consisted only of those who served in the army

1

organization. Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī was the only army general during the early phase of the caliphate to enjoy the prerogatives, duties, and responsibilities of a vizier without being one. It was only natural that this was the case, because al-Ṣiqillī was the sole ruler of Egypt for four years, until al-Muʻizz arrived in his newly-founded capital, Cairo.[1]

With the acquisition of Egypt and Syria, it became evident that the caliph needed to centralize his government and to organize it into a civilian bureaucracy. Al-Muʻizz realized that the only way to rule the vast area was with the help of strong, efficient administrators. Thus he named Ibn Killis as his vizier. Along with Jawhar, Ibn Killis was responsible for the establishment of the Fatimid administration which, it has been argued by Shaʻbān and by other historians, was "the most centralized administration ever known in Islam,"[2]

---

[1] Although al-Ṣiqillī was the ruler of Egypt for four years, he did not take any title or claim to the place. He remained a general and his rule could be construed in modern terminology as an interim military governorship.

[2] M.A. Shaʻbān, _Islamic History: a New Interpretation_, _Volume II_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 199.

even more centralized than the Ottoman Empire itself, a statement many historians will find disturbing. Be that as it may, such a hierarchical administration was a necessity for the Fatimid state. A state based on an articulate religious philosophy and da'wah "required utter obedience in a hierarchically stratified social order," or else its message could not be realized nor its universality become a reality.[3]

Although al-Ṣiqillī had power to direct the Fatimid state for at least four years, it was Ibn Killis's initiative and his innovative spirit in government that made him famous as the architect of the stratified Fatimid bureaucracy. During al-Mu'izz's and Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī's era, Ibn Killis's genius in statecraft became evident when he was given authority over taxation, treasury, prisons, endowments, police force, and all other related matters.[4] His ability to organize and to create an administrative system for the Fatimids became

---

[3] P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Syncretic Origin of the Fatimid Da'wa," Islamic Culture, 28 (1954), 475-491.

[4] Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ al-ḥunafā' bi-akhbār al-a'immah al-khulafā' (Cairo: n.p., 1967), I, 144.

apparent after his successes in managing the fisc. His
tax reforms, which were fair and equitable, will be
discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three in detail.

Having discovered the talents of Ibn Killis, al-
Mu'izz named him as his first vizier, which did not mean
that al-Ṣiqillī lost his prominence as the caliph's chief
consultant and as commander-in-chief of the army.[5] Al-
Mu'izz combined the talents of both men in order to
secure the best possible government at the onset of his
rule in Egypt and Syria. Their tolerance of the
diversity of their subjects helped make the transition
from Ikhshīdī to Fatimid rule possible. Moreover,
prevailing conditions prior to the Fatimid takeover
helped make the transition and the adjustment to Fatimid
rule a smooth process.

Prior to the Fatimid invasion, Egypt had been struck
by drought. Between 351/963 and 360/970, the Nile was
very low, which meant that peasants could not irrigate

---

5 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 144: wa khalīfatuhu al-
Qā'id Jawhar; and Ibn Zulāq 'Alī, Tārīkh Misr wa faḍā'iluhā,
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1817, fol 47v, who
speaks of Jawhar as the commander of the army, the vizier,
and the organizer of the kingdom of al-Mu'izz.

the land and thus could not cultivate it. The lack of
crops, especially of wheat, led to famine. Prices of
commodities rose, becoming prohibitive even for the rich.
The plague spread and hundreds of people died.
Historians of this era speak of the inability of people
to bury their dead and to their resorting to throwing
corpses into the Nile.[6] To add to the natural disaster
which struck Egypt, the military situation was unstable
as well. Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī was unable to stop the
Qarāmiṭah who attacked Bilād al-Shām in 352/963 and who
raided and plundered Egyptian pilgrims on their way to
Mecca in 355/965. Kāfūr was also incapable of defending
Egypt's southern border with the Sudan. The Nubian king
over-ran the southern part of Egypt, plundered and
devastated it, and then retreated from the area, leaving
behind an impoverished population. Kāfūr could not
really order his army to the battlefield, mainly because
he could not pay their wages, a situation which led them
to mutiny.[7]

---

6 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, _Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah_
(Cairo: Maktabat al-nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, 1958), p. 125.

7 _Ibid._, p. 125.

The Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, Kāfūr's nominal suzerain, was incapable of sending an army to counteract the invading force of the Fatimids. Anyway, the caliph was a mere figurehead; actual power rested in the hands of the Buyids (334-447/945-1055). The imminent threat to the Buyids was not from the Fatimids, however, but from the Byzantines, who were invading the northern provinces of the Abbasid caliphate. For the Buyids to turn to the west and to send an army to stop the Fatimid attack on Egypt was understandably a low priority. As for Bilād al-Shām, the situation was no better. Sayf al-Dawlah al-Ḥamdānī, the ruler of Aleppo, took over Damascus and had plans of his own to conquer Egypt, which prompted Kāfūr to organize his forces and fight Sayf al-Dawlah in the battle of Marj ʿAdra near Damascus; the latter lost the battle and fled to Aleppo. Kāfūr followed him to Aleppo and concluded a peace treaty with him.

The whole of Syria at this point came under the Ikhshīdīs' rule. Although Kāfūr had subdued Syria, he could not consolidate his power over the whole area, due to the trouble that Egypt faced internally. Kāfūr had to move his army back to Egypt to crush a revolt against him

by a nobleman named Ghalbūn in 350/961.[8] Kāfūr died in 357/967 and was succeeded by Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Ikhshīdī, who was eleven years old. His father's cousin, al-Ḥasan bin Ṭanj, ruled the country in his name for one year. The situation deteriorated internally and externally. The Ikhshīdīs lost Syria to the Qarāmiṭah; internally, the army mutinied for lack of money and provisions. They did not receive their pay and so they took to the streets. Ibn Ṭanj blamed his vizier, Jaʿfar ibn al-Furāt, for the mutiny and imprisoned him, which did not solve the problem but offered the right time for the Fatimids to move in.

Such was the political situation in Egypt on the eve of the Fatimid invasion. Some of the members of the Ikhshīdī army that revolted wrote to al-Muʿizz and asked him to send in his forces to take over Egypt. The Ikhshīdīs discovered the plot, gathered what was left of their army, and marched into battle against the Fatimids, who won an easy victory; the Egyptians surrendered in 358/968.

---

8 Jamāl al-Dīn Abī'l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf ibn Taghribirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhirah fi mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah (Miṣr: Dār al-Kutub, n.d.), IV, 2.

Egypt offered fertile ground for the Fatimids, who thought of it as their first step east, for their long-range plans were to take over the dying Abbasid empire and to make Baghdad the seat of the Fatimid caliphate, a plan perhaps they never took the trouble to execute, nor would they have been able to muster.[9] More important was their feeling that Egypt would be a place from which they could spread their Ismā'īlī faith. The Fatimids had many Ismā'īlī dā'īs in Egypt during the Ikhshīdī period and had felt that the dā'īs, if successful, would help them conquer Egypt. The truth was that the dā'īs' activities did not prepare the ground for a successful takeover by the Fatimids because they were very secretive about their work, a policy they practiced even during Fatimid rule in Egypt. The Fatimids encouraged a secretive approach to proselytization in Egypt in order not to antagonize the majority of the population, which was either Sunni Muslim or Coptic Christian in faith.[10]

---

9 The name of the Fatimid caliph was pronounced in the khuṭbah of the mosques of Baghdad for one year during the reign of al-'Azīz. See al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 274.

10 For an account of the Christians of Egypt and their wealth and numbers, see Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Armanī, Tārīkh fī
(continued...)

The Fatimids' victory was the achievement of Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī, the first person to lay the cornerstone of Fatimid rule in Egypt. Commander-in-chief of the Fatimid army, he was born a Christian, possibly Byzantine Orthodox, and converted to Islam.[11] He became a kātib (scribe) at the Fatimid court in the Maghrib. Being intelligent and dependable, he was named by al-Muʻizz as army commander at the age of fifty.[12] Jawhar was endowed with foresight and wisdom, both of which were evident in his policy from the start. Upon entering Egypt, he

---

10(...continued)
nawāḥī Miṣr wa aqṭāʻihā (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), and the editor's introduction by T.A. Evetts. Also see al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʻāẓ, III, 142, for an account of the Sunnis of Egypt and of the Mālikī, Shāfiʻī, and Ḥanbalī madhhabs.

11 ʻAlī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī (Cairo: Maṭbaʻat Majāzī, 1933), p. 21, where he argues that Jawhar was born a Muslim because Sicily was conquered by the Arabs in A.H. 212, an argument based on sheer speculation, as Jawhar was called al-Rūmī, no doubt in reference to his Christian religious background.

12 Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī was born ca. 300/912 and was named commander-in-chief of the army in 351/962. He entered Egypt in 358/968.

promised the Egyptians that no-one would be harmed.[13]   He
sent his own messenger into the streets to assure the
inhabitants of clemency.   This was a very important act,
for it meant that the marketplaces would open and
business would go back to normal shortly after the
takeover.   The transition from the Ikhshīdīs to the
Fatimids thus became easy for the average Egyptian, who
evinced loyalty and support because he was treated better
than he expected.   Al-Ṣiqillī endeared the peasantry to
him by having the government take up the task of
maintaining the irrigation canals.[14]   It was al-Ṣiqillī's
personality, his firmness, and his sympathy which enticed
the Egyptians to follow him.

Upon entering Egypt, al-Ṣiqillī instituted changes
in the rituals and formulas of the Muslim daily prayers
to make them conform to Ismā'īlī rather than to Sunni

---

13 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 106-107; Ibn Taghribirdī,
Al-Nujūm, IV, 31.

14 Ibn Zulāq 'Alī, Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍā'iluhā, fol
47v; anonymous, Kitāb jawāhir al-buḥūr wa waqāyi' al-umūr wa
'ajāyib al-duhūr wa akhbār al-diyār al-Miṣriyyah, Paris,
Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1819, fol 43v; Muḥammad ibn
Aḥmad ibn Iyās, Kitāb Tārīkh Miṣr, Badā'i' al-zuhūr fī
waqā'i' al-duhūr (Cairo: Būlāq Press, 1311/1893), p. 46.

doctrine.[15] He made this change with such firmness that
no-one challenged it. As a convert to Ismā'īlī Islam, he
possessed the zeal of a new convert. His accomplishments
were due to his strong-mindedness and to his commitment
to establish a strong administration for the Fatimid
caliph in Egypt and Syria.[16]

As for Ya'qūb ibn Killis (formally, vizier from 368-
380/978-990), his strength lay in his determination to do
all he could to reach the top and to be in control of all
offices of the caliphate short of antagonizing the caliph
himself. He was a strong-minded individual of great
intellectual capacity. He organized the administration
into dīwāns where he had full control over all

---

15 'Abd Allāh al-Sharqāwī, Tuḥfat al-nāzirīn fī-man
wulliya Miṣr min al-wulāt wa'l-salāṭīn (Cairo: n.p., 1864),
p. 45; Ibn Zulāq 'Alī, Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍā'iluhā, fol 47v;
anonymous, Majmū'ah, British Library, MS 5928, ff 264v -
265r; 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Salām al-Quḍā'ī and Abū-Ḥusayn
'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Rawḥī, Kitāb nuzhat al-albāb, jāmi' al-
tawārīkh wa'l-ādāb, vol. I, British Library, MS 23,285, fol
43v. The section on Fatimid Egypt was written by al-Rawḥī.

16 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah fī-
akhbār Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS
arabe 5871, fol 110v; Ibn Zulāq 'Alī, Tārīkh Miṣr wa
faḍā'iluhā, fol 47v; Ibn Iyās, Tārīkh Miṣr, p. 46.

instruments of government. A complete discussion of his career is found in Chapter Two.

Al-Ṣiqillī's first achievement, as mentioned earlier, was the building of Cairo, capital of the Fatimid caliphate. A new site was chosen for the capital so that government personnel and army officers coming from the Maghrib with al-Muʿizz would not antagonize the indigenous population of neighboring Fusṭāṭ. This choice was one way to ensure that the assimilation process would not carry with it side-effects such as rivalry among two ethnically different groups, which could have led to insurrections and revolts. Moreover, al-Ṣiqillī employed Sunnis and Copts in different government jobs – at the beginning – and avoided any clash he could between Egyptians and Maghribīs.[17] This tactic enabled the Fatimids to pursue their tolerant policy towards the non-Ismāʿīlī majority in Egypt. Al-Ṣiqillī realized from the beginning that the Fatimids could not impose their religious beliefs on the Egyptians, and that the best they could hope for was the conversion of many of them

---

17 Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1919), II, 45.

through Fatimid good treatment. Historians of later periods recognized that fact: though Fatimid rule lasted for two centuries, when it ended there were hardly any Ismā'īlīs in Egypt.[18]

Al-Ṣiqillī's second major achievement was the doubling of the kharāj tax from three and one-half percent to seven percent, which helped pump money into the treasury; the money in turn was used to build or repair bridges and roads. The network of roads made the provinces and areas on the periphery more readily accessible and prevented the population from thinking of rebellion. Tax collection was also made easier because of better communications.

Al-Ṣiqillī's brilliance as an administrator was shown in the building and lay-out of the new city of Cairo. He divided the city into quarters or hārāt (as are all Islamic cities) according to the ethnic and

---

18 Bernard Lewis, "An Interpretation of Fatimid History," Proceedings of the International Conference on the History of Cairo (March-April 1969) (Cairo: n.p., 1971), p. 293; hereafter, Proceedings.

socio-economic backgrounds of the would-be residents.[19]
This division was important in order to rule the
populace. Al-Ṣiqillī believed that the administration of
such ḥārāt provided fewer problems than if the population
were integrated. In case of any disturbance or
insurrection from within the new city, it was easier to
put that disturbance down and to keep an eye on that
sector so that no further upheavals would take place.
Moreover, the social and economic discrepancies between
classes were less keenly felt that way, for the poor were
physically remote, not in close contact with inhabitants
of the rich ḥārāt. The segregation of the population was
so fixed in al-Ṣiqillī's mind that he did not permit the
Maghribīs to live within the walls of the new city.
Their settlements were outside the city proper. To
insure that they did not spend the night within the walls
of Cairo, he had a special crew of callers (munādīs) who
went through the streets calling, "No Maghribī is allowed

_____

19 The word ḥārāt is synonymous with quarters or
independent entities with their own mosques, madrasahs,
sūqs, and baths, rather than roads or alleys. For a full
discussion of the ḥārāt, see Ibn Taghribirdī, Al-Nujūm al-
zāhirah, IV, 42-54.

to sleep in the city."[20] Divide and rule was his policy to control the newly acquired territory.

Commander-in-chief of the army, ruler of Egypt from 359-361/971, a builder and organizer of a new city, al-Ṣiqillī was also a lover of knowledge and a promoter of learning. He is credited with the building of the Azhar mosque, which became the symbol of the Ismā'īlī faith, although other schools of law were given permission to teach in it. During his era, al-Ṣiqillī ordered the imām in the Miṣr mosque to change the basmallah and to add the names of 'Alī and his family to the prayers. He also imposed Ismā'īlī rather than Sunni inheritance laws.[21] On the political front, he tried in every way to right the wrongs committed against the indigenous population during the Ikhshīdī period.[22] These were the achievements of Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī. He laid the cornerstone of the administration which his successor, Ibn Killis, brought to completion.

---

20 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 45.

21 Anonymous, Majmū'ah, British Library, MS 5928, fol 265r.

22 Ibn Zulāq 'Alī, Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍā'iluhā, fol 47v.

Ibn Killis was unable to run affairs of state alone. He knew that the Fatimids, because they were a minority, needed a strong centralized administration in order to control their people. Furthermore, for maximum benefit to the Egyptians, Ibn Killis felt that the Fatimids had to have a sound fiscal policy in order to keep the ra'iyyah content. They promised to have an equitable society and they set out to do it through a fair system of taxation.

The vastness of the Fatimid empire made it necessary for the caliph, with the help of his vizier, to reorganize the network of existing dīwāns and to create new ones. In order for the Fatimids to perfect the system, they had to introduce new administrative and personnel policies. Their aim was centralization and they did their best, although not always successfully, to ensure that their system functioned as they conceived it.

With the reorganization of the existing dīwāns and the creation of new ones, hiring new personnel became possible. Fatimid hiring policies reflected an increase in the number of their co-religionists in government positions. They gradually introduced Maghribīs into the system; thus the newcomers, who lack know-how, shared

their posts with Coptic or Sunni <u>kuttāb</u> who were not, however, phased out of their jobs.[23] The Fatimids, out of their tolerance, but more accurately out of expediency, were aware that without the know-how of the indigenous Egyptian class of <u>kuttāb</u>, they would never have been able to build their administration. Be that as it may, the Fatimids embarked on building their system by first dividing Egypt into four <u>wilāyāt</u> or administrative units: Qaws, the East, the West, and Alexandria. Syria and the Maghrib were also administrative units. The governors or <u>wālīs</u> of these provinces were directly responsible to the vizier or to the caliph.

At the same time that these administrative divisions were created the <u>dīwāns</u> were also reorganized and new ones appeared. Many of these bureaus duplicated each other's efforts. Such duplications were necessary as a system of checks and balances. One <u>dīwān</u> could confirm the figures of the other or it could show discrepancies between its figures and those of the other, thus leading to an investigation of the <u>dīwān</u> and the correction of the problem. In case of corruption, the vizier could

---

23 Al-Maqrīzī, <u>Itti'āẓ</u>, I, 119.

then fire all personnel connected with that specific

bureau. In such cases the government would have been

brought to a halt had there not been duplication of

effort, particularly in dīwān al-jaysh, dīwān al-rawātib,

and dīwān al-kura'. In dīwān al-jaysh and in dīwān al-

kura' the number of horses given to the army was recorded

by both dīwāns and the salaries of the army personnel

were inscribed in both dīwān al-jaysh and dīwān al-

rawātib; while dīwān al-kura' also tabulated the salaries

of the personnel in order to divide horses and mules

among those who received them according to rank and

seniority.[24]

The Fatimid bureaucracy was staffed from the special

class of scribes. These scribes or kuttāb were a select

group of administrators who had studied the art of

calligraphy and composition at the hands of masters in

both fields. Highly regarded for their breadth of

knowledge and education, this elite group were mainly

composed of either Copts or Melkite Christians who had

been trained to become scribes by their fathers and

---

24 Abū 'Abbās Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-
a'shā fī ṣinā'at al-inshā' (Cairo: al-Mu'assasah al-
Miṣriyyah al-'Āmmah, 1964), III, 488, 489, 492.

grandfathers and who had served in such positions since the Arab conquests.[25] As good mathematicians, the Copts were very valuable in keeping the books and accounts for all the dīwāns. As trained bureaucrats, they knew the art of administration, making it logical for them to attain even the highest position in government, the vizierate.[26] Many of the early Fatimid viziers were from this select group of administrators, referred to as arbāb al-aqlām.[27] The majority of them were at one point in their careers either poets or scribes in the bureaus.

The administration employed a large number of officials due to its extensive branches. Apart from employment in the dīwāns, the Fatimids had a great number of qāḍīs and individuals working for the treasury (bayt al-māl) and the mint; both institutions will be discussed later in this chapter.

---

25 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah, p. 293; Gustave von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement," Proceedings, p. 210.

26 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah, p. 293.

27 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 485.

The number of dīwāns increased during the Fatimid caliphate. The Fatimids inherited an administrative system which was far from elaborate. Their predecessors left behind the following bureaus: dīwān al-jaysh, dīwān al-kiswa wa'l-ṭirāz, dīwān al-aḥbās, and dīwān al-rawātib. This limited number of bureaus does not mean that the Ikhshīdīs did not have a system for collecting taxes or for running their state; nor does it mean that empires which preceded the Fatimids lacked such an apparatus. Far from it; what they lacked were bureaucracies which consisted of several bureaus or administrative units with clearly defined functions, fully staffed by individuals trained in the art of government, calligraphy, and composition. These scribes, as Ibn Māmātī described them, were expected to be "honest literary men, [preferably] jurisprudents..., [and] patient..., [who] treat people fairly and do not hesitate to admit their errors and to correct them."[28]

A typical bureau employed around seventeen persons, each of whom had his own title and designated work. Among these seventeen officials were: the nāẓir, or

---

28 As'ad ibn Māmātī, Kitāb qawānīn al-dawāwīn (Cairo: Maṭba'at Miṣr, 1943), p. 66.

supervisor, who oversaw the work of the rest of the
employees and who alone could initiate policy; mutawallī
al-dīwān, or executor, who was responsible for all
transactions that took place in his bureau; and the
mustawfī, or collection agent, a scribe whose duty was to
keep tabs over the time spent by the employees doing
their work and who alerted employees as to when taxes
should be paid or collected. The muʿīn, or helper, was a
scribe who assisted the mustawfī. The nāsikh copied
incoming and outgoing mail in order for the dīwān to keep
track of all its correspondence. The mushārif, or
overseer's job, did not differ much from that of the
nāzir. Such duplication, as mentioned before, was a form
of double-check. A bookkeeper, ʿāmil, calculated
expenditures and went over all calculations made by his
superiors; he saw to it that the books all balanced. A
kātib, or scribe, substituted for the ʿāmil if the ʿāmil
were absent. Another scribe, the jahbād, collected dues.
An eyewitness, shāhid, attested to the correctness of all
bookkeeping. A nāʾib, or substitute, was used by all
branches of bureaus when necessity dictated it. An amīn,
or confidant, functioned like the substitute. The māsih,
or surveyor, accompanied the cadastral survey and

registered its findings for the purpose of his dīwān.
The dalīl, or guide, was a scribe who took information
gathered in the surveyor's records as to names of
landholders and amounts of land they held in a given
area. The ḥāviz controlled the use of the narcotic leaf,
qāt, and its production. The khāzin received foodstuffs,
stored them, and kept records of them. Al-ḥāshir was the
"squeezer" who supervised the compliance of dhimmīs with
Islamic and specifically Fatimid regulations of dress and
behavior.[29]

These seventeen employees did not include the ra'īs
al-dīwān, or head of the bureau. He was answerable in
turn to ra'īs al-ru'asā' (chief of all the bureaus), who
ranked after the caliph and the vizier. His task was to
coordinate the findings of all dīwāns and to take them to
the vizier and caliph for their approval. The chief of
the bureaus also had the ultimate say regarding
appointments or terminations of heads of dīwāns. In his
hands lay the ultimate authority for dispensing funds; he
received requests for increases in the budgets of dīwāns
as well. According to Ibn Ṭaywīr, whom al-Qalqashandī

---

29 Ibid., pp. 297-306 for a complete description of
all the employees of the dīwān.

quotes, "There were no Christians in this position all through the Fatimid caliphate except for one al-Aḥram."[30]

As mentioned previously, the Fatimids did not inherit an elaborate system of government from the Ikhshīdīs; all they found were the remnants of disintegrated bureaus, such as <u>dīwān al-jaysh</u>, <u>al-kiswa wa'l-ṭirāz</u>, <u>al-aḥbās</u>, and <u>al-rawātib</u>.[31]   To this group, Ibn Killis, with the help of al-Ṣiqillī, added sixteen bureaus, thus creating the elaborate administration of which both men had dreamed. All of these bureaus may be divided into several groups for the purpose of this discussion, although the Fatimids obviously did not make such a division. These groups of <u>dīwāns</u> were the scribal, military, regional, internal Egyptian, and specialized.

The scribal bureaus consisted of <u>dīwān al-inshā'</u> and <u>dīwān al-barīd</u>, the bureaus of formulation of documents and of correspondence. The head of <u>dīwān al-inshā'</u> had to be a fluent and eloquent author and calligrapher. He received all incoming correspondence for the caliph,

---

30   Al-Qalqashandī, <u>Ṣubḥ al-a'shā</u>, III, 489.

31   Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, <u>Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah</u>, p. 292.

discussed its contents with him, then answered the
correspondence and sealed it with the caliphal seal.
Within his bureau there were two other important
officials. The first was a confidential secretary, al-
tawqī' bi'l-qalam al-daqīq fī'l-maẓālim, who sat with the
caliph when he was alone to repeat the Qur'ān with him,
ṭo relate tales of the prophets, and to help him in his
calligraphy. Another duty, which in fact was the most
important, was to be present as a confidential secretary
to the vizier when the latter judged legal cases. The
second important official was a recorder, or al-tawqī'
bi'l-qalam al-jalīl, whose main function was to record
cases and to present them to the confidential secretary,
who in turn signed them and gave them to the vizier and
the caliph. Then, after all the essential signatures
were collected, the documents would be inscribed in the
dīwān.[32]

Finally, the other scribal bureau was that of the
mail, dīwān al-barīd. This bureau was of great
importance to the caliph; it made sure that
correspondence reached its destination. This bureau used

---

32 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 487.

carrier pigeons; it also served as an intelligence bureau for the caliph.[33]

The military group of bureaus consisted of the bureau of the army, dīwān al-jaysh; bureau of fiefs, dīwān al-iqtāʿ; bureau of supplies, dīwān khazāʾin al-kiswah and bureau of clothing, dīwān al-ṭirāz.

The bureau of the army took care of the different military elements, such as the Turks, Kurds, Maghribīs, Sudanese (the blacks), the Ghuzz, and the Daylamites. Each of these groups had its own leader who reported to the head of the bureau concerning the affairs of his own group. The bureau also took care of military equipment, ammunition, and supplies. The army general received lists of all provisions from the head of this dīwān. This bureau also took care of building ships for the navy. needless to say, it was one of the biggest in the administration. The military formed the backbone of the country and also drew the largest sum of money from the treasury. The head of this bureau had to be a Muslim.

---

33 Hilāl ibn al-Muḥsin al-Ṣābiʾ, Kitāb al-wuzarāʾ, ed. A. Farrāj (Cairo: Dār Aḥibbāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyyah, 1958), p. 177; Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 54; Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah, p. 294.

His position was very sensitive, particularly because he provided the army with all money, equipment, and ammunition. He also made sure that army personnel had enough horses and mules to transport their arms, ammunition, and goods. The bureau had several individuals whose jobs were to keep track of soldiers who died or who went on vacation, as well as those who reported for duty. The latter officials were called nuqabā' al-umarā'.[34]

Dīwān al-iqṭā', or the bureau of fief allocation, kept records of fiefs given to army members. It had a complete account of all the names of those to whom land was given in return for service in the army. The fiefdoms were registered in this dīwān along with the names of their holders.[35]

The last two dīwāns in this group were not separated at the beginning of the Fatimid era but became so under the vizierate of Ibn Killis. Dīwān al-kiswah and dīwān al-ṭirāz respectively dealt with food and clothing provisions for the army and for some administrative

---

34 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 488; al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 183.

35 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 489.

personnel. Their division into two bureaus was probably
engineered in order to keep a close watch on their
expenditures. Such were the bureaus associated with the
military.[36]

The third group of bureaus had to do with regional
affairs. It consisted of two dīwāns, dīwān al-Shām and
dīwān al-Ḥijāz. Although al-Shām was a province by
itself, a special bureau was created to handle complaints
coming from it. The Ḥijāz dīwān regulated the routes for
the pilgrimage or ḥajj and provided safe conduct and
places of rest for travellers.[37]

As for the internal bureaus, they were created to
handle the affairs of the Egyptian provinces, such as
coordinating tax collection and paying salaried personnel
in the provinces. They also dealt with the complaints of
farmers in particular, who were concerned with the
central government's maintenance of irrigation canals.
The Fatimids dug the canals so that more land could be
irrigated and more crops grown. Irrigation was probably

---

36 Ibid., III, 490.

37 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-
Fāṭimiyyah, pp. 292, 294; Ibn al-Qalānisī, Dhayl tārīkh
Dimashq, ed. H.F. Amedroz (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1908), p. 49.

the single most important issue which the Fatimids had to deal with, because in the event of crop failure, their political stability would be threatened; this issue was most critical during the reign of al-Mustanṣir.[38] Ibn Killis instituted these dīwāns in order to have direct access to them rather than wait for reports sent to him by the wālīs or governors.

There were three dīwāns that dealt with provincial affairs: dīwān al-Ṣaʿīd, dīwān Asfāl al-Arḍ, and dīwān al-Thughūr. Dīwān al-Ṣaʿīd was responsible for both the Upper and Lower Ṣaʿīd regions. In addition to what was discussed above, this bureau handled the accounts and arrears owed to the central government. Dīwān Asfāl al-Arḍ was concerned with the towns and cities facing the Mediterranean Sea, excluding the seaports. The ports were handled separately by a special dīwān called dīwān al-Thughūr. The functions of these three bureaus were the same, the only difference between them being that they handled different geographical areas.[39]

---

38 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā, III, 491.

39 Ibid., III, 491.

Although the Fatimids inherited such bureaus as
dīwān al-rawātib and dīwān al-aḥbās, they created several
new and specialized bureaus to supervise all technical
aspects of the administration. One of the most important
bureaus was dīwān al-rawātib, which was concerned with
salaries and wages. Others were dīwān al-kharāj, or
bureau of taxation; dīwān al-kura', or the bureau of
transportation; dīwān al-jihād, construction bureau;
dīwān al-aḥbās, prisons bureau; dīwān al-jawālī wa'l-
mawārīth, personal status affairs; and dīwān al-shurṭah,
or bureau of internal security. Lastly were dīwān al-
majlis and dīwān al-taḥqīq, both of which will be
described below.

The bureau of salaries and wages, or dīwān al-
rawātib, contained lists of all the scales of wages or
salaries, starting with that of the vizier down to the
most menial official. The dīwān also had lists of all
the names of mercenaries in government service and the
name of every slave (male and female). Its scribes, under
the direction of a chief scribe or kātib al-kuttāb, had
several duties: to collect information on how many
persons were employed in the government or in the army;
on the number of deceased officials and whether their

positions were filled or vacant; and on the amount of
money, food supplies, and livestock to be divided among
those who received such non-monetary compensation. The
bureau provided tentative lists of names with proposed
salaries to the vizier and to the caliph for acceptance.
The caliph had to sign the proposed list and send it back
to the bureau in order for it to be acted upon.
Meanwhile, the caliph had the right to change, modify,
raise, or lower the salaries of any individual of his
choice, even though recommendations were proposed by the
bureau. Depending on who the caliph was, his word or
that of the vizier was the ultimate word on the subject.
Power as such rested with the central figure of the
central government in the person of the vizier
("government by deputy") or the caliph.[40]

The bureau of taxation was one of the most
important, for government revenues known as kharāj came
through it to the treasury. The kharāj existed prior to
the Fatimid takeover of Egypt. Historically it was
created by the Arab invaders in the seventh or early
eight centuries; but Ya'qūb ibn Killis, with the help of

_____

40 S.D. Goitein, "The Origin of the Vizierate and its True Character," Islamic Culture, 16 (1942): 383.

'Aslūj ibn al-Ḥasan, reorganized the kharāj and created a
bureau to deal with all aspects of taxation.[41] They
enacted a new system of tax collection and land survey
which gave the central government greater income. Prior
to this change, Egypt had had several centers for tax
collection. There was no central bureau of taxation, a
situation which created much unrest among the population,
who were overtaxed by their collectors; the latter
pocketed the difference and never reported any of their
gains to the government. The new dīwān had a strict
policy in tax collection which made the average person
content with Fatimid rule for nearly a century. Tax
collectors became salaried personnel rather than tax
farmers who took a share of the taxes for themselves.
Moreover, the bureau had scribes who took care of the
complaints of those who were taxed unfairly. The vizier
would then look into these cases and mete out punishment.
Another very important contribution which this new bureau
made was to list the expenses of all the dīwāns of

---

41 Abū-Qāsim 'Alī ibn Munjib ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-
Ishārah ilā man nāla al-wizārah (Cairo: Institut français
d'archéologie orientale, 1924), p. 102; al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ
al-a'shā, III, 492.

government. From this bureau, then, money was allocated for the rest of the bureaus according to their needs and expenses. Money which remained after the expenses of the dīwāns were paid was transferred to the treasury. The new reorganization of the bureau of taxation made the government aware of the sources of taxation, which areas yielded most of the kharāj, and which areas were richest in agricultural production. Moreover it gave the government a notion of which dīwāns spent the most and on what. This method allowed the government direct control of these dīwāns and a say in how and where money should be spent. According to al-Maqrīzī, dīwān al-kharāj supervised three sub-dīwāns: dīwān al-rabbā', dīwān al-mukūs, and dīwān al-ṣinā'ah. The first collected money from hospitals, personal waqfs, and monasteries. The second dealt with taxation on iqtā' land and on entertainment areas. The last collected taxes on manufactured goods.[42]

Dīwān al-kura', or bureau of livestock, handled the stables of mules horses, donkeys, camels, and beasts of

---

42 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 466-467; Ibn Māmātī, Kitāb qawānīn al-dawāwīn, p. 341; al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 342.

burden used for construction and for the use of the
dīwāns, along with all equipment and fodder for both
animals in stables and wild animals such as giraffes and
elephants. This bureau also handled the salaries of
personnel who worked in the stables. Three individuals
worked in dīwān al-kura': a scribe, an undersecretary,
and a helper.[43]

The Fatimids had several other dīwāns which were
highly specialized, such as dīwān al-jihād, also called
diwān al-'amā'ir, the bureau of construction, which
supervised manufacturing in Egypt. It also built ships
for the fleet. This bureau concerned itself with cutting
wood from lower Egypt for construction and heating. It
took care of the extras that were spent on admirals and
navy personnel, as well as the compensation of its own
personnel. But when the dīwān was unable to cover
salaries, the head of the dīwān could draw the extra
needed directly from the treasury via petition to the
vizier.[44]

---

43 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 492.

44 Ibid., III, 492.

Dīwān al-aḥbās was another specialized bureau. It had a very special place in the administration, for its personnel had to be Muslims only, and from the scribal class. Not only were they Muslim scribes; they were also sworn witnesses. This bureau also had several salaried directors, two scribes, and two helpers. Part of the taxes collected from the north and the sea coast went directly to dīwān al-aḥbās. This bureau handled all legal procedures involving prisoners and the prisons to which they were sent.[45]

Dīwān al-shurṭah, or the police bureau, had two headquarters: one in Fusṭāṭ, called al-shurṭah al-suflā, and the other in al-'Askar, called al-shurṭah al-'ulyā. Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī moved the latter from al-'Askar to Cairo. The power of the shurṭah was stronger in Fusṭāṭ, for originally it was a bigger city than Cairo and its population was not Shi'i.[46] Moreover, Fusṭāṭ was not the seat of government like Cairo, where many army men and civil servants could interfere with the police; the shurṭah had stronger jurisdiction in Fusṭāṭ than in

---

45 Ibid., III, 490.

46 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah, p. 296.

Cairo.[47] The head of this bureau, ṣāḥib al-shurṭah, had to be a Muslim well-versed in the law. His job was both religious and secular in character. His duties will be discussed in full under the judicial branch of government, although the ṣāḥib al-shurṭah was tied to the executive end of it also.

Dīwān al-majlis used to be the original and only bureau. It received all the information from all the other dīwāns and had several scribes and assistants. The head of this dīwān was second in rank to ra'īs al-dawāwīn or ra'īs al-ru'asā' and third in rank to the vizier, as far as status and power were concerned. His title was istimārat daftar al-majlis. He was the spokesman of the central government in the provinces and handled all distributions of money and food, kept count of all government personnel, including those who died in the line of duty. The bureau was responsible for ceremonies held on religious holidays and all expenditures connected with them. Its personnel supervised all disbursements from stored grain and food, disbursed money to the sons and daughters of the caliph and all his blood relatives,

---

47 Ibid., p. 296.

and kept records of all incoming and outgoing gifts from
the caliph's household including gifts to dignitaries of
foreign governments . Finally, the bureau handled
compensation of couriers and the costs of burial services
for the caliph's entourage.[48] Such was the diversity of
functions that dīwān al-majlis handled that the Fatimids
broke it down later into the other dīwāns.

The last of the specialized bureaus, dīwān al-
taḥqīq, kept track of all the other dīwāns. It
investigated other bureaus, if need be, and it acted as a
watchman over other dīwāns so that no embezzlement of
funds would take place. Its chief was the fourth most
important person in the government.[49]

These were the permanent bureaus of the Fatimids.
Although many others were created, some were in existence
for only a short time because they served specific,
temporary purposes, such as dīwān Umm al-khalīfah al-
Mustanṣir, which was dissolved after her death.[50]   The

_____

48 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 338; al-Qalqashandī,
Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 489-490.

49 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 338, 489.

50 For a complete discussion of all the dīwāns, see
al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 335-344.

d̲ī̲w̲ā̲n̲s̲ did not represent the whole administration:
although the employees of the bureaus formed the majority
of the bureaucratic cadre, the judicial system and the
mint were run as separate operations.

The judicial system during the Fatimid era was based
on Shiite law, which "did not differ much from the
[Sunni] even in its application" at that time.[51] This
new system had replaced the Sunni one which had been in
existence since the twenty-first year of the h̲i̲j̲r̲a̲h̲. But
not all Egyptian judges were Ismā'īlī Fatimids; the
government appointed judges from all the schools of
jurisprudence, all of whom had, however, to use the
Shiite school for interpreting the law.

The Fatimids were the first to introduce the
position of the supreme judge, or q̲ā̲d̲ī̲'̲l̲-̲q̲u̲d̲ā̲t̲, into the
judicial hierarchy outside Baghdad. The judge's seat was
Cairo and his jurisdiction was the Fatimid domains,
unlike his counterpart in the Abbasid caliphate who was
only the chief q̲ā̲d̲ī̲ of Baghdad. The title was given

---

51 "Elle ne différait pas beaucoup de cette dernière
même dans son application." A.M. Magued, "La fonction du
juge suprême dans l'état fatimide," Égypte Contemporaine, 51
(1960): 47.

first to one Abū al-Ṭāhir, a Sunni judge who had been

invested by the Abbasids to take care of justice in Egypt

and who, when Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī arrived, was given the

title of supreme judge.[52] Officially the position of

qāḍī'l-quḍāt did not become a part of Fatimid

institutions of law until al-ʿAzīz's time.[53] As a

position it was possible to combine it with the office of

dāʿī al-duʿāt or chief propagandist.[54] "The office of

Supreme Judge derived its authority by way of delegation

bestowed upon [the holder] by the Caliph himself."[55]

This office was not a government position but was a

delegated "ministry" over the community of believers.

The individual nominated was supposed to be of the

_____

52 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 137. He bestowed the
title of qāḍī'l-quḍāt on Abū al-Ṭāhir, who had previously
been named qāḍī by the Abbasid caliphs al-Muʿtaḍid, al-
Muktafī, al-Muqtadir, al-Qāhir, al-Raḍī, al-Muttaqī, al-
Mustakfī, and al-Muṭī'. See E. Tyan, "Ḳāḍī," Encyclopedia
of Islam, new ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960-   ), IV, 373-
374.

53 A.M. Magued, "La fonction du juge suprême," p. 48.

54 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 336.

55 A.M. Magued, "La fonction du juge suprême," p. 48.

highest religious integrity, well-read, and well-versed in Islamic jurisprudence.

From 525/1130, during al-Ḥāfiẓ's caliphate, the chief judgeship was shared by four qudāt from four schools or madhhabs: Imāmī, Ismā'īlī, Shāfi'ī, and Mālikī.[56] Not only was the chief judgeship during the later Fatimid period shared; it also became theoretically part of the job of a wazīr tafwīḍ. Many such viziers carried the title of qāḍī qudāt al-Muslimīn (or chief judge of the Muslims) or kafīl qudāt al-Muslimīn (or guarantor of the Muslim judges).[57]

The chief judge was to see that justice was done all over Egypt. He nominated the jurisconsults and qudāt of the different areas. He also set the niche for direction of prayers during the construction of new mosques. He saw to it that waqfs were administered honestly and that orphanages were up to the standards of the time. His duties also included the inspection of the bureau of the

---

56 For further information on the judges of Egypt during the Fatimid era, see Adel Allouche, "The Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in Fatimid Egypt," JAOS, 105 (1985): 317-320.

57 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 337.

mint. In addition, he made sure that money was spent on mosques in accordance with their activities, which included the students, teachers, writers, and workers. One of his most important duties was to supervise the administration of the courts, or majālis al-ḥukum.[58] The chief justice held court himself at the Miṣr Mosque in Cairo. He was one of the pillars of the judicial system, along with the muḥtasib (market inspector) and ṣāḥib al-shurṭah (prefect of police).

The muḥtasib, or inspector of markets, drew his authority from religious texts and laws. In Islamic jurisprudence, the norm, al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar, is incumbent upon all Muslims. The Qur'ān, the hadīth, and the sharī'ah gave religious sanction to the muḥtasib to enforce the laws so that justice would prevail. The muḥtasib's job, therefore, was to see to it that there was no cheating or abuse of weights and measures in the market place. This part of the work of Fatimid muḥtasibs was no different than that of his Sunni predecessors. But where the difference occurred was in

---

58 A.M. Magued, "La fonction du juge suprême," p. 52; S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), II, 364.

the list of munkarāt or prohibitions which in Ismāʿīlī
Shiite tradition were more numerous than in the Sunni
tradition. Justice here was based on an Ismāʿīlī
interpretation of religious morality: hence, for
instance, no cheating in weights and measures, no beating
of students in madrasahs in places where they could be
maimed or harmed.[59] All of the muḥtasib's actions to
forbid such acts were based on a new religious morality,
Ismāʿīlī Shiite Islam.

The job of the muḥtasib included also the
supervision of ahl al-dhimmah (protected non-Muslims) so
that they would not deviate from what was expected of
them in the customary dress codes, housing codes, etc.
But, as mentioned before, their main function was control
over the industrial and commercial parts of cities in
order to punish cheats and robbers, and to protect the
average inhabitant from abuse.[60]

---

59 A.M. Magued, "La fonction du juge suprême," p. 50.

60 Nāṣir-i Khusraw, Safar Nāmah, trans. into Arabic
by Yaḥyā al-Khashshāb (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-jadīd, 1970),
p. 108. Nāṣir reports that because of their muḥtasibs, the
Egyptians felt so safe that they left their shops unlocked,
and no one would steal their goods.

<u>Muḥtasibs</u> were chosen from those persons with a reputation for high integrity, knowledge of religious laws (especially the law of finance necessary for this moral and practical role),[61] which accounted for the great importance attached to the position.[62]

As for the prefect of police, <u>ṣāhib</u> <u>al-shurṭah</u>, his judicial function was to inflict punishment or execute the sentence of a judge. In the absence of a judge, he could take the law into his own hands and pronounce and execute sentence. In many cases the prefect of police was called <u>wālī</u> and his prerogatives and duties did not differ much from that of the governor of Cairo or other governors in Egypt, who also took care of law and order. He was aided by a police corps entrusted with executing judges' orders and making sure, even by use of force, that justice was done, even if the losing side in a legal case was bent on enforcing an illegal verdict.[63]

---

61   A.M. Magued, "De quelques jurisdictions fatimides en Égypte," <u>Égypte</u> <u>Contemporaine</u>, 52 (1961): 57.

62   <u>Ibid</u>., p. 57.

63   For further information, see Ibn Muyassar, <u>Akhbār</u> <u>Miṣr</u>, II, 45; and Ibn Duqmaq, <u>Al-Intiṣār li-wāsiṭat ʾiqd al-amṣār</u> (Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿah al-ʿĀmiriyyah, 1893), IV, 11.

The last major divisions of government to be considered here are the treasury and the mint. The treasury was independently staffed and not associated with any of the bureaus. It was the central repository of all money; from it, expenditures of the various bureaus were made, including salaries of government personnel. The treasury was a separate institution in that even the caliph-imam did not have access to it freely. It was not his private treasury from which he could draw funds; its function was to be a repository whence all money was distributed and wars financed. The income yielded to the treasury from the different taxes included the kharāj on the land, and the jawālī, taxes on ahl al-dhimmah.[64] The other income came from taxes imposed on imports and on manufactured goods; income from zakāt; income from inheritance taxes; income from the mint, the bureau of weights and measures, and prisons.[65]

The mint (dār al-ḍarb), an independent institution under the strict supervision of the qāḍī'l-quḍāt and his

---

64 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah, p. 549.

65 Ibn Māmātī, Kitāb qawānīn al-dawāwīn, pp. 308, 319.

nā'ib, was responsible for minting coins of equal weight and value. Weights were also made in dār al-ḍarb in order to avoid cheating in the market place. Some sources refer to this institution as dār al-ḍarb wa'l-'iyār.[66] Three kinds of metals were used in the minting of coins: gold, silver, and nuḥās (which was either copper or brass unless otherwise specified). Four minting houses existed during the Fatimid period: in Alexandria, Qaws, Tyre, and Askalon.[67] Although al-Qalqashandī speaks of four minting houses, al-Maqrīzī relates that the caliph al-Āmir (reigned 496-525/1102-1130) built a mint in the carpenters' quarter of Cairo (ḥayy al-kharrāṭīn).[68] Dinars minted in this new place were higher in gold content than any dinar of the same era. Apart from the regular dinars for daily use, the Fatimids struck special commemorative dinars which the caliphs distributed among the amīrs and the a'yān (the notables).[69] It is important to note that al-Baṭā'iḥī, the vizier of al-Āmir, created also an exchange and

---

66 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 336.

67 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 365.

68 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 92.

69 Ibid., III, 92.

depository (dār wikālah) for merchants who came to Cairo from Iraq or Syria to facilitate their business.[70] It was located near the mint. Finally, new dinars were struck when caliphs assumed power, which did not mean that at other times new coins could not be minted. When al-Yāzūrī became the vizier of al-Mustanṣir (reigned 428-487/1036-1094), he had his own name included on the coinage, a rather uncommon phenomenon.[71]

Such were the administrative units of the Fatimid bureaucracy. Its intricacies and the way it functioned have fascinated many historians of medieval Islamic institutions, who have seen in the Fatimid hierarchical system an efficiency and an order which can be attributed to the system's founders: the viziers.

---

70 Ibid., III, 92.

71 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, p. 9. The coins read: Ḍuribat fī dawlati āli'l-hudā, min āli-Ṭāha wa āli-Yāsīn, Mustanṣirun bi'llāhī jallā ismahu, wa 'abduhu al-Nāṣiru lil-dīn.

CHAPTER TWO

THE VIZIERATE IN THEORY

AND IN ISMA'ILI THEOLOGY

As the institution of the vizierate was less than
two centuries old, and the office of vizier not defined,
nor an elaborate support system in place to help him
actualize his position, the Fatimids took this
institution from the Abbasids and tried to make it one of
the pillars of their administration. The vizierate as an
institution was to become a permanent feature of the
Islamic state, so that even "the term vezir has come to
be internationally accepted in the sense of prime
minister with unrestricted powers in an oriental
government."[1] The Abbasid caliphs wanted to spread their
da'wah at the beginning of their caliphate but could not
handle all affairs of state themselves; therefore, they
delegated certain executive powers to their
representatives or wazīrs. The Fatimids followed this
Abbasid practice.

---

1 S.D. Goitein, "The Origin of the Vizierate and Its
True Character," Islamic Culture, 16 (1942): 255.

Although the Fatimids' dream was to actualize "the perfect 'Alid theocratic state"[2] through the absolute rule of the caliph, who was called the "substitute for God on earth" (qā'im maqām Allāh), the caliph-imāms could not achieve such a theocracy without delegating some power to their viziers. In speaking about the authority of the imām, al-Kirmānī emphasizes his role as an absolute ruler who should avoid division of power:

> The Imām constitutes the 'heart' of this Divine
> Politeia [of the caliphate], because in the same
> manner that the organs of the human body are
> subservient to the heart, the seat of inspira-
> tion and life, so also in politics should the
> affairs of man be commanded by an Imām, who is
> the light of God, having absolute authority and
> avoiding a division of power.[3]

Al-Kirmānī finds himself recommending that the imām be the all-encompassing ruler of the Muslim world and

---

2 P.J. Vatikiotis, "A Reconstruction of the Fatimid Theory of the State," Islamic Culture, 28 (1954): 399.

3 Ibid., p. 408, quoting and translating Hamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-'aql, ed. Muḥammad Kāmil Ḥusayn and Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ramaḍān (Cairo: n.p., 1953), pp. 214-215.

eventually of the universe, without having any division
or delegation of power, a task which was not within the
realm of possibility. Caught in this dilemma, al-Kirmānī
goes on to say that "there are no delegated powers or
offices in the state, only executive functions
subordinated to the Imām's absolute theocratic
authority."[4] For al-Kirmānī, there are four pillars of
the polity: "Imām; the king; his Wazīr, and agents of the
minister; and the subjects."[5] Thus, the vizier was
conceded an important position in the political life of
the Fatimid caliphate: he was made a pillar of the
political administration. Fatimid political theory, as
articulated by al-Kirmānī, gave the viziers limited
power, yet some viziers had much more influence and
authority than others. It would appear that everything
depended on the personality of these individuals and that
of their respective caliphs. Fatimid practices,
therefore, did not fit Fatimid theory. For example, how
was the Fatimid vizierate different from the Abbasid
model and from al-Kirmānī's model? Did the Fatimid

---

4 Quoted in Vatikiotis, "A Reconstruction," p. 408.

5 Ibid., p. 408, citing al-Kirmānī, p. 214.

vizier fit into al-Kirmānī's theory of the theocratic
state?

Although al-Kirmānī's theory of government was
supposed to be the best model for the theocratic Fatimid
state, the Fatimid caliphs and their advisors were very
pragmatic and knew that such a plan could never work.
Their first concern was to consolidate their power,
subdue their enemies, and maintain their grip over Egypt
and Syria. For them, proselytization and the spread of
the Ismā'īlī da'wah were secondary to actual political
hegemony over the land. Although "Fatimism as a
political creed would never have succeeded without a
religious creed,"[6] the Fatimids were also aware of the
Egyptians' resistance to their rule as an alien house and
a non-orthodox one; so to force them to convert or to
fight would have caused a great many wars and upheavals
which the Fatimids wanted to avoid. To Qāḍī al-Nu'mān,
the "primary political objective is the removal of
oppression and injustice by the overthrow of existing
political authority."[7] After all the Fatimids' success

---

6 P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Syncretic Origins of the
Fatimid Da'wa," Islamic Culture, 28 (1954): 488.

7 P.J. Vatikiotis, "A Reconstruction," p. 405.

was based on the fact that they were liberators of their subjects from "political and social disorder, economic disequilibrium and moral misery."[8]

The Fatimids built their administration as a parallel institution to their da'wah, a situation which al-Kirmānī found unacceptable. For him, politics had to "comply with the da'wah for the establishment of proper order.[9] This is no different than the concept of an Islamic government where "the caliphate represented the political and the religious leadership of the community of Muslims, individual believers and subjects belonged to a polity defined by religious allegiance."[10] Furthermore political institutions and religious communities developed independently of each other and the 'Golden Age' of the ideal Muslim society was very short-lived. The frustration shown by al-Kirmānī because of the abandonment of the Muslim concept of the state is clearly shown in his work. He wanted to recreate the perfect

---

8 P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Syncretic Origins," p. 489.

9 P.J. Vatikiotis, "A Reconstruction," p. 408.

10 Ira Lapidus, "Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society," IJMES, 6 (1975): 363.

Islamic state which, in the fourth century hijra, became

impossible. Although the ideal caliphate was supposed to

be the best and highest form of government, and its laws

were divine, the "historical caliphate" fell short of the

ideal. The Fatimids realized that and consciously or

unconsciously practiced a separation of state and

religion, leaving the Ismā'īlī da'wah and the Fatimid

administration separate but parallel institutions.

The Fatimid caliph was different from any other

caliph because he was the imām and he partook of divine

attributes. This explains why al-Kirmānī felt it

necessary for the imām to be the absolute ruler with no

delegation of powers. Von Grunebaum described the

Fatimid caliph as having "no human contemporary who would

be his equal - not merely in respect of rank but of

substance. There is thus no power to whom he could

possibly be beholden."[11] As such he was ḥujjat Allāh

'alā al-arḍ (God's proof on earth), the living testimony

of the existence of God. Not only was the caliph the

head of the sect but also of the state; so how could

there be any separation of state and religion such a

---

11 Gustav von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid
Achievement," Proceedings, p. 207.

case. One might argue that the Fatimid caliphs
consciously saw to it that state and religion were
separated. One might also speculate that they practiced
such a separation because if they linked both together,
in the event that the caliphate collapsed, their religion
or da'wah would also disappear with it.

When the Fatimids took over Egypt, they were faced
with the task of building a centralized administration
capable of controlling the newly-acquired territories.
One could assume that their hierarchical bureaucracy was
modelled after their da'wah, which was highly stratified.
The Fatimid da'wah was kept separate from the state
because the da'wah predated the state and was meant to
post-date it. As Samuel Stern put it, "The Ismā'īlī
activity [inside] and outside the Fatimid state was the
direct continuation of the missionary activity in the
third century A.H. which resulted in the establishment of
the state."[12] As such the Fatimids did not want to
contain the da'wah within the boundaries of their
administrative apparatus but to let it run in accordance
with its organization. The Fatimids did not offer to

---

[12] Samuel Stern, "Cairo as the Center of the Ismā'īlī
da'wa," Proceedings, p. 446.

incorporate the 'ulama into the administrative system. The dā'īs were not a bureaucratic cadre, nor were they salaried personnel in the administration. The da'wah remained independently run without having to be limited by the confines of a bureaucracy. What the Fatimids actually achieved was to keep the civil administrative system running parallel to their religious system or da'wah, converging and meeting only at the level of the imām. In Bernard Lewis's words, the imām "was an emperor and king of his vast domain, yet outside the boundaries of his empire he was a shepherd of the da'wa and its chief proselytizer."[13] The imām kept this "double apparatus both coordinate and apart, with the result that the 'party organization' long survived Fatimid rule on the Nile."[14]

In his article, "An Interpretation of Fatimid History," Bernard Lewis included "the mission" or da'wa as a "third branch of government" alongside the two well-

---

13 Bernard Lewis, "Ra'y fī tafsīr tārīkh al-Fāṭimiyyīn," Abhāth al-nadwa al-duwaliyyah li-tārīkh al-Qāhirah, 1969 (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1970), I, 290.

14 Von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement," Proceedings, p. 207.

known pillars of the state, the armed forces and the
civil bureaucracy:

> The Fatimids organized [the da'wah] into a third
> branch of government, with its own functions,
> structure, and hierarchy, under the direction of
> the Chief Missionary and the ultimate authority
> of the Caliph in his capacity as Imām. The
> Fatimids thus created something previously unknown
> to Islam - an institutional Church.[15]

According to Lewis, the Fatimids organized the da'wah and
made it part and parcel of the government, a hypothesis
which Stern and von Grunebaum among others cannot accept.
Von Grunebaum argued that the state offered the sect (the
Ismā'īlīs) the backing of a great power which made the
da'wah more effective abroad; within the confines of
Egypt it gave them the freedom to develop their
organization. But, as he went on to say, "the sect
structure did not coincide with that of the state [nor
could] the missionaries and their hierarchy... be
identified as functionaries of the Egyptian state,"[16] as

---

15 Bernard Lewis, "An Interpretation of Fatimid
History," Proceedings, p. 290.

16 Von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid
Achievement," Proceedings, p. 207.

Bernard Lewis seemed to suggest. Stern, on the other
hand, reaffirms von Grunebaum by stating that although
"Egypt was the center of Ismāʻīlī propaganda the exact
organization of this propaganda remains somewhat
obscure."[17] Furthermore, the evidence for the mission's
relationship between the center and the provinces is
sketchy, which makes for a rather uneven picture. Apart
from occasional mentions by al-Qāḍī al-Nuʻmān of
religious emissaries arriving at the Fatimid court in
Africa, or al-Mustanṣir's letters to the du'āt of Yemen
under the Ṣulayhids, one would be at a loss to know how
much communication there was between the center and the
periphery of the da'wah.

Thus to assume that the Fatimids organized the
da'wah after it had been already in existence for a
century, and after it had facilitated the creation of the
caliphate, is an overstatement of their mission. The
Fatimids followed a conscious policy of keeping religious
matters separate from administrative ones, at least once
they arrived in Egypt. When Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī took over
Egypt from Ikhshīdīs, his primary pre-occupation was to

---

17   Samuel Stern, "Cairo as the Center of the Isma'ili
Movement," Proceedings, p. 446.

establish for the Fatimids a lasting rule over the land.
He was quick to recognize that the Fatimids could not and
should not impose their religious beliefs on the
Egyptians. All they could hope for was the conversion of
many of the inhabitants to Ismā'īlism, which treated the
indigenous population tolerantly. Upon his arrival in
Egypt, Jawhar saw that it was more expedient to leave the
judicial authority in the hands of a Sunni judge, Abū al-
Ṭāhir, who had been the chief judge of Egypt representing
the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad and who now continued as
qāḍī'l-quḍāt.[18] This decision seems to indicate that the
Fatimids were conscious that if they imposed their
religion by pursuing an active policy of Isma'ilisation,
whether in the civil administration or otherwise, their
rule over Egypt might prove impossible. Faced with the
dilemma of imposing their religion on the indigenous
population or actually looking after their political
interests as rulers, the Fatimids opted for the latter.
Their mission was to spread their da'wah but not at the
price of creating resistance to and rebellion against
their rule. The Fatimid caliphs were known to come down

---

18 Al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, I, 137.

hard on extremists within their own community in order to consolidate their own power; a case in point is the ousting by the caliph al-Ḥākim of "the extremists who were responsible for the establishment of the Druze community."[19]

The Fatimid civil administration was conceived by Yaʿqūb ibn Killis, who with the help of al-Ṣiqillī was able to create a form of government which was bent on recruiting its employees from the indigenous population, both Coptic Christian and Sunni Muslim. There was a conscious effort by the architects of the new administration to be non-sectarian and to leave the da'wah in the hands of the du'āt in order to avoid confrontation with the Egyptians. The Fatimids did not want to force their religious ideology on the Egyptians and were cautious to avoid resistance to their rule and to their efforts to consolidate their grip on the country. They followed literally the ḥadīth, Lā ikrāh fī al-dīn, "No compulsion in religion." This did not mean, however, that the caliph could not profess his Ismāʿīlism nor that the state was not a Fatimid one. But it did

---

19 Von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement," Proceedings, p. 206.

mean that the da'wah remained secret and underground rather than an open activity.

Government positions were open to those who best served the state regardless of their religious affiliation. The Fatimids were known for their tolerance towards their subjects. The Ismā'īlī-leaning Ikhwān al-Safā' expressed this tolerance eloquently: "It befits our brothers that they should not show hostility to any kind of knowledge or reject any book. Nor should they be fanatical in any doctrine, for our opinion and our doctrine embrace all doctrines and presume all knowledge."[20] If the Fatimids adopted even partially this idea, it would explain a great deal their ability to staff their government to the highest levels with non-Ismā'īlīs If the da'wah and the state had been one, the bureaucracy would have been manned mainly by adherents of the Ismā'īlī faith. Qāḍī al-Nu'mān described the political objective of the Fatimid caliphate as "the removal of oppression and injustice by the overthrow of

---

20 S.M. Stern, citing the Ikhwān al-Safā', in Studies in Early Isma'ilism (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 1983), p. 86.

existing political authority."[21] After all, Fatimid

success was based on the fact that they were liberators

of their subjects from "political and social disorder,

economic disequilibrium and moral misery."[22] Unlike

Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān did not feel

threatened by the separation of state and religion. Al-

Kirmānī, writing during the time of the sixth Fatimid

caliph, al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allah (reigned 996-1021), felt it

necessary to emphasize the role of the imām as an

absolute ruler who should avoid division of power. Al-

Kirmānī did not believe in delegating power or office in

the state. He felt that the power vested in the viziers

and in the highest officials far exceeded the definition

of the theocratic state. It is because al-Kirmānī

observed the division between the civil administration

and the da'wah that he tried to reform the state and set

it on its course as ideally conceived. For al-Kirmānī,

as mentioned previously, politics had "to comply with the

da'wah for the establishment of proper order."[23] But

---

21 P.J. Vatikiotis, "A Reconstruction of the Fatimid
Theory of State," p. 399.

22 P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Syncretic Origins," p. 488.

23 P.J. Vatikiotis, "A Reconstruction," p. 408.

the Fatimid caliphs and their advisers were pragmatic and
knew that this would have never been possible. Their
concern was to maintain their grip over Egypt and Syria.
For them, proselytization and the spread of the da'wah
were secondary to actual political hegemony over the
land. Although "Fatimism as a political creed would
never have succeeded without a religious creed,"[24] the
Fatimids were willing to part company with the da'wah to
keep the civil administration separate from the religious
mission and to rule as both imāms and, in effect,
emperors.

By way of comparison, the Sulayhid Queen of Yemen
followed the same policy as the Fatimids in separating
the state and the da'wah towards the end of her rule, for
she had seen that her power was dwindling and that for
the da'wah to continue in the Yemen, she would have to
opt for such a division.[25]

The Fatimids were aware that the Isma'ili da'wah
helped bring about their caliphate. They were also aware

---

24 P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Syncretic Origins," p. 488.

25 Ḥusayn ibn Fayḍ Allāh al-Ḥamdānī and Ḥusayn
Sulaymān Maḥmūd, Al-Ṣulayḥiyyūn wa'l-ḥarakah al-Fāṭimiyyah
fī'l-Yaman (Cairo: Maktabat Miṣr, 1305/1890), p. 180.

that the da'wah should continue regardless of what
happened to the caliphate. In recognizing that the
da'wah should not be tied down to one particular place or
government, the Fatimids were able to separate the civil
administration from the religious one. This kind of
separation served as a sort of open policy in recruiting
viziers. The personal convictions of viziers were
generally of no concern to the caliphs, as long as these
men were capable of handling the affairs of the
caliphate.

The elite group of viziers studied here had a
standard of ideal behavior set by the theoreticians of
the era, such as al-Māwardī.[26] They were expected to
fulfill certain obligations and functions. They were
also given privileges and prerogatives of men in the
highest administrative offices of the caliphate. THe
viziers were supposed to be men of the highest integrity.
They were commanded to be just, to be charitable, and to
know God. They were to live by and practice justice in
their ways, speech, and conduct, even with their enemies.
They were to be calm, composed, and not be angered by the

---

26 Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Māwardī, Adab al-wazīr (Cairo:
Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1929).

slightest provocation. They were to be straightforward, know when to joke and when to be serious, where and in the presence of whom. Seriousness was an asset and a necessary quality for a vizier to rule his people. Honesty, frankness, and straight-forwardness were equally important characteristics.

The functions of the vizier were many, but his most important duty was to be the caliph's own man. The caliph placed all trust in him. The latter knew the intricate turnings of Dār al-Khilāfah. He guarded its secrets with his life. As to the degree of administrative and political power that the vizier enjoyed, they depended entirely on the kind of vizierate bestowed upon him by the caliph. There were two kinds of vizierate. As we shall see in the sources cited below, the first was called wizārat al-tanfīdh, in which the vizier only executed the wishes of the caliph rather than initiate any moves of his own. This kind of vizierate existed mainly in the early days of the Fatimid caliphate. It was distinguished from wizārat al-tafwīḍ, in which the vizier was given the power to initiate, if he deemed it necessary, any reforms to insure the smooth functioning of the state, from levying taxes to going to

war. This latter is the same as <u>wizārat</u> <u>al-sayf</u> <u>wa'l-</u>
<u>qalam</u>, a vizierate of "the sword and the pen." Such a
vizierate also gave the holder full control over the
treasury (the <u>bayt</u> <u>al-māl</u>) and the mint.

Al-Māwardī summarizes the duties and prerogatives of
<u>wizārat</u> <u>al-tanfīdh</u> as follows. First,

> [the vizier should be] the mediator between
> the king and his subjects, because the king
> is glorified and set aside from the eyes of
> his people. He is also protected from the
> practice of direct correspondence or discourse
> [with his <u>ra'iyyah</u>] and that is why he chooses
> to have a delegate or grand vizier [<u>wazīr</u>
> <u>mu'azzam</u>].[27]

This kind of ministry entailed different levels of
mediation, such as mediation between the king and his
army; between the king and his agents [<u>'ummāl</u>], which
category included heads of bureaus and all the employees
of the state; and, finally, between the king and his
subjects. A ministry of this kind protected the rights
of the king in matters of private wealth and the
collection of taxes, etc. The vizier was given the task
of choosing the employees and supervising their work.

---

27 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 37.

Second, according to al-Māwardī,

> the vizier should give the king his sound opin-
> ion, advice, and counsel, for the king although
> endowed with unerring judgement and clear de-
> liberation is secluded [because of his lofty
> position] from pursuing these matters [i.e.,
> mundane affairs]. Knowledge by experience is
> concealed from him. That is why the king needs
> a well-rounded and respected man with knowledge
> and experience to deliberate for him.[28]

In this respect the duties of the vizier are many: he
should provide counsel, help the king formulate his
opinion, and, if the king is wrong, protect him from
erring and from oppressing the ra'iyyah. The opinion of
the "chosen man" (the vizier) should be devoid of
personal favoritism.

Third, al-Māwardī says that

> the vizier should be the king's wandering eye
> and his listening ear. He should describe
> what he sees in detail and without any distor-
> tion. He should also tell all the truth with
> no exception, for he is an equal in kingship
> and power with the king. He is chosen to be
> especially close, and he is appointed to the
> highest administrative office. In return he

---

28 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

is expected to take care of the affairs of his king.[29]

He should discuss with the king matters pertaining to policy, keep him informed about what takes place, be in a position to distinguish among the important issues, and to take care of more pressing problems promptly, while not shelving the less important ones and dealing with them in due time.[30]

Fourth, the vizier should "offer up his comfort and ease for his king. He should protect him by defending his name against those who put him down. He is never absent even if allowed to be, and he does not despair if he is made to repeat [a task]."[31]

As for wizārat al-tafwīḍ, which combines the power of the pen and the sword, al-Māwardī described it as

> a vizierate in which [the vizier] takes hold of
> management, planning, economy, military, organiza-
> tion and direction [of affairs of the kingdom].
> He is the one who write contracts and breaks them.
> He is the one who appoints and who dismisses those

---

29 Ibid., p. 41.

30 Ibid., p. 41.

31 Ibid., p. 42.

in power.[32]

The conditions or the duties of <u>wazīr al-tafwīḍ</u> are four. First, he should implement the orders of the king whereby if the vizier thinks the order should be modified, he should act to ensure its modification; if it is adequate, it should be implemented immediately. He should then carry out his plans in order to run the kingdom effectively, informing the king of every plan he has. He should also see to it that his agents execute the tasks assigned them. In all he does, he should keep in mind the wishes of the people (<u>al-ra'iyyah</u>). Second, he should attend to the defense of the kingdom by defending the king from his relatives, friends, supporters, and foes; and by defending the kingdom against the enemy. Then he should attend to his personal defense; and finally he should defend the populace from being abused by their king. Third, fearlessness, enterprise, initiative, and courage in politics are the job's most important conditions. Fourth, cautiousness (<u>al-ḥadar</u>), alertness, and circumspection are prerequisites in this position. In order for the vizier to run the affairs of

---

32 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 10.

the kingdom smoothly, he should be careful and cautious, but not to the point of becoming weak and spiritless.[33]

After having discussed the duties and prerogatives of both kinds of vizierates, al-Māwardī summarizes the differences between them as follows:

> 1. The king gives power to wazīr al-tafwīḍ to safeguard his rights and the rights of his ra'iyyah while the wazīr al-tanfīdh is given direct orders from the king. 2. There is no contract for wazīr al-tafwīḍ, while for the tanfīdh there is a specific contract by which the vizier is made an official of the king.
> 3. The wazīr al-tafwīḍ is bound by his signature whereas wazīr al-tanfīdh is not responsible for any orders because they emanate from the king.
> 4. The wazīr al-tafwīḍ can be discharged from his office by simple utterance of the phrase [by the king], whereas the wazīr al-tanfīdh is discharged by a "truce" in which severance pay is given because he is the king's employee [ma'mūr].
> 5. The wazīr al-tafwīḍ leaves office by resigning from his position and returning all tasks pertaining to the administration back to the king; whereas if the wazīr al-tanfīdh wishes to resign, he has no attachments and can do so of his own will.
> 6. The wizārat al-tafwīḍ is a combination of both

---

33 Ibid., pp. 10-21 passim.

military and administrative ministry [with all powers vested in both], while _wizārat_ _al-tanfīdh_ does not have any of these powers.[34]

The theoretical vizierate was in several respects very different from the Fatimid experience. Many viziers exercised bad leadership, lacked knowledge of affairs of state, or indulged themselves with intrigues. Even worse, some viziers worked to promote themselves over the interests of the _ra'iyyah_ and the caliphate. Those who came close to al-Māwardī's description, or to al-Kirmānī's, were few and far between. Probably no human being could attain the degree of perfection that both theoreticians would have preferred. The rigid criteria by which al-Māwardī wanted to measure the viziers remained an ideal that few could realize. The next chapter will consider the salient characteristics of the sixty viziers who served the Fatimid caliphs and will study three of them in order to determine how closely Fatimid practice followed Fatimid theory.

---

34 _Ibid._, p. 43.

CHAPTER THREE

THE VIZIERATE IN PRACTICE:

A CAREER-LINE ANALYSIS AND THREE CASE STUDIES

We have already seen the resemblances and differences between the Abbasid and Fatimid vizierate, but many questions remain concerning the latter. How, for example, did it fit into al-Kirmānī's theory of the theocratic state? Did it help the Fatimids build an administration which was the most hierarchical of its time? Were the viziers as an elite group effective in mobilizing the ra'iyyah as has been suggested? Did they form a cohesive unit - as far as their backgrounds, their administrative experience, social, political and religious - which gave the Fatimid caliphate a sense of continuity?

The method that will be pursued here in studying the vizierate and the role of the viziers in the Fatimid caliphate is prosopographical. As described by Lawrence Stone, "prosopography is the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in

history by means of a collective study of their lives."[1]
This method constitutes a basis for answering questions
relating to "birth, death, marriage and family, social
origins and inherited economic position, place of
residence, education, amount and source of personal
wealth, occupation, religion, experience of office."[2]

Prosopographical study, the data for which are
contained in Appendix Two, has yielded the following
results. Concerning duration of office, thirty-five
viziers were in office for a year or less, thirteen of
them served less than one month, twelve spent less than
one year, and ten one whole year in office. Seven
viziers spent two years in office; eight served three
years; and two viziers spent four years in office. Four
viziers served eight years, and four served more than
nine years in office.

As for geographic origins, the viziers came from
lands even outside the caliphate: fourteen Iraqis, nine
Egyptians, seven Armenians, six Maghribīs, six Shāmīs,
two Arabs (bedouins?), two Kurds, two Palestinians, two

---

1 Lawrence Stone, "Prosopography," Daedalus, 100
(Winter 1971): 46.

2 Ibid., p. 46.

Persians, one Libyan, one Sicilian, one Rūmī
(Anatolian?), and seven unknown.

In religious background there were fewer Ismā'īlī
viziers than all other religious groups combined: twenty-
nine non-Ismā'īlī to twenty-three Ismā'īlī viziers.
Among the non-Ismā'īlīs, there were seven Christians,
three Jews, eleven Sunnis, six Shi'is, one "Unitarian"
(tawhīdī, perhaps Druze?), one Muslim without a madhhab,
and eight unknown.

Professionally or occupationally, the majority of
viziers, forty of them, came from administrative
positions such as ru'asā' al-dawāwīn or kuttāb class.
Five were qādīs, two from the military, two merchants,
one "literary man" (adīb), one tribal leader, one court
guard, one spy, and one laborer. Six viziers were of
unknown professional or occupational background.

The viziers' socio-economic backgrounds fall into
the following categories: fifteen were very wealthy,
influential, and well-known in society; another fifteen
were wealthy but not as well known or as influential;
seven aristocrats (amīrs and tribal shaykhs); three
religious men of whom two were from very well-known and
wealthy families; six from what one would today term the

middle class; three freed slaves; two slaves; one eunuch; one peasant; one sayyid; and six unknown. The criteria by which the contemporary sources chose to designate the viziers depended on their families' social standing and their wealth, measured by how much money they had, their ownership of beasts of burden, of slaves, and of concubines, their ownership of farms, and the extended families' prestige and holdings. For some of the viziers, chroniclers such as Ibn Muyassar in Akhbār Miṣr and Ibn al-Ṣayrafī in Al-Ishārah ilā man nāla al-wizārah, furnish such information.[3] If one were to superimpose a twentieth-century categorization on the viziers' class backgrounds, one would find that twenty-five belonged to the upper class; twenty-one belonged to the middle class (including fifteen from the upper-middle and six from the middle-middle classes); and seven belonged to the lower

---

3 For example, Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, in his biography of Yaḥyā ibn al-Mudabbar, the vizier of al-Mustanṣir, introduces him as follows: "This vizier was of a famous family in the Abbasid state; historical works have included information about his ancestors." In describing Abu Shujā‘ Muḥammad ibn al-Ashraf, Ibn al-Ṣayrafī has this to say: "He was generous and well to do, as is mentioned in the histories." Al-Ishārah, pp. 41, 53.

classes. Despite the Fatimids' efforts to recruit qualified viziers regardless of background, those who attained the office tended to come from the better-educated and more affluent classes.

Violence was the norm by which the viziers departed from this world, twenty-eight of them falling victim to conspiracies, jealousies, rivalries, etc. Nineteen died natural deaths. As for the rest, thirteen in all, no cause of death is recorded.

Although heirs to different political traditions, the Fatimid viziers served their caliphs within the framework of the new administration created by their masters and tailored for their own purposes of government. With few exceptions (such as al-Afḍal, the vizier of the caliph al-Āmir), they worked within the confines of the bureaucracy. Because the majority came from the scribal class, they were well versed in the art of government and capable of becoming pillars of the administration. In speaking of the Fatimid system in these words: "Given the perfection of [its] centralized administrative machine that would continue in large measure to work with fair effectiveness regardless of the

directing hand,"[4] Von Grunebaum seems to suggest that the Fatimid system was somehow immune to disintegration if the viziers were not competent, a partially true statement. The Fatimid administrative apparatus was structured to take into account the differences between one vizier and another and still be effective; yet no system functions to its full capacity if the management is defective.

Social and geographical mobility were welcomed by the Fatimids. Freed slaves or noblemen were treated alike by the caliphs, who gave them equally honorific titles. When Abū Najm Badr al-Jamālī al-Mustanṣirī, a slave of the caliphate (min mamālīk al-dawlah), worked his way up the ladder and became the vizier of al-Mustanṣir, he was given the title of al-sayyid al-ajall, amīr al-juyūsh, sayf al-Islām, nāṣir al-imām. The title given by the same caliph to one of the most celebrated Fatimid viziers, Sa'īd ibn Mas'ūd, was 'amīd al-mulk zayn al-kufāt, much less honorific than that given to a slave. The Fatimids were after competence and know-how. They wanted trustworthy individuals with insight and

---

4 Von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement," Proceedings, p. 200.

experience in bureaucracy to insure a smooth-running government. The Fatimids' lack of rigidity, in other terms their policy of non-discrimination towards religious minorities, non-natives, and lower classes, encouraged those seeking the second-highest office of state to prove themselves as excellent administrators and to be rewarded by selection to the vizierate.

Some would argue that this policy towards aliens, non-Ismāʿīlīs, and those of humble background, was due to the Fatimids' conviction that those men would serve the state with all honesty, integrity, and with no intention of creating problems for the caliph. This conviction might have been partially true, but the Fatimids solemnly believed that they were in power to relieve Muslims of the intolerance of other dynasties, to wipe out famine, and to remedy the ills that had afflicted the ummah.

As previously discussed, the Fatimids had the majority of their viziers as "alien residents" (ʿābir ṭarīq or gharīb), which could have been considered a liability, especially if the viziers' allegiance was to their place of birth. In many instances, that birthplace would have been either under the rule of the Abbasid caliphs, the Seljuk sultans, or some other dynasty in the

eastern Mediterranean. Many of the "alien resident" viziers were descendants of bureaucrats who had served those dynasties. This background, instead of being a liability, was a ticket for them to become administrators and eventually to become viziers in the Fatimid caliphate.

On the whole, Fatimid viziers had a great say in running affairs of state, with the exceptions of the majority of the viziers of the caliph al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh (reigned 386-411 /996-1021). The majority of viziers were wuzarā' tafwīd, rather than wuzarā' tanfīdh, and they ran the government single-handedly. Al-Suyūṭī suggests a different viewpoint in Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah: that this situation in part was due to a lack of ability on the caliphs' part from al-Mustanṣir on to maintain total control. Much of the power was in the hands of the viziers, as had been the case with the later Abbasids.[5]

---

5 Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah fī akhbār Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah, London, British Library, MS 23,332, fol 113r. 'Abd Allāh al-Sharqāwī, Tuḥfat al-nāẓirīn fī-man wulliya Miṣr min al-wulāt wa'l-salāṭīn (Miṣr: n.p., 1864), p. 47. If the Fatimids were unable to control their realms, nor able to govern, how can

Many of the caliphs did not abdicate all their responsibilities in administering their realm in favor of their viziers. Had they done that (as the Abbasids had before them) the caliphs would not have been able to fire their viziers at will or even to dispose of them in a harsher manner. Moreover, dynastic succession of viziers did not occur. The caliphs from al-Mustanṣir onward were willing to give viziers more power, because in many instances the caliphs themselves were not charismatic characters or able persons who could have dictated their terms to the ra'iyyah. Moreover, many of the later caliphs were far too young (not having attained their majority) to be able to handle government business. Therefore, many of the tafwīḍ viziers were given honorific titles indicative of their enhanced power.[6]

5(...continued)
one explain al-Ḥāfiẓ's dismissing his vizier and ruling as the only administrator? "Al-Ḥāfiẓ killed Riḍwān [his vizier] and did not appoint another after him; he directed affairs himself until he died." See 'Imād al-Dīn Abū'l-Fidā', Al-Mukhtaṣar fī tārīkh al-bashar (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifah, 1972), III, 12.

6 As an example of titles given to tafwīḍ viziers, one could choose Badr al-Jamālī (466-488/1073-1095) and his

Many other viziers with such titles, however, had little
influence on the bureaucracy or with the people.[7] But,
on the whole, one could attribute the government's
functioning, or lack of it, to this elite group, the
tafwīd viziers. They pulled the levers, although the
last word in many cases rested with the caliph, who more
often than not took their recommendations and acted on
them without any modification or amendment.

6(...continued)
son. Badr's titles were: al-sayyid al-ajall, amīn al-
juyūsh, sayf al-Islām, nāṣir al-imām. Badr's son al-Afḍal's
titles (487-515/1094-1121) were: shāhinṣah al-sayyid al-
ajall, al-afḍal, sayf al-Islām, jalāl al-Islām, sharaf al-
ānām, nāṣir al-dīn, khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn. These two
viziers were in office for twenty years each.

7 As for honorific titles given to viziers during the
caliphate of al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh or of al-Mustanṣir, such
viziers ruled for very short intervals and did not influence
events or contribute to the running of the caliphate. To
mention but a few as examples: the vizier of al-Mustanṣir,
Abū Ḥasan Ṭāhir ibn Wazīr (458 A.H.) was entitled al-ajall,
al-wajīh, sayyid al-kufāt, nafīs al-dawlah, ẓahīr amīr al-
mu'minīn. He was in power for a few days. So was his
contemporary, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Abī Ḥamd, who
spent one day as vizier and was given the title: al-qādir
al-'ādil, shams al-umam, sayyid ru'asā' al-sayf wa'l-qalam,
tāj al-'ulā, 'amīd al-hudā, sharaf al-dīn ghayyāth al-Islām
wa'l-Muslimīn, ḥamīm amīr al-mu'minīn wa ẓahīruh.

Although the Fatimids had a variety of viziers from different backgrounds, administrative experience, and social, political, and religious affiliations, they were to a certain extent a cohesive unit, as far as their ability to run the administration within the boundaries or set norms of Fatimid bureaucratic practice. That practice had been created by Ibn Killis with the help of Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī and their entourages. As far as mobilization of the ra'iyyah to support the system, the Fatimid viziers were successful. Full-fledged insurrections against them were rare. An alien house, the Fatimids, with the majority of their ra'iyyah as non-Ismā'īlīs, had no opposition to their rule. As Goitein put it, the Fatimids "knew how to make friends and how to influence public opinion."[8] Moreover, the Fatimids allowed their ra'iyyah "freedom of speech and thought, because their political prestige was so great."[9]

The viziers on the whole helped to build the administration of the Fatimids as a unique experiment in bureaucratic organization because it was possible for

---

8 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I, 34.

9 Bayard Dodge, "Fatimid Hierarchy and Exegesis," Muslim World, 50 (1960): 132.

such men to experiment, to suggest, and to implement their ideas. The liberal spirit of the Fatimid period promoted talent and encouraged a spirit of innovation.[10] Concerning the viziers themselves, then, it is clear that Fatimid practice did not fit al-Kirmānī's theory of the theocratic state.

To demonstrate this divergence between theory and practice, the careers of three prominent viziers from three different periods of the Fatimid caliphate will be discussed. (Data on the fifty-seven other viziers may be found in Appendix One). The three viziers are: Ya'qūb ibn Killis, Bahrām al-Armanī, and Badr al-Jamālī. These men represented the Fatimid administration at its best. They all contributed to its uniqueness and effectiveness. And they built the bureaucracy and helped it develop into a model to be followed by other Islamic empires.

By far the most important figure to hold the vizierate was Ya'qūb ibn Killis, the architect of Fatimid administration. Ibn Killis was an Iraqi Jew of distinguished lineage.[11] It is noteworthy that all the

---

10 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I, 34.

11 Ibn Killis traced his ancestry to Aaron. The

information we have concerning him comes from Arab

historians; the Jewish sources of his time are silent.

As Fischel points out, "the shortage of Hebrew sources

may be responsible for this, and possibly his conversion

to Islam, as the result of which Jewish sources might

prefer to ignore him...."[12] Whatever the case, Ibn

Killis still maintained his close relationships with the

Jewish communities in both the Maghrib and Egypt. Ibn

Khallikān notes that Ibn Killis died a Jew (māta ʻalā

dīnih); in the same breath Ibn Khallikān disregards his

own remark and says: "He professed Islam, and it was true

that he converted to it, and that his Islam was a true

one."[13] Whether or not Ibn Killis was truly a Muslim is

11(...continued)
biographer Ibn Khallikān lists him under the name Abū'l-
Faraj Yaʻqūb ibn Yūsuf ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Hārūn ibn Dāwūd ibn
Killis. See Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʻyān, ed. Iḥsān
ʻAbbās , 8 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968-1972), VII, 27. He
is also said to have claimed descent from al-Ṣamawʼal, the
well-known pre-Islamic master of the fortress of al-Ablaq.
See Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 9th ed. (London:
Macmillan 1968), p. 107.

12 Walter J. Fischel, Jews in the Economic and
Political Life of Medieval Islam (New York: Ktav, 1969), p.
67.

13 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʻyān, VII, 34.

a matter for debate, for he helped many Jews attain positions in the Fatimid bureaucracy. Whether this was a matter of their being most qualified or whether he was playing favorites cannot be proven.

As a young man, Ya'qūb studied the art of writing and mathematics in Baghdad. After spending the first, formative part of his life there, he moved with his merchant father to Syria, where he set up his own business. His stay in Syria did not last very long and he then moved to Egypt in 331/942. There he worked as a currency exchange broker. Ibn al-Ṣayrafī describes him as an honest man who was loved by his co-workers and his clients alike.[14] At that time the Fatimids' immediate predecessors, the Ikhshīdīs, were the rulers of Egypt. Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī, impressed by Ya'qūb's honesty and intelligence, invited him to join his court. At the court Ya'qūb worked very hard to win Kāfūr's trust, which he soon attained. He thus became sole organizer of the court's expenditures. Kāfūr became more and more dependent on Ibn Killis and thought of giving him full authority over the realm as a vizier. But Kāfūr was

---

14   Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, <u>Al-Ishārah</u>, p. 91.

unable to make this appointment because Ibn Killis was not a Muslim.[15] Upon learning that, Ibn Killis decided to convert. He became a Muslim on Monday, 18 Sha'bān, 356/966.[16] He then took up the study of the Qur'ān and of Arabic grammar, in which he became very well versed. He served in Kāfūr's court until the latter died. Because of Ibn Killis's preferred status at Kāfūr's court, Ibn al-Furāt, who was the number one man during the Ikhshīdī era up until the rise of Ibn Killis, made it impossible for the latter to stay at court. He even imprisoned him, but Ibn Killis bought his freedom and travelled to the Maghrib, where he joined the Jewish community. There is no evidence that he apostatized from Islam, a capital offense in Islamic jurisprudence.[17]

---

15 A non-Muslim was not allowed to become a vizier because one of the vizier's duties was to stand at the minbar during Friday prayers, a practice which a non-Muslim could not carry out. This was an important duty, for every Friday the oath of allegiance to the state was taken by the ra'iyyah.

16 Ibn Khallikan, Wafayāt al-a'yān, VII, 28; Ibn al-Sayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 92, provides the date.

17 Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, Mir'āt al-zamān, Volume IV (358-400 A.H.), Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5866, fol 127r.

While in the Maghrib, he joined the administration of the
Fatimid caliph al-Mu'izz in 363/973. With al-Mu'izz he
moved to Egypt, where he was entrusted, along with 'Aslūj
ibn al-Ḥasan, with the kharāj and the collection of all
other taxes: al-ḥisbah, al-mawārīth, al-aḫbās, al-
shurṭatayn, al-sawāḥil, and al-jawālī.[18] This was the
time when he introduced his equitable taxation method.
He also handled the budget and the salaries of all state
personnel.

In his new capacity as a tax collector, Ibn Killis
and his colleague introduced a new Egyptian currency
which made any payment with the previously used Raḍī
dinar equivalent to seventy-five per cent of the newly-
coined dinar, called al-Mu'izzī.[19] In making tax

---

18   Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 144-145. It has been said
that whenever Ibn Killis went to a village in EGypt, he knew
by glancing at it how many people lived in it, how much
their income was, and how much tax they paid. He actually
ran a census of all the villages and instituted a
reassessment of the kharāj so that no-one would suffer
unduly. Cf. Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr,
ed. Henri Massé (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie,
1919), II, 45.

19   Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 146: "Ya'qūb and 'Aslūj
(continued...)

payments, people lost on the exchange, which was tantamount to a devaluation, while officials thereby replenished the coffers of the depleted bayt al-māl. The government collected taxes without accepting any delays or barter or hawālah (letter of credit). Cash on the spot was the way Ibn Killis ran the affairs of the new regime in Egypt. It is related by al-Maqrīzī and by Ibn Zulāq that in one day Ibn Killis collected 220,000 dinars in kharāj money from Damietta, Tinnīs, and Ashmonīn, only to be superseded by 'Alī ibn 'Amr al-'Addās during the caliphate of al-'Azīz.

Ibn Killis's strict policy of tax collection provided the Fatimids with a full treasury which was much needed in building a solid administration and in consolidating their rule over the newly-acquired territories. Al-Maqrīzī relates that al-'Azīz, when he was ready to fight Haftakīn, a general in Buyid service - this reference is to Haftakīn al-Turkī al-A'war, the slave of Mu'izz al-Dawlah ibn Buwayh al-Daylamī, who

---

19(...continued)
refused to accept the kharāj except in Mu'izzī dinars; thus the Radī dinar was devalued and in exchange transactions it lost one-fourth of its actual value. People lost on their liquid assets."

ruled al-Shām during the early part of al-'Azīz's caliphate[20] - his princes collected a tremendous amount of money to absorb the cost of the war. When al-'Azīz wanted to return the money to its donors because it exceeded by far the projected cost, Ibn Killis protested by saying that the treasury needed to be full for the future so that the caliph would not have to count on donations from his loyal followers; rather, he could wage war with no strings attached, as it would be financed by his own treasury.[21] Thus, al-'Azīz had to back down from returning the gifts and instead channeled them into the bayt al-māl.

Ibn Killis became ra'īs al-dawāwīn or head of the bureaus at a point in his career when he was already running the caliph al-Mu'izz's affairs from the latter's palace. A few years afterward, in Ramaḍān 368/978, he was given the title of al-wazīr al-ajall, the glorious vizier.[22] Ibn Killis outlived his master and was among

---

20 Jamāl al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah, ed. André Ferre (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1972), p. 31.

21 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 248.

22 Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 92.

the few who were privileged to know that his sovereign
had passed away before the news was officially announced
by the caliph's son; in fact, the vizier was present at
the death bed. He was then reappointed vizier by al-
'Azīz in the same year (368/978).[23] He thus became the
first vizier of the Fatimids in Egypt. According to Abū-
Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, Ibn Killis's vizierate was "a
substitute for a caliphate."[24] He was a vizier from
arbāb al-aqlām, and his power as unlimited as al-
Māwardī's wazīr al-tafwīḍ.

Ibn Killis was a learned man whose court was the
meeting place of lawyers, judges, linguists, and learned
men of the day. In fact, a historian and contemporary,
Ibn Zulāq 'Alī, referred to Ibn Killis as al-qāḍī al-
wazīr.[25] He must have had an education at the hands of
the 'ulamā' who frequented the court, thus entitling him
to be called qāḍī. He was also a faqīh of the Ismā'īlī

---

23 Muḥammad ibn Salāmah al-Quḍā'ī, Tārīkh al-Quḍā'ī,
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1491, fol 118v.

24 Quoted in Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 91:
wizāratuh niyābatan 'an khilāfah.

25 Ibn Zulāq, Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍā'iluhā, Paris,
Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1817, fol 41v.

rite and wrote several books, of which his <u>Al-Risālah al-wizāriyyah</u> was particularly widely read and was considered by the Fatimid propagandists (<u>dā'īs</u>) to be the best book for the interested layman.[26] Although a convert to Islam, he did much to help promote the Ismā'īlī cause. For example, it was to his credit that an Ismā'īlī mosque outside Bāb al-Futūḥ in Cairo was finished.

Ibn Killis was a man whose insight and brilliance made it possible for him to build a centralized government for the Fatimids. "In Egypt the Fatimids started their rule by setting up the most centralized and hierarchical administration ever known in Islam [up until then], [and] the architect of this elaborate plan was Ya'qūb b. Killis."[27] His most important contribution was

---

26 Al-Maqrīzī, <u>Itti'āẓ</u>, II, 175. Ibn Killis's work, which has not survived, is referred to by Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, <u>Al-Ishārah</u>, p. 91.

27 M.A. Sha'bān, <u>Islamic History, Volume II</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 199. A contemporary reference to Ibn Killis as the architect of the Fatimid administration is Muḥammad al-'Aynī, <u>Dawlat Banī'l-'Abbās wa al-Ṭulūniyyīn wa'l-Fāṭimiyyīn</u>, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5761, ff 172v-173r.

tax reform, especially of the <u>kharāj</u>. He went about his reforms by personally visiting every village and by calculating how much potentially each village could contribute to the coffers of the central government and by matching his figures with what the government was actually getting. Where the population had increased, he increased taxes, and where it had decreased, he lowered taxes, thus relieving hardships for peasants, allowing them to improve their lot and to become more productive. His skill as financier helped replenish the treasury after it had been drained by wars. He was not an extravagant man; he spent wisely, thus allowing for accumulation of capital, which was channelled to defense purposes if need be. Ibn Killis also had control over the expenditures of the army, and over recruitment and numbers.

Ibn Killis's power as a vizier was unlimited because of his personal ties as trusted advisor and friend of al-'Azīz. In many instances his word overruled that of the caliph himself.[28] Many critics of the Fatimids during

---

28 "It is said that the <u>wālī</u> of Ḥimṣ, Bakjūr, during al-'Azīz's caliphate, asked al-'Azīz to grant him the
(continued...)

the time of al-'Azīz did not hesitate to make their feelings known as to who ran the state. A poet who lived in Egypt, and who was a contemporary of al-'Azīz, Ibn Killis, and the army commander, Faḍl, articulated the dismay of many Egyptians at the power which Ibn Killis enjoyed:

> Become a Christian, for Christianity is the true religion,
>> For all the signs of our times point in this direction.
> So pronounce the Three in reverence and humility,
>> And drop those not in their company, for they are unacceptable.
> For Ya'qūb the vizier is the father, while al-'Azīz is the son, and the holy spirit is Faḍl.[29]

28(...continued)
wilāyah of Damascus. Al-'Azīz responded by installing him. But, when he went to inform the wālī of Ba'albak about his fortune, the latter refused him the office because of a letter that Ya'qūb ibn Killis had written to him, telling him to refuse Bakjūr for the position. Bakjūr was unable to assume his new office until Ibn Killis gave his blessing." Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 259.

29 Although the poem infuriated Ibn Killis, al-'Azīz pardoned the poet; but Ibn Killis, exercising his power as wazīr tafwīd, had him decapitated. Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, I, 298. The poem reads:

The power of Ibn Killis was such that many persons thought that it was he who was actually the ruler, and not the caliph. Al-Kirmānī's emphasis on and concern for the possibility that the caliph-imām not lose his authority as the man in command, as the one who should exercise absolute authority over his realm, with all of his assistants subordinate to him. Ibn Killis had become at least an equal to the caliph, if he did not exceed him in power. His creation and organization of many new bureaus merited him the title of architect of the Fatimid bureaucracy. His position was so strong that he was allowed to run the dīwāns from his own home rather than from the traditionally-accepted place for them, the caliph's palace. The employees of these administrative bureaus worked in his own home and under his supervision. He oversaw the day-to-day work mechanics of the bureaus and made sure that salaries paid were not wasted. Only

---

29(...continued)
Tanaṣṣar fa al-tanaṣṣur dīnu ḥaqqin.
'Alayhi zamānuna hādha yadullu.
Wa qul bi-thalāthatin 'izzu wa jallu
Wa 'aṭṭil mā siwāhum fa huwa 'iṭlu.
Fa Ya'qūbu al-wazīru abun, wa hādhā
Al-'Azīzu ibnun, wa rūḥu al-qudsī Faḍlu.

once, in 373/983, when Ibn Killis was thrown in prison for an alleged conspiracy which cost the life of a friend of the caliph, did al-'Azīz order the removal of the bureaus from Ibn Killis's home. They were then housed for a two-month period in the caliphal palace, their usual site, until Ibn Killis was reinstated.[30] Ibn Killis was also the first vizier to have his name appear with that of the caliph on the ṭarrāz or royal cloth which was spun for the use of the nobility by the official cloth-maker of the state.[31] No doubt his was a wizārat tafwīḍ, for he had the initiative in all affairs of government.[32] It is interesting to note that Ibn Killis, because of his ability as an administrator, was also given, for the first time, the honor of having his own letterhead, which read: "From Ya'qūb ibn Killis, vizier of amīr al-mu'minīn to so and so."[33] A letterhead

---

30 Ibn Killis was proven not guilty and was reinstated as vizier; the bureaus were returned to his own home.

31 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, I, 262.

32 Ḥamza ibn al-Qalānisī, Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq (Beirut: al-Maṭba'ah al-Yasū'iyyah, 1908), p. 32.

33 Ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah, p. 39.

might not be novel in this day and age, but it was surely
an innovation during Ibn Killis's time. One might also
argue that if Ya'qūb ibn Killis held court for all the
dīwāns, he should have had his own letterhead, which,
however, would have been unprecedented in a caliph's
court. Although many of his contemporaries begrudged Ibn
Killis his power and success, many historians who called
him a hypocrite did not fail to say that the affairs of
al-'Azīz's empire ran smoothly and correctly.[34]

Ibn Killis remained as vizier until his death in the
year 380/990. Even on his death-bed, he still had time
to advise his master, al-'Azīz: "O Commander of the
Faithful, keep peace with Byzantium, when they keep peace
with you; and keep the Hamdanids satisfied by constant
contact."[35] With the death of Ibn Killis, the Fatimids
lost a mastermind and a creator of an administrative

34 Ibid., p. 39.

35 Quoted in Abbas Hamdani, "Byzantine-Fatimid
Relations before the Battle of Manzikert," Byzantine
Studies, 1 (1974): 173.

system which was to outlive the Fatimid caliphate itself.[36]

Ibn Killis did not fit into al-Kirmānī's definition of a vizier in a theocratic state. In fact, it was viziers like him who had preceded al-Kirmānī who prompted the latter to write his treatise. As a devout Ismā'īlī theologian, he did not, for obvious reasons, want to see the power of the imām being delegated. Ibn Killis's vizierate was "a substitute for a caliphate."[37] The caliph not only delegated power but also gave him the authority to make major decisions, from waging war to changing the tax system. If al-Kirmānī's model had existed at the time of al-'Azīz and if it had been rigidly pursued and absolutely binding, Ibn Killis would not have had all this power, nor would he have been able to run the affairs of the caliphate without being checked by the caliph himself. He would not have been able to initiate any fiscal reforms, nor would he have been able to assume the responsibility for creating new dīwāns and for reorganizing the caliphate into new administrative

---

36 Al-'Aynī, Tārīkh dawlat banī'l-'Abbās, Paris MS arabe 5761, fol 173r.

37 Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 91.

units. Any such reforms would have had to emanate from
the caliph himself. The power to go to war if necessity
dictated it, according to al-Kirmānī's theory, should
only be vested in the caliph-imam, not the vizier, who in
the case of Ibn Killis continued to be considered a Jew
by the people, and not an Ismā'īlī.

Although al-'Azīz was a strong caliph, he chose to
delegate power to Ibn Killis. He gave him a delegated
ministry over the Fatimid realms, wizārat tafwīḍ, because
the Fatimids, upon moving their capital to Cairo, decided
that it would be impossible for them to rule such a vast
empire without sharing or delegating power to an
administrator of their choice, which in practice diverged
from al-Kirmānī's theory. In the case of Ibn Killis, the
Fatimid caliph al-Mu'izz and his son al-'Azīz chose the
right man for the job.

The reorganization of the administration was due to
Ibn Killis's efforts. He alone deserves the name he was
given as architect of the Fatimid bureaucracy. The chain
of command the responsibility for caliphal policies
rested in his hands. In turn he was responsible to the
caliph and took orders only from him. He issued commands
to the bureau chiefs and they in turn handed the orders

to the kuttāb and from the kuttāb to the hujjāb and to the lowest-ranking officials. This pyramid-like concept of administration made it the most hierarchical administration in the Muslim world then. In his capacity as qāḍī and vizier, Ibn Killis was in touch with the ra'iyyah, its aspirations and complaints, which were heard by him and by his bureau chiefs. The vizier in this respect was able to sway the masses of the populace, especially in rallying around the caliph and in defending the realm.

Ibn Killis was the man for his time, as was our second example, Badr al-Jamālī, whose vizierate occurred at a time when the future of the caliphate was in doubt. Abū Najm Badr al-Jamālī al-Mustanṣirī al-Ismā'īlī (d. 488/1095; vizier, 466-488/1073-1095) was born a slave to Jamāl al-Dawlah ibn 'Ammār. An Armenian by origin, Badr al-Jamālī was an ambitious young man who reached the highest office of state.[38] As a freed slave, he entered the service of the caliph in the army. He distinguished himself as a career officer and worked his way up until he was named commander-in-chief of the army. In this

---

38   Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 58.

position he introduced a new element into the army, the
Armenian contingent, which owed him its loyalty because
of his ethnic background. At its zenith, this contingent
numbered over 20,000 men. The new ethnic group was the
key element in Badr al-Jamālī's ability to control the
situation and re-establish peace and order in the realms
of the caliphate after 466/1073.

Although Badr al-Jamālī's Armenian contingent was
the reason for his success in re-establishing the peace,
the addition of one more ethnic group to the army created
problems for the Fatimids later on. Their army was
composed of Turks, Sudanese, Maghribīs, and
mercenaries.[39] Introducing the Armenians posed the risk

---

39 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, II, 311; Jere L. Bacharach,
"African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East,"
IJMES, 13 (1981): 486: "The most important change
[introduced by Badr al-Jamālī] was the use of large numbers
of Armenians for infantrymen." For further discussion of
the composition of the army during Badr al-Jamālī's time,
see M. Canard, "Notes sur les arméniens en Égypte à l'époque
fatimide," Annales de l'Institut d'études orientales, 13
(1955): 144; and Muḥammad Ḥamdī al-Manāwī, Al-Wizārah wa'l-
wuzarā' fī'l-'aṣr al-Fāṭimī (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970),
p. 179: "After Badr got rid of the bad elements in al-
Mustanṣir's army, the only contingent that was left was the

of adding the potential for internecine conflict among
the military contingents, which became a reality later in
the history of the Fatimid state.

Badr al-Jamālī's distinguished career as a commander
of the army was matched by his administrative one. He
was the governor of Damascus in 454/1062.[40] His
governorship of that area did not last more than two
years, due to a revolt against his strict application of
the law. This episode did not by any means end his
career. He was shortly afterwards (458/1065) renamed
governor of "Greater Syria," from which he fled in
460/1067 because of a military insurrection which
ultimately led to a general revolt in the whole area.[41]

39(...continued)
Armenian one, which originally came with Badr from al-Shām
and were known as al-Juyūshiyyah, in reference to amīr al-
jaysh Badr, and he gave them al-Ḥusayniyyah quarter, which
used to be for the blacks [lis-sūd]."

40 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, II, 268.

41 Ibid., II, 277, contains the reference to Greater
Syria or bilād al-Shām; Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 58;
Ibn al-Qalānisī, Dhayl, p. 93. For a complete biography of
Badr al-Jamālī as governor of Damascus and of al-Shām, see
Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, Tuḥfat dhawī al-albāb fī man
ḥakam bi-Dimashq min al-khulafā' wa'l-mulūk wa'l-nuwwāb,
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5827, ff 131r-131v.

These two administrative positions, although short-lived, helped to prepare him to become a vizier of the type described previously as "vizier of the sword and the pen," a combination of military and administrative career. He was called by al-Mustanṣir to assume the vizierate in 466/1073.

Badr al-Jamālī became vizier at the insistence of the caliph, whose reign had been plagued by internal strife and by struggles within the armed forces, mainly between the black contingents and the Turkish ones. Al-Mustanṣir's reign was dominated by his mother, who was a black woman.[42] Under her influence, al-Mustanṣir installed her nominee as vizier. She was able through her man to run the affairs of the caliphate in the name of her under-age son. In her capacity as Umm al-Mustanṣir, she was able to increase the number of blacks

---

42 Al-Sayyidah Raṣd, the mother of al-Mustanṣir, was born a Sudanese slave and was owned by a Jewish merchant in Egypt named Abū Saʿīd ibn Hārūn al-Tustarī. She was given to the caliph al-Ẓāhir upon the latter's request for his enjoyment. During her husband's lifetime she showed no favor to Abū Saʿīd and played no political role until her son al-Mustanṣir became caliph. See Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 1; Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs (New York: Ktav, 1970), p. 77.

(Sudanese) in the army and in her own personal contingent: "By purchasing black slaves as her special contingent..., she favored them in government and she was extremely generous to them."[43] She was hostile toward the Turkish contingents, which created many problems for al-Mustanṣir. This led to increased tensions between the Turks and the newcomers, particularly the fact that the Turkish contingent looked down on the latter as slaves. Eventually a rift arose in the Fatimid armed forces. The Turks led the fight against the "slaves" (ʿabīd), a common name for black Africans. The country ultimately was paralyzed for twelve years as al-Mustanṣir witnessed the disintegration of his realm. The war between both groups started in 454/1062 and lasted into 466/1073, when Badr became al-Mustanṣir's vizier. That year marked the beginning of the end of the caliphate's problems; at least with internal strife over for a while, the caliphate would last another century.

The period of unrest in Fatimid history from 454-466/1062-1073 had been marked by the short-lived vizierates of sixteen men, which made any policy-making

---

43 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, II, 273.

or continuity impossible. All through this period the army was able to dictate to al-Mustanṣir its own candidates for the second-most important position in the caliphate, the vizierate. Because of the Turks' stature in the army, their numbers, and influence, and because of al-Mustanṣir's weaknesses and the economic weakness of the time, the Turks were able to demand a raise in pay to meet the inflationary situation. The growing numbers of blacks in the army alarmed the Turkish contingent. According to al-Maqrīzī, the black contingents numbered about 50,000 men in 459/1066.[44] When finally the Turks and the blacks fought, the Turks won and pursued the blacks all the way to the Ṣaʿīd, deep into upper Egypt. Because they were victorious, the Turks insisted that they get their pay raises. But the treasury was already depleted, so al-Mustanṣir had to beg them to defer the pay raises; but they insisted. So he sold arms and ammunition in order to pay the Turks, even paying them with weapons instead of cash. With the Turks setting a precedent for other state employees to ask for increases, the caliph had to sell everything he owned to raise the

---

44 Ibid., II, 273.

money. The situation kept deteriorating until, in 461/1068, food prices soared as food became scarce, the customs houses did not report income, and people were so desperate that they ate the bodies of their fellow men. War, famine, and disease made the death toll soar.[45] The infighting made it impossible for the ordinary peasant to plow the land and plant crops. As al-Maqrīzī put it, the Nile flooded on time but there were no men to build the bridges or till the land. There were entire villages whose population died as a result of war or famine.

Al-Mustanṣir, in a desperate move to save his caliphate, called upon Badr al-Jamālī, who was then in Acre, to come and save him. He "promised him control over the country (al-bilād)."[46] Before accepting the invitation, Badr had his own conditions for going to Egypt: first, that he would come with his own army; second, that he would completely wipe out the existing

---

45 Ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah, p. 75, speaks of the famine and plague that hit Egypt as the "years of Joseph," the seven lean years.

46 Al-Maqrizi, Itti'āẓ, II, 311; Ibrāhīm ibn Duqmaq, Kitāb al-jawhar al-thamīnah fī sīrat al-khulafā' wa'l-salāṭīn, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5762, fol 50r.

Egyptian army; and third, that he would hunt down and execute former viziers whom he accused of contributing to the malaise of the state.[47] It is interesting to note that, though Badr al-Jamālī did not include Egypt's princes on his list, when he reached Egypt he did not spare them either. Al-Mustanṣir accepted the conditions set by Badr. The latter, travelling by sea from Syria to Egypt, was taking a risk (it was winter), but was on his way.

Al-Mustanṣir in desperation had thus given up his authority, which was vested in him by Allāh, as _imām_, to guide his own people. In fact, according to al-Kirmānī's theory, he had abdicated his responsibility as a caliph.

Badr al-Jamālī arrived in Egypt with 10,000 of his own men. Landing at Damietta, he embarked on his scheme to set the country back on its feet. The first thing he did was to ask the merchants for a fixed tribute. While en route to Cairo, he was given provisions for his army by a rich man from Buḥayra. Arriving at the outskirts of Cairo, he sent a secret messenger to inform the caliph of his arrival and to ask him to dismiss the Turkish general

---

47   Al-Maqrīzī, _Itti'āẓ_, II, 311.

Yaldikūsh. Al-Mustanṣir dismissed Yaldikūsh and Badr entered Cairo alone; his men followed him one by one so as not to give the impression of being conquerors but rather friends. Next, Badr began to keep the company of the princes of Egypt. He then arranged to have them all to a dinner party; when they left he sent his own escorts with them. On the way home, each one of these princes was killed. He then confiscated their properties, with which he replenished the coffers of his master.[48] Badr then turned to the army and destroyed those whom he suspected of misconduct in regard to the caliph and the ra'iyyah. Previous viziers and a fair number of qāḍīs were next on his list. This action was an attempt on his part to set the caliphal house in order. Internally, he tried to enforce the laws so that Egyptians would have an incentive to go back to the villages and to start replanting the land. He offered them a three-year tax-

---

48 Ibid., II, 291. Those princes, along with the upper echelons of the army, had been responsible for stripping the caliph of his gold, silver, arms, ammunition, personal belongings, and treasures of Dār al-Khilāfah. Thus, Badr al-Jamālī was only trying to reclaim part of what was stolen from the caliph's home. Badr himself was also a recipient of some of the stolen goods.

free income from the land if they cultivated it.
Furthermore, as a vote of confidence in those who moved
to devastated areas, he provided them with plenty of
food, which was carried free of charge from faraway
places.[49] He thus repopulated these areas without the
use of force. The tax incentive gave Egypt plenty of
crops. Badr was a firm believer in the idea that after
he subdued his enemies in the Aswan area and the Ṣa'īd,
he would be able to rule Egypt. He used his enemy's
strategy: "If you get lower Egypt, the seashore, and all
the rural area, you can own Miṣr."[50] Having accomplished
his goals of setting the caliphal house in order, he
turned to the enemies of his master in bilād al-Shām and
reinstated the khuṭbah for al-Mustanṣir in Mecca and
Jerusalem. Badr's final step was to reorganize the
bureaus and to control them through his own men as bureau
chiefs. This gave him direct access to the bureaus and
complete control over all branches of government.

---

49 Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf al-Dimashqī, Akhbār al-duwal wa
āthār al-uwal, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 4923,
fol 118r.

50 Ibn Yaldikūsh, quoted in al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, II,
317.

Badr al-Jamālī's vizierate was <u>wizārat</u> <u>tafwīḍ</u>. If

Ibn Killis's vizierate was called a "substitute for a

caliphate," Badr al-Jamālī's was even more so. Badr's

powers exceeded those of Ibn Killis. The latter's powers

had been bestowed upon him by a powerful caliph who did

not feel threatened nor afraid to be undermined. In many

ways Ibn Killis complemented al-'Azīz. Badr was

delegated power by the weak al-Mustanṣir, who at that

point in his career had nothing to delegate. He had lost

everything he owned to his army, to his viziers, and to

his bureau chiefs. He was unable to maintain his own

<u>haram</u>: his mother, wife (or perhaps wives), and daughters

had to leave Egypt and live with friends in Baghdad.[51]

The height of degradation in an Islamic context occurs

when a man cannot provide for or defend his own women.

Badr could have usurped the power that al-Mustanṣir

bestowed on him because al-Mustanṣir had no power to

delegate. It was all stripped from him. For all

practical purposes, Badr ruled Egypt unchecked. The

---

51 Ibn Ẓāfir, <u>Akhbār</u> <u>al-duwal</u> <u>al-munqaṭi'ah</u>, p. 75:
"In 462 A.H., the daughters of al-Mustanṣir and his mother
arrived in Baghdad fleeing from the famine [which afflicted
Egypt]."

caliph was at his mercy and not he at the mercy of the
caliph. There is no comparison, then, between Ibn
Killis's position and that of Badr. Al-'Azīz held the
reins of state in his hands and no-one could have
dictated any policy to him without his consent. Al-
Mustanṣir, on the other hand, was a puppet in the hands
of his vizier, Badr. He owed his temporal power to the
man. He even owed him the continuation of Fatimid rule
over Egypt and Syria. There is no parallel for this
scenario in Fatimid history.

After he re-established order and brought the
country back to normal functions, Badr became the master
of the Fatimid lands. He remained in office until his
death at the age of eighty. He fell victim perhaps to a
stroke which robbed him of his speech for the last year
of his life. In all, he was in office for twenty-one
years. His military valor and his reputation as a
ruthless commander made it possible for him to reorganize
the government and fire those who were accomplices to the
crime committed against the people of Egypt and the
state. The Fatimid administration started to function
normally again. Badr was able to set the administration
and the caliphate back to normal because he had his own

army of ten thousand men who obeyed his commands and
defended his interests and those of the caliphate.
Badr's fiscal and tax policy promoted productivity and
the return to a normal way of life in Egypt. His policy
of return to the land, mentioned earlier, yielded crops
which were badly needed to feed the Egyptians. He was
also able to change the taxes to reflect new demographic
realities: many villages were completely empty because
the inhabitants had either been killed in wars between
the Turks and the blacks or had died of famine and
epidemic diseases.

As mentioned before, al-Kirmānī would have been
shocked by the power that was vested in Badr al-Jamālī.
Not only was he made a vizier but he was given the title
"prince of the realm," the title "supreme judge" (qāḍī'l-
quḍāt), the "sword of Islam," and the "shield of the
imām." The theocratic state which al-Kirmānī had
envisioned could not be created; the caliphs recognized
that fact. Rather than lose full control over their
realm, they opted to delegate power to one trustworthy
individual who could run their internal and external
affairs.

Badr al-Jamālī helped to create a workable administrative hierarchy by firing or killing those who took bribes or dipped into the Fatimid treasury or whose corruption was the cause of the populace's misery. Thus the vizier, with his "iron hand" policy, was able to bring about the administrative changes which eventually were responsible for the recovery of the caliphate from bankruptcy and corruption. The ra'iyyah were behind him because the famine which had befallen them in the period 459-464/1066-1071 was due to the mismanagement of the caliphate by those who were in power.

Although Badr al-Jamālī was a freed slave, his administrative experience and his determination made him uncompromising as far as reforms were concerned. No-one was exempt, even his own son who rebelled against him in Alexandria. He too was brought to his knees. Badr's integrity was a driving force behind his reforms. In all these respects he was the equal of Ibn Killis.

In contrast to Ibn Killis and to Badr al-Jamālī, Bahrām al-Armanī (529-532/1134-1137) was a newcomer to the Fatimid capital, Cairo. An Armenian Christian whose background was unknown to the Fatimids, Bahrām succeeded in attaining the position of vizier without real effort.

Not much is actually known about his birth or what he did prior to becoming the vizier. Two theories existed concerning his socio-economic and political background. One theory stated that he was a prince who ruled for a very short period over the Armenians of Tell Bashīr, northeast of Aleppo and was ousted because of a revolt.[52] As a result he left Tell Bashīr and moved to Egypt where he worked his way into the caliph al-Ḥāfiẓ's court. The second theory described him as a khādim or servant, a eunuch who climbed the military ladder and became the head either of the Jayshiyyah or the Yanīsiyyah army corps. Both groups were formed by Armenians, Badr al-Jamālī and Abū'l-Fath Yanīs, respectively. The majority of both corps were Armenians. Ibn Muyassar subscribed to the latter theory, while al-Maqrīzī felt that Bahrām was of noble birth. Ibn Taghribirdī refers to Bahrām as al-amīr without any hesitation. M. Canard suggests that Prince Bahrām, after leaving Tell Bashīr, must have

---

52 Tell Bashīr or Turbessel is located in a plain northeast of Aleppo and southeast of Ayntab between the Taurus Mountains and the Euphrates River. See M. Canard, "Un vizier chrétien à l'époque fatimite," Annales de l'institut d'études orientales (Algers), 12 (1954): 88.

started his career as an officer in one of the two Armenian contingents before becoming the head of all the Armenians. He is also of the belief that Bahrām was no eunuch but a descendant of a rather well-known and well-to-do family whose fortunes had changed over time. Furthermore, his two brothers lived in Egypt: Vassak was a governor and Gregory was the Armenian Catholics of Egypt.[53] Be that as it may, Bahrām was forced on al-Ḥāfiẓ as a vizier by the army (al-ajnād).[54]

He was no choice of al-Ḥāfiẓ, but he came at a time when the caliph or no say in affairs of state, so he was forced to accept the choice of the army. Although Bahrām was not chosen by the caliph, the latter bestowed on him

---

53 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, p. 79; al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 155-157; Yūsuf ibn Taghribirdī, Al-Nujūm al-ẓāhirah, V, 242; M. Canard, "Un vizir chrétien à l'époque fatimite," p. 111: "Ainsi finit ce vizir arménien, resté chrétien, frère d'un Catholicos arménien, peut-être de grande famille arménienne, forcé par les malheurs de la nouvelle patrie que les arméniens s'étaient créé dans la région du Taurus et de l'Euphrate, à venir chercher fortune en Égypte. Son renom ne s'est pas borné à l'Égypte, car il était connu chez les francs en Palestine et chez les normands en Sicile."

54 Ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah, p. 97; and al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 156.

two honorific titles: "the sword of Islam" and "the crown
of the caliphate." For a non-Muslim and an alien of
sorts to be given such titles was indicative of al-
Ḥāfiz's desperation over his state of affairs. He was
ready to abdicate his imāmate in favor of saving his
temporal power.[55]

The circumstances that surrounded Bahrām's rise to
the vizierate are as unclear as his background.
Historians such as Ibn Taghribirdī suggested that as head
of the Armenian corps (muqaddam al-Arman), he was asked
by the caliph's son, Ḥasan, to help him force his father
to name him as his heir and to cede power to him while
al-Ḥāfiz was still alive. Al-Maqrīzī's version of the
story was as follows. Ḥasan was a vengeful character who
alienated the princes and tribal shaykhs. His bloody
career as heir apparent led to a mass movement against
him supported by large numbers of army contingents. The
caliphal palace was surrounded and al-Ḥāfiz, with his son

---

55 Concerning the titles, see Ibn Taghribirdī, Al-
Nujūm, V, 242; and al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, III, 156. The
caliph's contemplation of abdication is alluded to by Gustav
von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement,"
Proceedings, p. 208.

Ḥasan, became prisoners. The besiegers demanded Ḥasan's head; al-Ḥāfiẓ had to comply or else lose his own life and the lives of those who lived in the palace. He arranged for Ḥasan to be poisoned by one his private physicians. With the news of his death, the Sudan contingent of the army, supporters of Ḥasan, mutinied and forced the army (al-ajnād) to flee. To avoid disintegration of the army, al-Ḥāfiẓ called on Bahrām to use his Armenian contingent and to subdue both sides. When Bahrām arrived at the gates of the palace, the main army (al-ajnād) hailed him as savior and carried him to the caliph to bestow on him the vizierate. Bahrām was no choice of the caliph; he was imposed on him.[56]

Bahrām was the second Armenian vizier to enjoy the title of wazīr al-sayf or wazīr al-tafwīḍ.[57] He was a military man who by becoming vizier combined two jobs which gave him great power. Because al-Ḥāfiẓ had accepted his as vizier, he had to listen to the complaints of personal friends and disenchanted amīrs.

---

56 For a complete account of Bahrām's rise to power, see al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 155-156.

57 M. Canard, "Un vizir chrétien à l'époque fatimite," p. 97.

The criticism voiced against the caliph was well-known to many historians of the Muslim world: how could a non-Muslim stand at the minbar with the imam and caliph during the religious holidays? Al-Ḥāfiẓ got around that problem by appointing the qāḍī al-quḍāt as a substitute for Bahrām on such occasions.[58] Although Bahrām was "an intelligent man, an organizer, and a good politician,"[59] he nevertheless was unwanted by the amīrs whose powers were immense at that point in the history of the Fatimid caliphate. Bahrām came to power thirty-five years before the Fatimid era ended. The mood that swept the caliphate was paranoia; anyone who was not a Muslim or from the established Egyptian aristocracy was suspect, especially if that person attained a high position, let alone the vizierate. At such a late date in the history of the dynasty, the caliph had but nominal powers; the true power rested in the hands of the vizier.

Bahrām's Christianity, according to al-Maqrīzī, made him the target of the ra'iyyah's hatred. As a

---

58 Mar'ī ibn Yūsuf, Kitāb nuzhat al-nāẓirīn fī-man wulliya Miṣr min al-khulafā' wa'l-salāṭīn, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5920, fol 16v.

59 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 156.

politician, Bahrām had full control over the realm and subdued every revolt against the state. He spent a large fortune on the army to reorganize it. In this respect he could not be criticized. Although Maqrīzī argues that Bahrām's Christianity was his Achilles heel, I am inclined to believe that the Egyptian military aristocracy was responsible for creating obstacles for Bahrām because they wanted al-Ḥāfiẓ to bestow the vizierate on their candidate, the amīr Riḍwān ibn Walakhshī, a well-known scribe. The army unfortunately sabotaged their efforts and had their own man, Bahrām, named as vizier.

The downfall of Bahrām nevertheless ultimately came at the hands of Ibn Walakhshī, who with the support of the amīrs of Egypt again demanded the vizierate for himself. One possible explanation for this stubborn opposition is that the historians al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Taghribirdī, and Ibn Muyassar all claim that Bahrām invited around 30,000 Armenians, including his own brothers and relatives, to come and settle in Egypt. Furthermore, the influx of such large numbers of Armenians at a time when Egyptians were finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their standard of

living (due in large part of loss of territory and revenue to the Crusaders) made Bahrām and his people targets for the Egyptians' anger. Moreover, being rich Christians, the Armenians built a great number of churches and monasteries. They also practiced their religion outwardly, which led Muslims to become afraid of a Christian takeover which would take Egypt away from them, as was happening in Syria under the Crusaders.[60] This led many of the a'yān to put pressure on the caliph to let Bahrām go. Al-Ḥāfiẓ wanted to appease the army, so he did not take heed; so the a'yān turned to Riḍwān ibn Walakhshī, who called a jihād in the name of God to fight Bahrām and his Armenian followers. Bahrām, the Armenians, and the Fatimid army met Ibn Walakhshī, the contender for the vizierate, with all his supporters. When the two armies met, Ibn Walakhshī's forces raised the Qur'ān as a battle standard, and all the Muslims in the Fatimid army left Bahrām and joined Riḍwān. Bahrām, with his Armenian contingents, fled to the Ṣa'īd, where they took refuge in a monastery. There Bahrām remained until his death. Riḍwān ibn Walakhshī marched victorious

---

60 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 159.

into Cairo, where al-Ḥāfiẓ named him as vizier. Bahrām's
headquarters (<u>dār al-wizārah</u>) and the Armenian quarter of
the city were completely ransacked by Riḍwān's followers.
This was the first time in the history of the vizierate
that <u>dār al-wizārah</u> had been sacked.[61]

Of the three viziers considered here, Bahrām fits
least into al-Kirmānī's scheme. Al-Ḥāfiẓ had named
Bahrām his vizier and had given him absolute power by
<u>wizārat tafwīḍ</u> and the honorific titles of <u>sayf al-Islām</u>
and <u>tāj al-khilāfah</u>. The title, <u>sayf al-Islām</u>, was
equally extraordinary, for here was a non-Muslim being
called the "sword of Islam." Al-Ḥāfiẓ had become a
puppet manipulated by different interest groups vying for
power, such as the Turks, the Armenians, the Sudanese
(blacks) in the army, and the princes who lived under the
auspices of the caliph.

In his model of the theocratic state, al-Kirmānī
insisted that at no time should the power of the vizier
be equal to that of the caliph. According to him, the
vizier should be the man to execute the wishes of the
caliph and not the man to initiate the policy of the

---

61 <u>Ibid.</u>, III, 160.

caliphate. Al-Kirmānī's model vizier would be an Ismā'īlī who adhered to the da'wah, not a dhimmī such as Bahrām.

Even though the circumstances surrounding Bahrām's nomination were not ideal, Bahrām nonetheless tried to reorganize the army in order to recapture the lost lands of the caliphate. His efforts at reforming the administration were sabotaged by princes (here, the land-owning elite with private armies) seeking power for themselves. THe power struggle among the elites was uncontrollable. Within the army, the split was too deeply entrenched for Bahrām to eradicate it completely. Add to all this al-Ḥāfiẓ's unhappiness with Bahrām's appointment, hence his non-supportive attitude towards his vizier. Al-Ḥāfiẓ himself was in turn a very weak individual and was incapable of ruling.

As mentioned before, Bahrām also suffered from the lack of sympathy or support from the general population, who saw in his Armenian background a liability and in his Christianity the danger, perhaps unfounded, that Egypt would be lost to Dār al-Islām, as had happened to those parts of Syria which had fallen to the Crusaders. During Bahrām's vizierate there was little hope that the

caliphate could sustain any attack by the Crusaders nor withstand any more internal rifts. Bahrām's time offered little hope for anyone - regardless of background or capacity - to salvage the dying empire.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FATIMID ADMINISTRATION AND VIZIERATE:

A COMPARISON AND A CONCLUSION

In light of what was presented in Chapters One and
Two concerning the hierarchical and centralized nature of
the Fatimid administration, it might be useful to compare
it to both the Abbasid and Seljuk systems. The latter
flourished at the same time as the Fatimids, the Abbasids
from 133-657/750-1258, the Seljuks from 447-591/1055-
1194, and the Fatimids from 297-568/909-1172. In order
for a comparison to be meaningful, it will be necessary
to describe the two systems briefly, following now
standard analyses.

The Abbasid administration as a system was put to
the service of the empire as an experiment. Neither the
Abbasids nor their predecessors, the Umayyads, found in
either the Qur'ān or the Sharī'ah a prescription as to
how to administer the ummah. They had to resort to their
own innovations in government:

> The Sharī'a..., by virtue of its character as
> the expression of God's Will, and by the common
> acceptance of its prescriptions and their

implications on the part of all Muslims, supplies the authority, sanctions, and moral basis for the unity and constitution of the Umma as a political entity. But neither in the Qur'ān nor in the Sunna of the Prophet are there to be found precise instructions as to the forms and institutions by which the unity of the Umma as a political organization should be expressed and maintained.[1]

The Abbasids thus were pioneers in trying to form a bureaucracy whose main function was to coordinate all the institutions of the empire and to create new ones to cope with the ever-growing, ever-changing Muslim community. As pioneers in this experiment, the Abbasids created a system which was neither highly developed nor specialized. Limited by their inheritance of statecraft and administrative procedures from the Umayyads, they were slow to create their own institutions and were empirical in the methods and applications of their own procedures.[2] Equally inhibiting to the Abbasids were the

---

1 H.A.R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization: the Muslim Community and the State," in Law in the Middle East, Volume I, ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert Liebesny (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1955), p. 4.

2 Al-Rashīd, when announcing his plans for the succession, included a major restructuring of the

bureaucrats whom they had retained as hold-overs from the Umayyad period and who were from the Umayyad-trained bureaucratic cadre.

The Abbasids had an administration which for all practical purposes was limited in scope and operation. Although a number of dīwāns were created, the majority of them specialized in the collection of taxes from different parts of the empire, such as dīwān al-kharāj, which was the most important bureau.[3] The collection of

---

2(...continued)
administration of the empire. He was to divide the empire between his two sons, al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn. "A most important stipulation was that the revenues and forces of each domain... be used only for the benefit of its respective region. Ma'mūn would have complete autonomy and the final say on fiscal matters in his area. However, he was required to help his brother with military forces if the need arose." M.A. Sha'bān, Islamic History, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 39.

3 The dīwān al-kharāj was called simply "the dīwān," which was also synonymous with dīwān al-sawād, as the Sawād was the richest area of the Abbasid Empire and yielded a great percentage of its income. For further information, see Dominique Sourdel, Le Vizirat abbaside de 747 à 936 (Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1960), II, 590. Hilāl al-Ṣābi' considered dīwān kharāj al-Sawād, dīwān

the _kharāj_ was divided among several bureaus concerned
with the different provinces of the empire, such as _dīwān
kharāj al-Shām_, _dīwān kharāj al-'Iraqayn_, _dīwān kharāj
al-Mashriq_, _dīwān kharāj Miṣr wa Ifrīqiyya wa'l-Mawṣil wa
Arminya wa Azarbāyajān wa'l-Madīna wa Makkah wa'l-Yaman_.
One gathers from the prominence of these bureaus that the
Abbasid administration's most important function was the
collection of taxes imposed on agricultural land,
especially since the absolute majority of the inhabitants
lived on such lands. THus land was the backbone of the
economy and the main source of income for the caliphate.
The other kind of income came from _'ushr_ land, i.e., the
land that gave ten per cent of its share of income to the
state. _'Ushr_ land fell under the jurisdiction of a
special bureau that collected its taxes, the _dīwān al-
ḍiyā'_ or the bureau of _'ushr_ land. Its function was very
similar to that of _dīwān al-kharāj_. Both bureaus were
controlled by the central administration and had problems
because the money that was collected went straight from

3(...continued)
kharāj al-Mashriq, and _dīwān kharāj al-Maghrib_ as being the
most important bureaus (_uṣūl al-dawāwīn_). See Hilāl al-
Ṣābi', _Kitāb al-wuzarā'_, ed. A. Farrāj (Cairo: Dār aḥibbā'
al-kutub al-'arabiyyah, 1958), p. 295.

these bureaus to the coffers of the caliph, the bayt al-
mal or the public treasury, to which the great majority
of collected funds were channelled. It is from this
center that expenses in general and those of the army in
particular were disbursed.[4] Thus the revenues collected
were not used immediately to pay the expenses of running
the dīwāns but were sent to the main treasury. As a
result the whole financial operation of the
administration fell into the hands of the caliph, who
according to his discretion saw to it that the money was
allocated to the different bureaus, a situation which had
the potential of crippling the administration if the
caliph acted whimsically.

Some bureaus, as in the case of the Seljuk
administration, appeared and disappeared according to
necessity, a phenomenon not so different from the
ministries of our day and age. Other bureaus were
constant features of the Abbasid administration. These
were: dīwān al-jaysh, or the bureau that took care of the

_____

4 "C'était le Bayt al-Māl, Trésor publique où était
versée la plus grande partie de ces diverses contributions,
qui alimentait à son tour les services des Dépenses et de
l'armée." Sourdel, Le Vizirat abbaside, II, 594-595.

affairs of the army; dīwān al-nafaqāt, the bureau of

expenses, wherefrom the small employees of the court and

administration received their pay; dīwān al-rasā'il, from

which official decisions were announced and whence

correspondence with other sovereigns originated; dīwān

al-tawqī' or dīwān al-khatam (the privy seal), and dīwān

al-faḍḍ received letters and affixed the insignia of the

caliph before letters were sent out or firmāns announced.

Other less important dīwāns included dīwān al-muṣādarīn

or the bureau which disciplined those who absented

themselves intentionally or unintentionally from their

employment or responsibilities; dīwān al-mawārīth, which

dealt with settling inheritance issues; dīwān dur al-

ḍarb or the bureau of the mint; dīwān al-birr or dīwān

al-ṣadaqāt, the bureau for distributing the zakāt or waqf

money;[5] and dīwān al-mukhālifīn, or the bureau which

dealt with the confiscation of property of rebels. Many

of these latter bureaus appeared and disappeared from the

---

5 "Sous al-Ma'mun nous savons cependant qu'Aḥmad b.
Yūsuf percevait la sadaqa d'al-Baṣra et qu'une partie des
sommes ainsi prélevées lui était laissée en bénéfice."
Ibid., II, 593.

reign of one caliph to another.   Such were the bureaus of the central administration.

As for the provinces or the periphery of the empire, they were governed mainly by military personnel who administered land as fief holders in exchange for payment of salaries and in many instances as recognition for defending the lands of the empire form attack, chiefly from Byzantium.   In this respect the Abbasids added to the fragmentation and the parcelling out of their own land to individuals, who were for the most part exempt from tax payments, as a way of compensating them for services rendered.   The Abbasid caliphs, as Jacob Lassner points out, had a dilemma which "was the possibility of a challenge to the central authorities from an important regional sinecure....   The quintessential problem was how to ensure strong local rule while safeguarding the interests of the central regime..."[6]   To ensure and to safeguard against fragmentation of the empire, the central administration tried to rotate governors (wālīs) of provinces frequently and to assign to those posts

---

6   Jacob Lassner, The Shaping of Abbasid Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 58.

persons loyal to the caliph or "close kinsmen."[7] This
policy, as the Abbasids discovered, was not successful,
for even members of the caliphal family declared their
independence from the central government if they felt
that they had been unsuccessful in attaining their
demands. As such the policy concerning the provinces was
not immune to failure.

The staff of the administration came mainly from the
scribal class, or kuttāb, who were educated either in the
Byzantine tradition or the Persian one, depending on
which phase of the caliphate one examines. The kuttāb
were excellent calligraphers and possessed the skill
which was a prime requirement for the profession.

The bureaus or dīwāns included in their operations a
majlis, or staff meeting, in which individuals
responsible for running the affairs of the bureaus
debated the validity of their decisions.[8] Side by side

---

7 Ibid., p. 58. As an example of trustworthy men
being given iqtā', al-Muqtadir bi'llāh gave land that was
under the supervision (muwakkalah) of Zaydān to him as
fiefs. "Zaydān's share were villages near Kaskūr and some
land which yielded crops or profit in Baṣra." Hilāl al-
Ṣābi', Kitāb al-wuzarā', p. 37.

8 Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 600.

with the majālis there existed "an [internal] organism of
control" called the zimām, or the section of the bureau
which dealt with accountability. This feature, Sourdel
argues, did not exists except in the theoretical work of
Qudāma ibn Ja'far. While a separate, autonomous dīwān
al-zimām was a reality, there is no evidence of this type
of control within each bureau.[9] The fact remains that in
actual practice the Abbasids used three dīwāns to run the
empire: the dīwān al-inshā' or chancellery, the dīwān al-
zimām, and the dīwān al-khatam.[10]

As Goitein has pointed out, the Abbasids were the
first to delegate power to one individual from the
scribal class whose trust won him the position of an
associate: the vizier.[11] This post was created by the

---

9   Ibid. While Sourdel argues that dīwān al-zimām
was a separate dīwān, Hilāl al-Ṣābi' spoke of it in the
plural as dawāwīn al-azimmah, thus allowing the possibility
of the existence of more than one dīwān, but as separate
entities. Cf. Hilāl al-Ṣābi', Kitāb al-wuzarā', p. 89.

10   Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 601.

11   Although a few viziers were not from the scribal
class, the tendency remained during the whole Abbasid era to
choose them from that class. Cf. Tawfīq Sulṭān al-Yūzbakī,
Al-Wizārah: nash'atuha wa taṭawwuruha fī al-dawlah al-
'Abbāsiyyah (Baghdad: Maṭba'at al-Irshād, 1970), p. 124.

Abbasids but not clearly defined by them. The
prerogatives and duties of the vizier varied greatly.
Some viziers were administrators under the direct
authority of the caliph, while others were dynastic
sultans without caliphal authority. One should not
forget that as pioneers in the field the Abbasids
experimented and thus varied in the actual way they did
their work, but finally the idea was so successful that
it became an integral part of all the administrations
that followed.

The Abbasid vizier was chosen to head the
bureaucracy and was directly responsible to the caliph.
With the latter's blessing, he was able to run the
affairs of the empire. One of the tasks incumbent upon
the vizier was the responsibility for running all the
bureaus without being in charge of any one in
particular.[12] He supervised

> the acts of the secretaries of the government
> offices [dīwāns], since they are in a fiduciary
> position towards Moslems in respect of what they
> receive and disburse from their property; they
> should therefore be kept strictly to rule, all

---

12 Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 605.

irregularities in their receipts or expenditures
restrained, and all excesses punished.[13]

He was supposed to give a detailed outline of events, to
register the orders of the sovereign, and to see to it
that orders were transmitted to the appropriate
administrative units through the intermediary of dīwān
al-qaṣr, or bureau of caliphal affairs.[14]

Whereas the vizier was responsible for originating
or transmitting the nominations of individuals for
positions in the administration through the chancellery,
he sent direct orders for allocation of money to the
public treasury. Other instructions involving money
matters were sent to the bureaus of kharāj and ḍiyāʻ.
The vizier also had the prerogative to send orders to
dīwān al-jaysh and to dīwān al-nafaqāt for the payment of
administrative personnel.[15] The vizier was also
responsible for dīwān al-khatam, where his name appeared
in many cases alongside the caliph's, thus taking full
responsibility for much of what was done in the empire.

---

13 H.F. Amedroz, "The Maẓālim Jurisdiction in the
Aḥkām Sulṭāniyya of Māwardī," JRAS, (July 1911): 639.

14 Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 605.

15 Ibid., II, 605.

In essence the vizier was an equal of the caliph and in a
sense shared the domain of the caliphate with him. THe
Abbasid vizier was able to groom his sons or grandsons
for the position.

It was Hārūn al-Rashīd's (173-194/789-809) policy
towards the Barmakī family that set the precedent for the
vizierate to become hereditary, a tradition which had
both a negative and a positive impact on Abbasid rule.
Hārūn al-Rashīd's involvement in the wars against the
Byzantines during his father's reign and then during his
own, where he found himself in dangerous situations vis-
a-vis the enemy, decided on freeing

> himself from all administrative responsibilities
> and [taking] personal charge of the army. For
> the administration of the whole empire, he fell
> back on his mentor and longtime associate Yaḥyā
> b. Khālid b. Barmak, a man whose loyalty, and
> that of his family, to the Abbasids was absolutely
> beyond any shade of doubt.[16]

---

16 M.A. Sha'bān, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 28.
Al-Rashīd called Yaḥyā al-Barmakī "father" because the
latter's wife was al-Rashīd's wet-nurse. "[Al-Rashīd] told
him [Yaḥyā]: Oh father, you have been my mentor and you have
advised me wisely. I [now] invest in you the authority over
my people and I have placed this burden on you. Judge [the
(continued...)

Yaḥyā al-Barmakī trained his sons to run the Abbasid administration and one after another they took sole responsibility, with full executive powers, to accomplish their task. That the Barmakids were qualified men could not be doubted. They were well-trained administrators and well-respected individuals. They were loyal to the Abbasids and they had the interest of the caliph at heart. Such qualities were shared among them all.[17]

The hereditary vizierate provided continuity in policies and it encouraged the vizierial families to invest their energies in creating and maintaining an administrative apparatus which would outlive them and from which their own children would benefit by grooming

---

16(...continued)
ummah] as you see fit. Employ whomsoever you want, dismiss whom you please, and impose whom you see fit.... I am not going to hold you accountable in any way." Quoted without citation of source by Muḥammad Aḥmad Barāniq, Al-Wuzarā' al-'Abbāsiyyūn (Miṣr: al-Maṭba'ah al-Namūdhajiyyah, n.d.), p. 62; Yūzbakī, Al-Wizārah, p. 58, reproduces this speech and cites Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wal'-mulūk (Būlāq: Būlāq Press, n.d.), X, 50, and later sources.

17 Dominique Sourdel, "Le valeur littéraire et documentaire du livre des vizirs d'al-Ǧahšiyārī d'après le chapitre consacré au califat de Hārūn al-Rashīd," Arabica, 2 (1955): 196.

them for the vizierate. This dynastic tradition had its negative aspects too. It strengthened the vizierial families by allowing them to accumulate wealth and to abuse their power by creating nuclei of acquaintances and friends in sensitive positions. In so doing they were able to control the caliph. They had him at their mercy and the roles were reversed: instead of his being the chief executive and they his delegates, they became the executives and he the executor of their wishes.[18] Thus, the Abbasid vizierate became an inherited position with extraordinary privileges and wealth, so much so that when the Abbasid caliph's power and prestige dwindled, the vizierial dynasties had ample support among the ra'iyyah and the jaysh and had the techniques or expertise to run the empire, plus the power to command, which helped them create their own sultanates. These dynasties had all it took to become independent entities, except for the legitimacy of being the rulers commanded by God to run the affairs of the kingdom.

As mentioned before, the Abbasids followed a policy of recruiting viziers generally from the kuttāb class.

---

18 M.A. Barāniq, Al-Wuzarā', pp. 66-67.

They refused to choose their viziers from among the
'ulamā'.[19] The 'ulamā', in contrast to the bureaucrats,
were not government employees. They lived on the ṣadaqāt
or zakāt of pious Muslims. They often belonged to one
mosque school or another where they studied the Qur'ān
and had a set interpretation of it. "As judges, notaries
and administrators of public or trust properties, the
school members acquired positions of social as well as
religious leadership."[20] They were the true voice of the
people and stood as spokesmen of the ra'iyyah at the
caliph's court. In their eyes, as Ibn Ḥanbal argued, the
'ulamā' had the power to lead the ummah (and not the
Abbasid caliph). "It was the duty of the 'ulema to
revive and preserve the law, and the duty of all Muslims
'to command the good and forbid the evil,' that is, to
uphold the law, whether or not the caliphate would
properly do so."[21]

Thus the Abbasid administration was directed by the
vizier and his family, a situation which created a

---

19 Al-Yūzbakī, Al-Wizārah, p. 124.

20 Ira Lapidus, "Separation of State and Religion in
Early Islamic Society," IJMES, 6 (1975): 369.

21 Ibid., p. 383.

dynastic system replacing the caliph for all practical purposes and leading to the disintegration of the caliphate into several kingdoms.

As for the Seljuk administration, it was based on the Samanid and Ghaznavid models, the offspring of ancient Persian administrative models:

> The Seljuks were primarily a military state geared for war and expansion which superimposed a foreign ruling element upon the indigenous population whose elite were called upon to manage the affairs and organization of government and administration.[22]

In this respect they were continuing the tradition of the two above-mentioned empires. As a Sunni dynasty, the Seljuks tried to build an administration which was "compatible with the basic tenets of the Islamic ideology."[23] Their theory of state was thus based on both the Islamic and the old Persian one.[24] It was Niẓām

---

22 Carla Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate: a Study of Civil Administration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 5.

23 Ibid., p. 5.

24 A.K.S. Lambton, "Aspects of Saljuk-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia," Islamic Civilization, 950-1100, ed. D.S. Richards (Oxford: Cassirer, 1973), p. 106.

al-Mulk, the vizier of the Seljuk sultan Malik Shāh
(1072-1092), who was responsible for reconciling both
theories of state. According to him,

> temporal stability was guaranteed by the protec-
> tion of religion.... "The foundation of kinship
> (dawlat) and the basis of dominion consist in
> the observation of the laws of God, glory and
> exaltation be to Him, and in giving precedence
> to the raising of the banners of religion and the
> revival of the signs and practices of the Sharī'ah
> and in respecting and honoring the sayyids and
> 'ulamā' who are the heirs of the Prophet."[25]

On the other hand, Niẓām al-Mulk went on to say that "God
chooses someone from among the people in every age and
adorns him with kingly virtues and relegates to him the
affairs of the world and the peace of His servants."[26]

The power of the sultan was absolute and required no
authorization. In him the administration was
centralized.[27] The Seljuks tried to establish the

---

25 A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the
Saljuq Empire," The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume V, ed.
J.A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p.
210.

26 Quoted in ibid., p. 210.

27 Ibid., p. 211; A.K.S. Lambton, "Aspects of Saljuq-
Ghuzz Settlement in Persia," p. 106.

importance of the sultan as the absolute ruler, "head of
the political institution," by making him the "shadow of
God upon earth," a concept well-entrenched in the Persian
idea of kingship.[28]   The hordes of Turkmen did not share
this concept, especially the "princes, [who considered
the sultan] merely as Primus inter pares," and were not
pleased by the newly acquired image of their leader.[29]
The theory behind their action was to legitimize the
sultan as the head of the ummah as well as the political
head of the state:

> The power of the Sultan was in theory delegated
> by the Caliph, but when the latter ceased to be
> effective and immediate source of this power,
> as was the case by the fifth century A.H., the
> tendency arose to ignore the historic imamate
> and to regard the Sultan as the shadow of God
> upon earth, appointed by Him and directly
> responsible to Him without intermediary in the
> person of the Caliph.[30]

---

28   A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the
Saljuq Empire," p. 209.

29   Claude Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, trans. J. Jones
Williams (New York: Taplinger, 1968), p. 25.

30   A.K.S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes: Some
Reflections on the Persian Theory of State," Studia
Islamica, fasc. 5, pt.1 (1956): 127.

The Seljuks early on kept the Abbasid caliph as head of the empire solely to lend legitimacy to the sultan as spiritual leader of the Muslim community. The caliph gave them the unprecedented honor of becoming his lieutenants all over Dār al-Islām.[31] Thus the power of the Seljuks, unlike that of the Buyids, rested upon the Sharī'ah. In attempting to live by the laws of orthodox Islam, the Seljuks were capable of preserving the religious life of the community and of giving a sense of continuity in the Muslim lands.[32] Having attained the blessing of the caliphs at the onset of their sultanate, the Seljuks soon realized that they did not actually need the caliph to give them legitimacy and concentrated their efforts on drawing the religious class to back them. It was the 'ulamā' trained by the Seljuks in the numerous madrasahs who ultimately gave them legitimacy as the leaders and rulers of the Muslim community.

The Seljuks had hoped to create an administration which was an improvement on the previous ones, especially

---

31 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), II, 43.

32 A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire," p. 207.

by avoiding the mistakes of their predecessors. Every
dynasty that came to rule the areas claimed to be an
improvement on what preceded it. In this the Seljuks
were no exception. They hoped still to achieve such an
aim, as Carla Klausner argues, "by renewing the
association of government and the religious institution,
and [by] controlling the new education system, and [by]
establishing the primacy of civil administration, which
had disintegrated under the last Buyid rulers."[33] The
Seljuks' dream was to bring about a relationship between
the sultan or the government and the religious authority
in the hope of creating an administration whose
principles were Sunni and whose values were deeply
entrenched in orthodox Islam. They hoped to have such an
administration by creating madrasahs that would graduate
religious men and administrative elites. Thus,
administrative positions were to be filled from religious
school graduates. Nizām al-Mulk, the famous vizier, in
creating the Nizāmiyyah schools, had hoped to inculcate
the perfect practices of the Sunni intelligentsia in
administration. In many ways such an administration was

---

33 Carla Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 5.

envisaged as being able to attract the support of the average Muslim and thus give the Seljuks the sense of being accepted as legitimate rulers. The use of 'ulamā' or religious class in government was a ploy to give "juridical acceptance of the sultan as the agent of political and military administration alongside the caliph as head of the religious institution only...."[34] A.K. Lambton, on the other hand, argues that Niẓām al-Mulk's purposes in initiating such a movement were

> presumably to provide government officials
> trained in the tenets of orthodoxy who would
> replace the former secretarial class and
> implement his political policies; and secondly,
> by using the 'ulamā' educated in the madrasahs,
> he hoped to control the masses and combat the
> spread of the Ismā'īlī sect, which had begun
> to threaten the existence of the state.[35]

The Seljuks' introduction of the madrasah-trained 'ulamā' into the administrative cadre and the support that the government got from incorporating them led to the compromising of this elite group, which normally was

---

34 Ibid., p. 6.

35 A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Seljuk Empire," p. 214.

out of the reach of government. The Seljuk
administration co-opted the 'ulamā', paid them salaries,
and created a dīwān to take care of their affairs.[36] The
qādīs, as part of the religious elite, were entrusted by
the Seljuks "to watch over the religious institution on
behalf of the sultan, and this perhaps marks a further
stage in the subordination of the religious institution
to the political institution."[37] The qādī headed the

---

36 A.K.S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes," pt. 1,
p. 135; Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples,
trans. Joel Carmichael and M. Perlmann (New York: Capricorn
Books, 1960), p. 177. As Carla Klausner notes: "despite the
bitter warnings and better judgement of some of their
members, the 'ulamā' were effectively incorporated within
the framework of Seljuk government, and religious affairs
were placed under the general supervision of the Vezir. To
some extent the 'ulamā' continued to protect the interests
of the people; but insofar as there was a tendency for them
either to associate with and join the bureaucracy or to
acquire extensive estates and become assimilated to the
land-owning class, their function as spokesmen of the people
was undermined and weakened." Klausner, The Seljuk
Vezirate, p. 25. As is well known, al-Ghazālī himself also
saw that the position of the 'ulamā' would continue to be
compromised if they kept on lending their services to the
temporal authorities.

37 A.K.S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes," pt. 1,
p. 135.

dīwān al-awqāf or pious endowments where he saw to it
that the income, especially that from rental property,
was spent on the support of the new madrasahs, although
some of it went to the support of mosques, hospitals,
hostels, etc.[38] Thus, the Seljuks' use of the religious
elite in the civil administration set the precedent for
their use by the Ottomans and even found its way into the
Arab regimes of today. The hope of the Seljuks was to
strengthen their administration by the use of the 'ulamā'
in the bureaucracy and thus to counteract the strength of
the military establishment and to lessen the chance of
decentralization, which was inherent in the Turkish model
of state. Different members of the Seljuk family and
tribe shared rule of the empire, thus parcelling out the
land among themselves. They also shared the
administration of their realms with the military elite,
to whom iqṭā' land was originally given as compensation
for their efforts. The 'ulamā', who were supposed to be
a stabilizing influence and a centralizing factor, were
also beneficiaries of the iqṭā' system.

   As the 'ulamā' scholars became increasingly
   dependent on the waqf endowments, they found

------

38   Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, II, 51.

themselves in a position largely independent
but complementary to the amīrs, as the chief
alternative beneficiaries of the land revenues
and to that degree they were prepared to sanc-
tion the system as a whole.[39]

The iqtā' system created problems for the Seljuks which
eventually led to the disintegration of their sultanate.
Not the least of these problems was decentralization
brought about by the distribution of land or land
revenues to civil and military officers, the majority of
whom were entrusted with the civil administration of
their iqtā'. The iqtā' system emerged during the tenth
century because of economic needs. It was "in response
to the state's dominant need to finance its operations
and to pay its civil and military officers...."[40] During
the Seljuk era, it was apparently difficult to make clear
distinctions between "military" and "administrative"
iqtā's and to distinguish even between the different
forms of iqtā'. What is known is the fact that once a
military leader was assigned an iqtā' and the right to
collect the taxes of an area, it became easy for him to

---

39 Ibid., II, 51-52.

40 A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the
Saljuq Empire," p. 231.

establish his independence. Thus, the military officers became responsible for the civil administration of their iqṭā', which eventually spelled decentralization of the government and secession from the empire at the leisure of the iqṭā' holder when he found it expedient to do so. Payment by iqṭā' was even given to the highest civil officials of the state, such as the viziers.[41] In this respect, when the land was parcelled out, the central government had no device by which to maintain control over the "administrative" iqṭā' except - in case of injustice or rebellion - the threat of superior force.[42] Thus, during the time of strong sultans, such as Malik Shāh or Tughrul Beg, the authority of the central government was evident. Decentralization and political disintegration caused by rebellion of iqṭā'-holders or their secession came about under the rule of weak sultans.

The Seljuks created a bureaucracy or civil administration with five major dīwāns: dīwān al-a'lā, or the vizierate; dīwān al-istifā', or the bureau which

---

41 Ibid., p. 238.

42 Ibid., pp. 237-238.

dealt with finances and with keeping of accounts; dīwān al-tuqhra, which included in it dīwān al-inshā' (the chancellery of the empire and the home of the official dispatches and correspondence of state); dīwān al-ishrāf, which took care of the supervision of the collection of taxes and revenues and their distribution; dīwān al-'arḍ, which was responsible for paying the standing army and "recording the grant of iqṭā's to the military class."[43]

These Seljuk bureaus were staffed by graduates of the Niẓāmiyyah school and other madrasahs. Alongside the bureaus, the Seljuks had a provincial administration which was in several respects independent of the central bureaucracy. The central bureaucracy was unable to dictate its policies in many instances to the provinces. They were "only able to maintain the balance of power between the military and civil authorities,"[44] because side by side with the civil administrator or governor of the province there was a military governor who, more

---

43 Carla Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 18; A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire," p. 230.

44 Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 20.

often than not, was responsible for the civil
administration too. In exchange -as mentioned above -
for a salary in many instances he got the civil
administration of a province, thus giving him the power
to levy taxes and entitling him "to all the revenue of
the land, and the civil officers became his direct
administrative subordinates."[45]

The Seljuks attempted to form a centralized system
of administration but, on the other hand, were keen on
keeping the Turkish system of parcelling out the land
among the extended members of the ruling family, and by
giving out military iqtā's to their deserving officers.
The two systems of centralized bureaucracy and the
parcelling out of the land, which spelled
decentralization, were parallel yet contradictory. A
bureaucratically ideal system was compromised by
political tradition. Thus, one system in essence negated
the other.

The Seljuk administration was innovative in many
respects, yet such new ideas in government were tested
and sometimes caused grave consequences for the state.

---

45 Ibid., p. 20.

One example was the creation of the dīwān for qāḍīs, which made the latter salaried personnel and thus compromised their ability to be honest arbitrators for the ra'iyyah as a whole. Being co-opted into the system lessened their respectability and their effectiveness with the masses whose interests they were supposed to safeguard. Although the Seljuk sultans intended to create a system that would be guided by Islamicate principles and would be the best suited for the era, their system had inherent weaknesses which will be discussed below, when a comparison will be drawn between their administration and that of their nominal overlords, the Abbasids, and that of their contemporaries, the Fatimids.

The political and administrative organization under the Fatimids had its strength in operating from a single center, the capital at Cairo, which "was designed to be strictly the administrative and military capital of the regime."[46] While that was the case with the Fatimids, the Seljuks, on the other hand, had an inherent weakness in the structure of their government, namely a tendency

---

46 M.A. Sha'ban, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 198.

towards decentralization and division. This tendency is mainly seen "in the Turkish conception of leadership as vested in the entire family."[47] The Turkish conception of leadership was quite different from the Persian idea of the absolute monarch. "The Turkish leaders continued to think of the empire as the property of the whole family."[48] To them, all members of the extended family and tribe shared in running the sultanate. The administration of provinces was assigned to members of the extended family, which eventually led to the breakdown of the empire into separate dynasties, such as those of Rūm, Syria, etc. The Fatimids, however, believed that only the caliph, with the help of the vizier who was the caliph's choice, was vested with the authority to run the imamate. By definition, the imāmate could not be shared because it was not an office but an authority designated by God to one man as the chosen person to lead the ummah; thus, one could argue that there was no division of power in the Fatimid caliphate. The members of the caliphal family did not participate in

---

47 Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 20.

48 Ibid., p. 9.

any administrative capacity and incidents where power
struggles occurred were very few. A struggle did arise
between the sons of the Caliph-Imām al-Mustanṣir at his
death in 487/1094 in which his eldest son sought to take
over the imāmate from his brother, who had been named by
al-Mustanṣir as al-Musta'lī bi'llāh, the new imām.[49]

The Abbasid administration, in contrast, had as its
ultimate aim the centralization of power. But because in
many ways the Abbasids were pioneers in creating new
administrative units and because they were also heirs to
the administrative legacies of the Byzantines and
Persians, they were unable to manage completely the

---

49 The sons of al-Mustanṣir were Nizār, 'Abd Allāh,
Ismā'īl, and Aḥmad, his youngest, who became al-Musta'lī
bi'llāh. It was Nizār who showed anger against his brother
and refused to give him allegiance (bay'ah) and went to
Alexandria, where he staged a rebellion. He protested by
saying: "Even if I am cut into pieces I refuse to give him
allegiance." Nizār lost his life in 488/1095 at the hands
of al-Afḍal ibn Badr al-Jamālī. This also started the
schism in Isma'īlism between the Nizāriyyah and the
mainstream. See al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 11-14. See also
Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, p. 35.

situation as they wished.[50] Moreover they were forever
experimenting with new ways of administering their
realms. The caliph, although vested with the power to be
the sole and absolute ruler, was unable to hold on to his
prerogatives and rights because he delegated authority to
families whose actual power equalled and paralleled his
own, such as the Barmakids and the Furāts, not to mention
the Buyids and Seljuks. Thus the Abbasids' weakness in
attaining a centralized system of government stemmed from
their policy of non-commitment to the newly-created
bureaus or administrative units. As Sourdel explains,
bureaus appeared and disappeared, sometimes for no
apparent reason.

Unlike the Seljuks and the Abbasids, the Fatimids
did not believe in the military fief system. They did
not depend on this type of system nor any other type of
indirect administration. For land tax collection, they

-----

50 "Si la qualité de kitab était regulièrement
requise du vizir, c'est qu'il avait pour première tache de
diriger les nombreux services administratifs qui régissaient
l'empire abbaside et qui hérite en partie de l'époque
umayyade, continuaient de tendre vers une centralisation et
un éfficacité qui ne furent jamais pleinement réalisées."
Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 580.

used the qabālah system, in which a given district paid a fix sum of money by contracting it out. The original system, which was devised by the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn, was greatly modified by the Fatimids. They auctioned the contracts to the highest bidder, and the contractors did not have to belong to the community concerned. Moreover, the contractors did not have to fix the canals and dikes in their tax-farming areas.[51] Tax-farming was not a hereditary position, yet some tax collectors were able to ensure their sons such employment. In many ways, the modifications were an improvement, but not in others, especially the question of not fixing irrigation canals, which meant that the yield of the land was reduced and, in turn, that taxes paid into the treasury were reduced. Al-Maqrīzī laments this situation in his Ighāthat al-ummah fī kashf al-ghummah.

Again, auctioning the position of tax collector avoided the hereditary tendency, but at the expense of the ra'iyyah, who during the reigns of weak imāms were taxed unmercifully; while under normal circumstances, a

---

51   M.A. Sha'bān, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 201.

system of checks and balances devised by the central administration and frequent surveys and censuses by the Fatimids ensured a fair system of taxation. The periodic cadastral survey (rawk) produced an equitable form of taxation assessed on the land and from merchants and ports. The Abbasids and Seljuks, on the other hand, had their taxes collected by fief holders (tax farmers) who, at their own discretion, sent the money to the central government. Cases of extortion from the populace were many. If the tax farmer found it expedient to gain extra money from the masses of peasants, he did not hesitate to increase their taxes in order to pocket the difference before sending the sums of money owed to the government. In the case of the Abbasids, the money collected went straight to the treasury, from where the caliph drew his personal and court expenditures. This meant that the leftover money was divided among the bureaus.

The Fatimid system was just the opposite of the Abbasid. Taxes collected went straight to the bureaus for payment of salaries and for the purpose of ensuring

that the bureaus' expenditures were met.[52] The leftover
money was sent to the treasury from where the Caliph-
Imām drew his palace expenditures. Although the public
treasury was by no means his personal property, he had
access to it if necessary. It was during times of crisis
such as famines, floods, and disasters that the caliph
drew money out of the treasury to relieve the human
suffering of his people.[53]

As far as the army officers were concerned, the
Fatimids rewarded them by granting them monetary awards
rather than by giving them iqtā' and depending on them
for running the provinces or the remote areas of the
caliphate.[54] Iqtā', however, was not completely

---

52 "Mais il était prévu, dans les finances de cette
époque, que chaque revenue serait spécialement affecté à une
dépense particulière de l'état. Le trésor publique et la
casette royale ne servaient seulement qu'à encaisser les
excédents de recettes et les réserves." A.M. Magued,
"L'Organisation financière en Égypte sous les fatimides."
L'Égypte Contemporaine, 53 (1962): 54.

53 Thierry Bianquis, "Une Crise frumentaire dans
l'Égypte fatimide," JESHO, 23 (1979): 70.

54 A description of the pay of the Turkish contingent
of al-Mustanṣir's army during the worst days of the Fatimid
(continued...)

nonexistent in Egypt. But, even when it existed, it was not in the form that was commonly known as iqṭāʿ jayshī. It was Claude Cahen who in "L'Administration financière de l'armée fatimide d'après al-Makhzūmī" brought to my attention a paragraph from al-Maqrīzī's Khiṭaṭ which confirms this point. He translated it as follows:

> Sache que ni sous les Fatimides d'Égypte ni
> sous les émirs qui les avaient précédés il
> n'y avait pour les armées du pays d'iqtaʿ à
> la manière de ce qui se pratique aujourd'hui
> pour les soldats de l'État "turc" [= mamlūk].
> Mais le pays était affermé moyennant des qab-
> ālāt déterminées à quiconque le voulait des
> émirs, des soldats, des notables arabes et coptes
> du district etc.[55]

54(...continued)
caliphate, when the treasury was empty, is in al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III, 275-76, 281. Many government offices dealt in promissory notes instead of cash when they were unable to meet all the pay of their employees until positive cash flow was achieved. Goitein draws the conclusion that "the society of the Fatimid period to a certain extent was based on a paper economy," either credit extended or payment made by promissory notes. S.D. Goitein, "Bankers' Accounts from the Eleventh Century A.D.," JESHO, 9 (1966): 28.

55 Claude Cahen, "L'Administration financière de l'armée fatimide d'après al-Makhzūmī," JESHO, 15 (1972): 173.

The Fatimids used _iqṭāʿ iʿtidād_, in which the land was leased out on the basis of a fixed period of time with a fixed amount of money based on cadastral surveys, thus the _ʿibrah_ method of payment. The _ʿibrah_ "was based on the average revenue as arrived at by taking the revenue of the best and worst years, adding them and dividing by two, after allowing for changes in prices and occasional events such as wars and plagues."[56]

Because the army personnel were kept as salaried individuals, the Fatimids avoided parcelling out their kingdom and thus causing the disintegration of the caliphate into small sultanates. The policy of the Fatimids vis-a-vis land ownership was built on the theory of the imamate. All land belonged to God, the imām was God's representative on earth and owned all the lands that he ruled over; as such he was free to grant pieces of land to whomever he pleased.[57] "The rest of the

---

56 Hassanein Rabie, "The Size and Value of the Iqṭāʿ in Egypt, 546-741 A.H./1169-1341 A.D.," Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 131.

57 "Les souverains fatimides étaient proprétaires de la terre d'Égypte à la façon des souverains pharoniques."

(continued...)

people who had been in possession of the land lost their titles to their properties but were allowed to continue to cultivate them. No one was forced off his land and it was passed from father to son....."[58] Thus, these previous freeholders became renters of the land as the tax they paid was kirā', or rent tax.[59]

As many historians concede, the Fatimid system of taxation and control over the land differed from that of the regimes which preceded the Fatimids or those which followed them. Both the Abbasids and Seljuks created bureaus or administrative units to divide the work of government among specialized entities so that tasks were done more efficiently. Yet both were imprecise in the definition of what the bureaus were supposed to do. While such was the case with the Abbasids and the Seljuks, the Fatimids increased the number of dīwāns from

---

57(...continued)
A.M. Magued, "L'Organisation financière en Égypte sous les fatimides," p. 48.

58 M.A. Sha'bān, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 200.

59 Ibid., p. 201; al-Maqrīzī, Al-Khiṭaṭ al-Maqrīziyyah (Cairo: Būlāq Press, 1833), I, 85.

the four they had inherited to twenty.[60] Thus the

intricate fabric of the administration. Many of the

dīwāns created by the Fatimids duplicated each others'

work on purpose in order to impose checks and balances,

so that no offenses could be committed by one without

their being caught by the other dīwāns.

The Fatimids also differed in their recruitment

policies and in their staffing of administrative units.

Their aim was competence, and they pursued it even if it

meant that their kuttāb were for the most part Coptic

Christians.[61] The Fatimids had no interest in injecting

their religion into the political arena, whereas this was

not true of the Seljuks or the Abbasids. The latter,

although they inherited a scribal class which was mainly

Christian, made an effort to staff their bureaus as time

passed with Muslims who were supporters of the Abbasid

---

60   See Chapter One for detailed information on the
dīwāns.

61   Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Armanī, Tārīkh fī nawāḥī Miṣr wa
aqṭā'ihā, ed. B.T.A. Evetts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894),
p. 47/fol 34b. On ff 28b and 29a, the author speaks of
Muḥammad as saying to his people to treat the Copts in Egypt
well, for "they will be you help and support." The author
cites an isnād on the authority of 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ.

da'wah. Ultimately they had a majority of non-Arab, highly-educated Muslims in the bureaucracy.[62] The Seljuks, on the other hand, groomed Sunni 'ulamā' and their students from the madrasah system to become administrators. The Nizāmiyyah schools were created precisely for the education of the new scribal class in a religiously-oriented manner, thus making Islam part and parcel of the sultanate's ideology.[63] The Fatimids practiced the separation of state and religion in that they did not offer to incorporate the 'ulamā' into the administrative system. The Fatimid dā'īs were not a bureaucratic cadre, nor were they salaried personnel in the administration. As we have seen, the Fatimid da'wah in many ways was underground in Egypt. "The Fatimid Caliph was an Emperor and a king of his vast domain, yet outside the boundaries of his Empire, he was shepherd of the 'da'wa' and its chief proselytizer."[64] The Fatimids

---

62 F.E. Peters, Allah's Commonwealth (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 403.

63 A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire," p. 214.

64 Bernard Lewis, "Ra'y fi tafsīr tārīkh al-Fāṭimiyyīn," Abhāth al-nadwah al-duwaliyyah li-tārīkh al-Qāhirah, I, 290.

sought to keep their _da'wah_ and their religious system completely separate from their civil administrative system so that one ran parallel to the other, converging and meeting only at the level of the caliph-imām. Thus, the Fatimids tried to prevent the corruption of the religious system.

The Abbasid and Seljuk _qāḍīs_ were salaried individuals. They were nominated practically for life, as was the case with all government officials.[65] Their pay was high so that they would not be tempted by bribes. Al-Qalqashandī relates that a certain _qāḍī_, Bakkār ibn Qutayba, was paid 1000 dinars per month.[66] The Fatimids, on the other hand, even when their chief _dā'ī_ was paid by the government, created a "divorce of the juridical from the executive authorities," thus a separation in which no crippling of the system took place.[67] Although the system of justice was administered according to an Ismā'īlī Shi'i code, the _qāḍīs_ were from many different

_____

65 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, _Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah_, p. 306.

66 _Ibid._, p. 318. See also al-Qalqashandī, _Ṣubḥ al-a'shā_, III, 526.

67 S.D. Goitein, _A Mediterranean Society_, II, 365.

madhhabs. This was possible because the difference
between the Shi'i code and the Sunni one are not great.[68]

Recruitment of the viziers was no different. The
Abbasids and Seljuks named only Muslims to the position,
while the Fatimids did not limit themselves to
recruitment only from among the Ismāʿīlīs, but were able
to recruit the most qualified men regardless of their
religious, social, economic, and educational backgrounds.
Thus, the Fatimids had several viziers who were freed
slaves and who were extremely capable men. Unlike the
Abbasids or Seljuks, the Fatimids did not look for
viziers from the scribal class; for although such a
qualification was a plus, it was not the only criterion
by which the Fatimids judged the merits of their
candidates for the vizierate. Thus, their viziers on the
whole were capable men who made it possible for the
caliphate to have a sense of continuity.

_____

68 "Toutefois, la justice se subit pas un grand
changement lorsque les lois Chiites remplacèrent les lois
sunnites, car les divergences entre le code chiite et le
code sunnite ne sont pas grandes." A.M. Magued, "La
Fonction de juge suprême dans l'état fatimide en Égypte,"
L'Égypte Contemporaine, 51 (1960): 45.

The chain of command, the fashion in which the Fatimids passed on an order coming from the vizier or the caliph, was a pyramid-like structure, so that the second, third, and so-on in the chain of command received instructions by order of their rank. In the Abbasid and Seljuk systems, in contrast, stratification was limited to three to four kinds of hierarchical positions. The Fatimids' "elaborate system of administration was organized with scientific precision," thus contributing to their success.[69] They were able to create a strong administration by putting emphasis on justice and freedom of trade. Through a justly-administered dīwān al-mazālim, the Fatimids were able to make propaganda for their dynasty and administration.[70] In an atmosphere of safety, the average merchant could flourish and the coffers of the state be replenished.

Building on what they inherited, the Fatimids reformed and created new apparatuses to deal with their own bureaucracy. They built their administration on the model of their da'wah, whereby they had different

_____

69 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I, 33.

70 A.M. Magued, "De quelques jurisdictions fatimides en Égypte," L'Égypte Contemporaine, 52 (1961): 47.

positions for different stages which a <u>dā'ī</u> could attain.
The result was a pyramid-like structure with a chain of
command and of orders working from top to bottom: from
one man, the caliph or vizier, to the simple employee.
Complaints worked their way up from those in the lower
echelons to the top administrator, the vizier, and even
sometimes to the caliph. Such was the system the
Fatimids devised which had no parallel in other Islamic
empires.

APPENDIX ONE

SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT DATA

ON THE FATIMID VIZIERS

Prefatory Note:

The first column in the table contains names and titles,
if any, for the viziers. The second column designates
religion and place of birth or origin. Professional and
economic backgrounds are summarized in the third column
(for a fuller explanation and analysis of this data, see
Chapter Three). The fourth column indicates the year of
assumption of office, the fifth the year and cause of
death, and the last the duration in office.

163

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
		REIGN OF AL-`AZĪZ BI'LLĀH (365-386/976-996)			
Ya`qūb ibn Killis	Jewish, Ismā`īlī; Iraq	Merchant; upper middle class	368/978	380/990 (natural)	13 yrs., 8 mos.
Jabr ibn al-Qāsim	Ismā`īlī; Maghrib	Scribal; upper class	373/983	-	3 mos.
Abū'l-Ḥasan `Alī ibn `Umar al-`Addās	Bāṭinī Muslim; ?	Scribal; ?	380/990	-	7 days
Abū'l-Faḍl Ja`far ibn al-Faḍl ibn al-Furāt	Sunni; Iraq	Scribal, vizierial; upper class	382/992	391/1000	1 year
		REIGN OF AL-ḤĀKIM BI-AMR ALLĀH (386-411/996-1021)			
`Īsā ibn Nastūrus ibn Sūrus	Copt; Egyptian	Scribal; ?	383/993	387/997 (killed)	3 years
Amīn al-Dawlah Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn `Ammār ibn Abī-'l-Ḥusayn [Amīnī `alā Dawlatī]	Ismā`īlī; Maghrib	Tribal shaykh; upper class	386/996	390/999 (killed)	1 year
Al-Ustādh Barjawān	Ismā`īlī; Sicily	Eunuch; slave	387/997	390/999 (killed)	3 years
Al-Ḥusayn ibn ┌Al-Qā'id Jawhar [qā'id al-quwwād]	Ismā`īlī; Maghrib	Military; upper class	390/999	401/1010 (killed)	3 years
│ --co-vizier with--					
└Abū'l-`Alā Fahd ibn Ibrāhīm [al-Ra'īs]	Christian; Egypt	Scribal; upper middle class	390/999	393/1002 (killed)	3 years
Zar`ah ibn Nastūrus [al-Shāfī]	Christian; Egypt	Scribal (son of a vizier); upper class	401/1010	403/1012 (natural)	2 years
Al-Ḥusayn ibn Ṭāhir al-Wazzān (wasāṭah) [amīn al-umanā']	Tawḥīdī (Druze?); Iran	Scribal; upper class	403/1012	405/1014 (killed)	2 years
Al-Ḥasan ibn ┌Abī Sayyid (wasāṭah)	Ismā`īlī; ?	Scribal; upper middle class	405/1014	405/1014 (killed)	62 days
│ -- co-vizier with --					
└`Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī al-Sayyid	Ismā`īlī; ?	Scribal; upper middle class	405/1014	405/1014 (killed)	62 days

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū'l-ʿAbbās al-Faḍl ibn al-Wazīr Abī'l-Faḍl Jaʿfar ibn al-Faḍl ibn al-Furāt (wasāṭah)	Sunni; Iraq	Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class	405/1014	405/1014 (killed)	5 days
Abū'l-Hasan ʿAlī ibn Jaʿfar ibn Falāḥ [wazīr al-wuzarāʾ dhū'l-riāsatayn al-amīr al-muẓaffar, quṭb al-dawlah]	Jewish; Ismāʿīlī; Maghrib	Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class	406/1015	409/1018?	3 years
Saʿīd ibn ʿĪsa ibn Nasṭūrus [al-amīn al-ẓāhir sharaf al-mulk tāj al-maʿālī dhū'l-jādīn, qāsim al-khilāfah]	Christian; Egypt	Scribal; brother & son of a vizier; upper class	409/1018	409/1018 (killed)	5 months
Abū'l-Fath Masʿūd ibn Ṭāhir al-Wazzān (wasāṭah) [al-amīr shams al-mulk al-makīn al-amīn]	Ismāʿīlī; Iran	Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class	409/1018, 410/1019, 414/1023 415/1024	? (natural)	2 years

REIGN OF AL-ẒĀHIR LI-IʿZĀZ DĪN ALLĀH (411-427/1021-1035)

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū'l-Husayn ʿAmmār ibn Muhammad (wasāṭah) [al-amīr al-khatīr raʾīs al-ruʾasāʾ]	Ismāʿīlī; ?	Scribal; upper middle class	411/1020	412/1012 (killed)	7 months & a few days
Mūsā ibn al-Hasan (wasāṭah) [Yadd al-dawlah Abū'l-Futūh]	Ismāʿīlī; ?	Scribal; upper middle class	413/1022 (twice)	413/1022 (killed)	9 months
Abū Muhammad al-Hasan ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Rūzabārī [ʿamīd al-dawlah wa nasīhuha]	Ismāʿīlī; Iraq	Scribal; upper middle class	418/1027	?	1 year

REIGN OF AL-MUSTANṢIR BI-ALLĀH (427-487/1036-1094)

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAlī ibn Ahmad Jirjirāʾī (wasāṭah)[al-wazīr al-ajall al-awhad ṣafī amīr al-muʾminīn wa khāliṣatuh]	Ismāʿīlī; Iraq	Scribal; middle class	418/1027	436/1044 (natural)	9 years
Abu-Manṣūr Ṣadaqah ibn Yūsuf al-Falāḥī (nominated by predecessor) [al-wazīr al-ajall tāj al-riʾāsah fakhr al-mulk Muṣṭafā amīr al-muʾminīn]	Jewish; Iraq	Scribal; son of a vizier; upper middle class	436/1044	439/1047 (killed)	3 years

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū'l-Barakāt Ḥusayn [sayyid al-wuzarā' zahīr al-a'immah samā' al-khulaṣā' fakhr al-ummah]	Ismā'īlī; Iraq	Scribal; nephew & son of viziers; upper class	440/1048	ca. 468/1075 (natural)	1 year
Sa'īd ibn Mas'ūd (wasāṭah) [Abū'l-Faḍl 'amīd al-mulk, zayn al-kufāt]	Ismā'īlī; ?	Scribal; upper class	441/1049	? (natural)_	1 year
Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Yazūrī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad al-makīn sayyid al-wuzarā' tāj al-aṣfiyā' qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt 'alam al-majd khāliṣat amīr al-mu'minīn al-nāṣir li'l-dīn ghayth al-Muslimīn]	Sunni; Palestine	Qāḍī; lower middle class	442/1050	450/1058 (killed)	8 years
Abū'l-Faraj 'Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad al-Bābilī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-as'ad al-makīn al-ḥāfiẓ al-amjad al-amīn 'amīd al-khilāfah jalāl al-wuzarā' tāj al-mamlakah wazr al-imāmah sharaf al-millah kafīl al-dīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn wa khāliṣatuh]	Ismā'īlī?; Iraq	Scribal; ?	450/1058 (twice) 452/1060 454/1062	454?/1062 (natural)	2 months, 14 days; 4 months, 10 days; 5 months; 11 months, 24 days
Abū'l-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Ja'far al-Maghribī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-kāmil al-awḥad ṣafī amīr al-mu'minīn wa khāliṣatuh]	Ismā'īlī; Maghrib	Scribal (grandson of a vizier); upper class	450/1058	478/1085 (natural)	2 years, 2 months
'Abdallāh ibn Yaḥyā ibn Mudabbir [al-wazīr al-ajall al-'ādil al-amīr sharaf al-wuzarā' sayyid al-ru'asā' tāj al-aṣfiyā' 'izz al-dīn mughīth al-Muslimīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn wa khāliṣatuh wa ṣafwatuh]	Sunni; Iraq	Adīb from a family of Abbasid viziers; upper class	453/1061 455/1063	455/1063 (natural)	several months
'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakīm [al-wazīr al-ajall fakhr al-wuzarā' 'amīd al-ru'asā' qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt majd al-ma'ālī kafīl al-dīn yamīn amīr al-mu'minīn wa ṣafwatuh]	Ismā'īlī; Syria	Qāḍī; middle class	453/1061	454/1062 (natural)	1 year

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū-ʿAlī Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm ibn Saʿīd [al-wazīr al-ajall qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dāʿī al-duʿāt thiqat al-Muslimīn khalīl amīr al-muʾminīn wa khāliṣatuh]	Ismāʿīlī; Syria	Scribal; son of vizier above, first to succeed his father; upper class	454/1062	? (natural)	17 days
Abū-ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Sadid al-Dawlah [al-wazīr al-sayyid al-ajall al-kāmil al-awḥad dhū'l-kafalatayn]	? ; Syria	Scribal; ?	454/1062	478/1085 (natural)	6 months; returned to Syria
Abū-Aḥmad Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad sayyid al-wuzarāʾ majd al-aṣfiyāʾ qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dāʿī al-duʿāt khalīl amīr al-muʾminīn]	Ismāʿīlī; Syria	Qāḍī; nephew of vizier & qāḍī; upper class	455/1063 (twice)	455/1063? (natural)	2 months, 45 days
Abū-Ghālib ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir ibn Faḍl ibn al-ʿAjamī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad al-asʿad tāj al-wuzarāʾ al-amīn al-makīn sharaf al-kufāt dhū'l-mafākhir khalīl amīr al-muʾminīn wa khāliṣatuh]	Ismāʿīlī; ?	Qāḍī, dāʿī; upper middle class	455/1063 (several times); 456/1063, 465/1072	465/1072 (killed)	3 months; 34 days; 1 day
Al-Ḥasan ibn al-Qāḍī ibn Kudaynah [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad jalāl al-Islām ẓāhir al-imām qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dāʿī al-duʿāt sharaf al-majd khalīl amīr al-muʾminīn wa khāliṣatuh]	Ismāʿīlī of Khārijī origin; Iraq?	Qāḍī; upper class	455-466/1063-1073 (5 times; 6 times as qāḍī al-quḍāt)	466/1073 (killed)	?
Abū'l-Makārim al-Musharraf ibn Asʿad [wazīr al-wuzarāʾ al-ʿādil khalīl amīr al-muʾminīn]	Sunni; Iraq	Scribal; client of Abū'l-Faraj al-Bābilī; upper middle class	456/1063 457/1064	466/1073 (killed)	2 months
Abū-ʿAlī al-Ḥasan ibn Abī-Saʿd Ibrāhīm ibn Sahl al-Tustarī [al-ʿamīd ʿalam al-kufāt]	Jewish; Iraq	Merchant; upper middle class	456/1063	?	10 days
Abū'l-Qāsim Hibat Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Raʿyānī [al-wazīr al-ajall sayyid al-wuzarāʾ tāj al-aṣfiyāʾ dhukhrat amīr al-muʾminīn]	?; ? (ṭāriʾ ʿalā Miṣr)	Scribal; ?	457/1064 (twice)	?	10 days; 10 days
Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn al-Anbārī [al-athīr kāfī'l-kufāt]	?; Syria	Scribal; middle class	457/1064	? (killed)	less than one month

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū-ʿAlī al-Ḥasan ibn Sadīd al-Dawlah Dhū'l-Kafalatayn [al-wazīr al-ajall tāj al-ri'āsah ʿalam al-dīn sayyid al-sādāt]	Shiʿi (imāmī); Egypt	Sayyid; brother of a vizier; upper class	457/1064	? (natural)	a few days
Abū-Shujāʿ Muḥammad ibn al-Ashraf [al-ajall al-muʿazzam fakhr al-mulk]	Sunni; Iraq	Scribal, military (son of Iraqi vizier); upper class	457/1064	466/1073 (killed)	a few days
Abū'l-Ḥasan Ṭāhir ibn Wazīr [al-ajall aḷwajīh sayyid al-kufāt nafīs al-dawlah zahīr amīr al-mu'minīn]	? ; Syria	Scribal; ?	458/1066	?	a few days
Abū-ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Abī-Ḥamid [al-qādir al-ʿādil shams al-umam sayyid ru'asā' al-sayf wa'l-qalam tāj al-ʿulā ʿamīd al-hudā sharaf al-dīn ghayyāth al-Islām wa'l-Muslimīn hamīm amīr al-mu'minīn wa zahīruh]	? ; Egypt	Scribal, military; upper class	458/1066	? (killed)	1 day
Abū-Saʿd Manṣūr, known as Abū Zunbur [al-ajall al-awḥad al-makīn al-sayyid al-afḍal al-amīn sharaf al-kufāt ʿamīd al-khilāfah muḥibb amīr al-mu'minīn]	Christian; Egypt	? (son of nāẓir al-rīf); ?	458/1066	?	a few days; fled office
Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ ʿAbd al-Ghanī ibn Naṣr ibn Saʿīd al-Ḍayf (wasāṭah) [al-sādiq al-ma'mūn makīn al-dawlah wa amīnuha]	Muslim; ?	Scribal; ?	458/1066	466/1073 (killed)	8 years
Abū-Najm Badr al-Jamālī al-Mustanṣirī [al-sayyid al-ajall amīr al-juyūsh sayf al-Islām nāṣir al-imām]	Ismāʿīlī; Armenian	Military, mamlūk; slave	466/1073	488/1095 (natural)	21 years
Abū'l-Qāsim Shāhinshāh ibn Badr al-Mustanṣirī [al-sayyid al-ajall al-afḍal sayf al-imām jalāl al-Islām sharaf al-ānām nāṣir al-dīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn]	Ismāʿīlī; Armenian	Military, scribal (son of Badr al-Jamālī); freed slave	487/1094 (succeeded father)	515/1121 (killed)	28 years

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū-`Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Abī-Shujā` al-Āmirī [al-sayyid al-ajall al-ma'mūr tāj al-khilāfah `izz al-Islām fakhr al-ānām niẓām al-dīn khāliṣat amīr al-mu'minīn]	Ismā`īlī; Egypt	Military, scribal; freed slave	515/1121	522/1128 (killed)	4 years

NO VIZIERS DURING REIGN OF AL-ĀMIR (519-524/1125-1129)

INTERREGNUM, 524-526/1129-1131

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū'l-`Alī Aḥmad ibn al-Sayyid al-Ajall Al-Afḍal Shāhinshāh, Amīr al-Juyūsh (wazīr al-sayf wa'l-qalam)	Imāmī; Armenian	Scribal (son and grand-son of viziers); upper middle class	524/1129	526/1131 (killed)	1 year, 1 month, 13 days
Abū'l-Fatḥ Yānis [amīr al-juyūsh]	Christian; "Rūmī"	Military, mamlūk; slave	526/1131	526/1131 (killed)	9 months, a few days

NO VIZIERS DURING PART OF AL-ḤĀFIẒ LI-DĪN ALLĀH'S REIGN, 526-529/1131-1134

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Abū Muẓaffar Bahrām al-Armanī [sayf al-Islām tāj al-mulūk]	Christian; Armenian	Military, scribal; prince, upper class	529/1134	535/1140 (natural)	2 years
Raḍwān ibn al-Walakhshī	Sunni; Egypt	Military, scribal; amīr	531/1136	533/1138 (killed)	2 years, 5 months

NO VIZIERS DURING LAST PART OF AL-ḤĀFIẒ'S REIGN, 533-544/1138-1149

CALIPHATE OF AL-ẒĀFIR BI-AMR ALLĀH (544-549/1149-1154)

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Maṣāl [al-sayyid al-ajall al-mufaḍḍal amīr al-juyūsh]	Ismā`īlī; Maghrib	? ; amīr	544/1149	544/1149 (killed)	2 months
`Alī ibn al-Sālār al-amīr Muẓaffar Abū'l-Ḥasan [al-`Ādil]	Sunni; Egypt	Military, scribal; amīr	544/1149	548/1153 (killed)	3 1/2 years
`Abbās ibn Yaḥyā ibn Badīs	Sunni; Maghrib	Scribal (nephew of a vizier); amīr	548/1153	?	1 year; fled office

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office

CALIPHATES OF AL-FĀ'IZ BI-NAṢR ALLĀH AND AL-ʿĀḌIO BI'LLĀH (549-555/1154-1160) AND (555-567/1160-1172)

Name & Titles	Religion & Place of Origin	Professional and Economic Background	Year Assumed Office	Year & Cause of Death	Duration in Office
Ṭalā'i' ibn RazzTk (wizārat kifālah) [al-sayyid al-ajall al-malik al-ṣāliḥ]	Imāmī; Armenian	Military, scribal; upper class	549/1154	?	7 years, 4 months
RazzTk ibn Ṭalā'i' [al-ʿādil ibn al-ṣāliḥ]	Imāmī; Armenian	Military, scribal; son of vizier; upper class	556/1160	?	2 years
Shāwar ibn MujTr al-Saʿdī [al-ajall al-nāṣir sanad al-imām zaʿTm al-ānām mujTr al-Islām khadam amīr al-mu'minTh]	Sunni; Arab (tribal)	Military; shaykh	558/1162 559-564/1163-1168	? (natural)	4 years, 8 months
Dirghām ʿĀmir ibn Suwār al-LukhamT [shams al-khilāfah abū'l-ashbāl]	Sunni; Yemen	Military; amīr	558/1162	559/1163 (killed)	9 months
Asad al-DTn Shirkūh	Sunni; Kurd	Military; ?	564/1168	564/1168 (natural)	2 months
Ṣalāḥ al-DTn al-AyyūbT	Sunni; Kurd	Military	564/1168	-	-

Ṣalāḥ al-DTn al-AyyūbT assumed power in his own right and became sultan, ending the Fatimid caliphate.

APPENDIX TWO

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF

THE FATIMID VIZIERS

REIGN OF AL-'AZĪZ BI'LLĀH (365-386/976-996)

Ya'qūb ibn Killis (368-380/978-990)
(For a full account of his life and career, see Chapter Three).

Jabr ibn al-Qāsim (373-374/983-984)
A Maghribī from a very prominent sedentary (ḥaḍar) family, he served al-'Azīz in the capacity of his "heir" (khalīfah) when the latter was in Syria.[1] Al-'Azīz brought him as a vizier when Ibn Killis was imprisoned because of a misunderstanding between the latter and the caliph; but when Ibn Killis was released, Jabr returned to his previous position as head of the police of both Upper and Lower Egypt.

Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Umar al-'Addās (380-381/990-991)
He became vizier (ḍāmin, guarantor of affairs of state) when Ibn Killis died. It is important to note here that the caliph al-'Azīz had a hard time finding a vizier after Ibn Killis's death. No-one could measure up to Ya'qūb, and the standard was very difficult to meet. Thus, al-'Azīz had a succession of viziers with limited prerogatives who occupied the office only for a year or less. Al-'Addās was no exception. Furthermore, he mismanaged collection of the kharāj and thus reduced the caliphate's income. Accused of embezzlement, he was acquitted because he was not guilty of stealing but of

---

1 Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah ilā man nāla al-wizārah, p. 90; also see Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah, p. 38.

mismanagement. He spent fifty-seven days out of his one-year term in prison.

Abū'l-Faḍl Ja'far ibn al-Furāt (382-343/992-993)

He was the vizier of the Ikhshīdī ruler, Kāfūr, and continued as such even when Jawhar conquered Egypt. The latter "re-instated him in his position" during the early part of his rule over Egypt.[2] Named by al-'Azīz as his vizier, he seems to have been a competent servant, yet he did not last more than a year. He is said to have died in 391, but the biographers are not very sure even of the date.[3] There is a consensus of the medieval historians concerning his lineage: he was the great-grandson of a vizier, many of his family having served as viziers of the Abbasids.

'Īsā ibn Nastūrus (383-386/993-996)

This vizier of al-'Azīz belonged to a Coptic family. A scribe and secretary of finance before becoming vizier, he was noted for having amassed large amounts of kharāj money through his strict collection policy. Ibn Nastūrus was accused by some contemporaries of hiring only Christians for positions in the dīwāns and of firing

---

2 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, III?, 119.

3 In his edition of Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 87, 'Abd Allāh Mukhliṣ quotes Yāqūt, Mu'jam al-udabā' and Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-a'yān as giving two years for Ibn al-Furāt's death; but Mukhliṣ feels that the former source is more accurate.

Muslims.[4] Whether this favoritism was alleged by biased Muslim historians or whether the vizier actually discriminated in recruitment cannot be verified. However, one should remember that the staff of the bureaus in the early days of the caliphate in Egypt came from the Coptic class of professional scribes; one might then take the Muslim historians' criticisms as sour grapes or envy. Regardless of whether the accusation was right, Ibn Nastūrus all the same lost his position as vizier and was killed by the caliph al-Ḥākim in 391/1000.

REIGN OF AL-ḤĀKIM BI-AMR ALLĀH (386-411/996-1021)

Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn 'Ammār ibn Abī'l-Ḥusayn [Amīn al-Dawlah] (386-387/996-997)

A nobleman from the Kutāmah tribe of north Africa, he was known to be an able diplomat who would negotiate a settlement rather than resort to war. He actually left office after an insurrection in the army between the Maghribīs and the Turks, which prompted him to retire to private life. He was in office for one year only and was the first vizier to receive an honorific title.[5]

---

4 'Alī Nūr al-Dīn al-Azharī, Al-Nuzhah al-saniyyah fī dhikr al-khulafā' wa'l-mulūk al-Miṣriyyah, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1815, fol 153r; Ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah, p. 41; 'Alā' al-Dīn Juvaynī, Tārīkh-i Jihānqushāy (Tehran: Maṭba'aṭ-i Majles, 1352 A.H.), p. 94.

5 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1966), IX, 118.

Barjawān [al-Ustādh] (387-390/997-999)

A white eunuch, he ascended to the highest office of
state. He was entrusted by al-'Azīz to take the oath
(bay'ah) for al-Ḥākim. Barjawān was also al-'Azīz's
choice to be al-Ḥākim's chief administrator until the
latter came of age. Barjawān was nonetheless unable to
exercise his prerogatives as mudabbir al-dawlah because
Ibn 'Ammār (the vizier described above) claimed the
vizierate for himself. Barjawān remained very close to
al-Ḥākim and eventually was able to seize the vizierate
for himself.[6] He was in power for three years, at the
end of which he was murdered on orders from al-Ḥākim.
Although he was successful in his wars against the
caliphate's enemies, Barjawān's unrestricted powers
threatened al-Ḥākim and prompted the caliph to have him
murdered.

Al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Qā'id Jawhar [Qā'id al-Quwwād] (390-393/999-1002)

He was named as vizier when Barjawān was murdered but he
was not alone in this position. He had to share the
vizierate with Abū'l-'Alā' Fahd ibn Ibrāhīm (see below).
Al-Ḥusayn was an army general who was very careful in his
dealings with others lest he be accused of mismanagement
by al-Ḥākim and thus lose his life, which occurred after
he abandoned his post when his co-vizier was killed.

---

6   Ibid., IX, 119-120.

Abū'l-'Alā' Fahd ibn Ibrāhīm [Al-Ra'īs] (390-393/999-1002)

He shared the vizierate with al-Husayn ibn Jawhar. He had been the head of the dīwāns. After falling out of favor with the caliph al-Hākim, he was murdered like his predecessors.[7]

Zar'ah ibn Nastūrus [Al-Shāfī] (401-403/1010-1012)

His vizierate was spent in accumulating wealth for the Fatimids and in organizing affairs of state after an interruption in the vizierate and the murder by al-Hākim of many administrators. A son of 'Īsa ibn Nastūrus, Zar'ah died a natural death while in office.

Al-Husayn ibn Tāhir al-Wazzān [Amīn al-Umanā'] (403-405/1012-1014)

Prior to his vizierate, he was the head of the treasury (bayt al-māl). He was obsessed with collection of taxes to the point that after the death of the vizier al-Husayn ibn Jawhar, he sold all the latter's properties and deposited the proceeds in the treasury. For no apparent reason, he was killed personally by al-Hākim when the two went out riding together. His was not a vizierate as such but a wasātah, a limited vizierate by definition. This vizier was an "intercessor" between the caliph and his subjects. This kind of vizierate was very common during al-Hākim's reign, for the caliph did not believe in delegating power to anyone.[8]

---

7 Ibid., IX, 122.

8 Ibn al-Sayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 83.

Al-Ḥasan ibn Abī al-Sayyid (405/1014) and 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī al-Sayyid (405/1014)

These two brothers shared the position of wasāṭah. They were regarded as honest men and collected the government's dues with strictness. For no apparent reason they fell out of favor and were murdered after only sixty-two days in office.

Abū'l-'Abbās al-Faḍl (405/1014)

He was the son of the vizier Abū'l-Faḍl Ja'far ibn al-Faḍl ibn al-Furāt. A vizier by wasāṭah, he was in office for only five days before being murdered on orders of the caliph.

Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Ja'far ibn Falāḥ [Wazīr al-wuzarā' dhū-al-riyāsatayn al-amīr al-muẓaffar quṭb al-dawlah] (406-409/1015-1018)

A prominent man from the Kutāmah tribe, he was a close friend of al-Ḥākim, and his family were close friends of the Fatimids. Al-Ḥākim was very generous with 'Alī ibn Ja'far when he bestowed the vizierate on him: he gave him a large sum of money and a great number of beasts of burden. In addition, this vizier was given the governorships of Alexandria, Tannīs, and Dimyāṭ, the prefecture of police, and the ḥisbah. After all the power and money given to him, he nevertheless suffered the same fate as his predecessors: he was killed when riding home.

Sa'īd ibn 'Īsa ibn Nastūrus [al-Amīn al-ẓāhir sharaf al-mulk tāj al-ma'ālī dhū'l-jādayn] (409/1018)

He was named vizier as was his brother before him; he did not last more than six months before being killed. Al-Ḥākim had given him a vizierate of the sword and the pen, for he was qāsim al-khilāfah or sharer of the caliphate.[9]

Al-Mas'ūd ibn Ṭāhir al-Wazzān [al-Amīr shams al-mulk al-makīn al-amīn abū'l-fatḥ] (409-410, 414-415/1018-1019, 1023-1024)

Given a wasāṭah or limited vizierate, he conducted government business from his own home as had Ibn Killis. He was spared death at the hands of al-Ḥākim and was renamed vizier by the new caliph, al-Ẓāhir, when al-Jirjirā'ī took over as regent for al-Ẓāhir.

REIGN OF AL-ẒĀHIR LI-I'ZĀZ DĪN ALLĀH (411-427/1021-1035)

Abū'l-Ḥusayn 'Ammār ibn Muḥammad [al-Amīr al-khaṭīr ra'īs al-ru'asā'] (411/1020)

A scribe and head of dīwān al-inshā', he was a diplomat of sorts, for he mediated among the Turks, the Easterners (al-Mashāriqah) and the hadarah (soldiers of sedentary, non-bedouin origin) in the army. He also took the oath for al-Imām al-Ẓāhir li-I'zāz Dīn Allāh after the disappearance of al-Ḥākim. He remained in office for seven months and a few days, then lost his life.

---

9 Ibid., p. 80.

Mūsā ibn al-Ḥasan [Yad al-dawlah abū'l-futūḥ] (413/1022)
In the service of al-Ḥākim as prefect of police, he
became governor al-Ṣaʿīd for al-Ẓāhir in 412/1021 and was
also head of dīwān al-inshā'. He became vizier by
wasāṭah and lasted for nine months, after which he was
imprisoned then killed.

Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Rūzbārī [ʿAmīd al-
dawlah wa naṣīḥuhā] (418/1027)
An elderly man who was well-versed in the art of
government, he was administrator of Ramlah during al-
ʿAzīz's caliphate. He also became the governor of al-
Shām, then the head of dīwān al-jaysh, and finally
vizier. According to Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, he was mistreated
by al-Ẓāhir, who did not respect his age and seniority
and threw him out of office, reinstated him, then
dismissed him again.

Abū'l-Qāsim ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Jirjirā'ī [al-Wazīr al-
ajall al-awḥad ṣafī amīr al-mu'minīn wa khāliṣatuh] (418-
427/1027-1035)
An Iraqi by birth, he came with his brothers to Egypt and
joined the Fatimid bureaucracy in the Ṣaʿīd during the
reign of al-Ḥākim. So many complaints were voiced
against him that al-Ḥākim punished him by cutting off his
hands. Vizier of al-Ẓāhir from 418-427/107-1035, when
al-Ẓāhir died, al-Jirjirā'ī took the oath for al-
Mustanṣir bi'llāh and remained in his service for nine
years. He died a natural death. The mastermind of the

Fatimid recapture of north Africa,[10] he also subdued
revolts against Fatimid rule in Syria.

REIGN OF AL-MUSTANṢIR BI'LLĀH (427-487/1036-1094)

Abū Manṣūr Ṣadaqah ibn Yūsuf al-Falāḥī [al-wazīr al-
ajall tāj al-riyāsah fakhr al-mulk muṣṭafā amīr al-
mu'minīn] (436-439/1044-1047)

A convert to Islam from Judaism, he was a personal friend
of and aide to al-Jirjirā'ī, who had asked al-Mustanṣir
to name him as vizier after his death. He became the
vizier as al-Jirjirā'ī wanted. Al-Falāḥī was not a
strong man and had to share power and position with Abū-
Sa'd al-Tustarī, the personal director of al-Mustanṣir's
mother's affairs. Al-Tustarī was the owner of al-
Mustanṣir's slave-mother and sold her to al-Ẓāhir. With
the two dhimmīs in control of the caliphate, there was
widespread anger at the power which these two men
enjoyed.[11] Al-Falāḥī was resentful of al-Tustarī's
power, however, and sought to phase him out. The latter
was killed but his death did not mean that al-Falāḥī was
free finally to run affairs for al-Mustanṣir. On the

---

10 Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Ḥammād, Akhbār mulūk Banī
'Ubayd wa sīratuhum (Algiers: Carbonel, 1927), p. 59.

11 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah fī
akhbār Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale,
MS arabe 5871, fol 157r.

contrary, the mother of al-Mustanṣir saw to it that he was imprisoned and executed in 439/1047.[12]

Abū'l-Barakāt al-Ḥusayn [sayyid al-wuzarā' ẓahīr al-a'immah samā' al-khulaṣā' fakhr al-ummah] (440-441/1048-1049)

A brother of al-Jirjirā'ī and an Iraqi by birth, he took over the vizierate after al-Falāḥī. He was known for confiscating properties, imprisoning people and exiling many more. The same fate befell him as had befallen his predecessor: he was imprisoned by al-Mustanṣir, only to be exiled to Syria in 441/1049.

Abū'l-Faḍl Sa'īd ibn Mas'ūd ['amīd al-mulk zayn al-kufāt] (441-442/1049-1050)

A senior scribe and a dīwān head, he was in charge of dīwān al-Shām until he was asked to become a wasīṭ, a lesser form of vizier.

Abū-Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Yāzūrī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad al-mukīn sayyid al-wuzarā' tāj al-aṣfiyā' qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt 'alam al-majd khāliṣat amīr al-mu'minīn] (442-450/1050-1058)

Al-Yāzūrī was catapulted into office. A member of neither the scribal nor the military class, he was born in a small village called Yāzūr, located in the district of al-Ramlah in Palestine. Ibn al-Athīr describes him as

---

12 For a complete account of al-Falāḥī and al-Tustarī's relationship, see al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, II, 195-197.

a peasant who knew nothing but his trade.[13] Al-Yāzūrī's
father was the village qāḍī. Al-Yāzūrī left Ramlah for
Cairo where he became nāẓir of dīwān al-sayyidah, al-
Mustanṣir's mother, after which he became Sunni qāḍī.
Al-Mustanṣir made him his vizier and bestowed on him
several honorific titles, not the least of which was dā'ī
al-du'āt, in itself a contradiction, as al-Yāzūrī was a
Sunni. Desperate as al-Mustanṣir was to have a vizier
during this period of his caliphate, when famine,
disease, and war threatened his rule, he was willing to
make concessions to anyone who would relieve him of these
pressures. Al-Yāzūrī got yet another concession from al-
Mustanṣir, who allowed him to have his name included on
newly-minted coins.[14] This was the reward that the
caliph gave him for subduing Banū Qurrah (the Arabs of
al-Jazīrah in Egypt), who were opponents of the caliph.[15]
Al-Yāzūrī took care of may other enemies of the caliphate
and wanted to go as far as acquiring Baghdad for his
master. His expenditures on war at a time when famine
and disease were widespread and when the Nile was low
depleted the treasury, thus leading to more disasters.
Moreover, al-Yāzūrī did away with fixed prices on
staples, thus causing prices to soar and more persons to
die because they could not pay for food. Having depleted

---

13 Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh, IX, 566.

14 Text in al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah, fol 156v.
See Chapter One, note 71.

15 Ibn al-Qalānisī, Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq (Beirut:
al-Maṭba'ah al-Yasū'iyyah, 1908), p. 84.

the treasury, al-Yāzūrī was removed by al-Mustanṣir from the vizierate, placed under house arrest, and executed as a traitor.[16]

Abū'l-Faraj 'Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad al-Bābilī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-as'ad al-makīn al-ḥāfiẓ al-amjad al-amīn 'amīd al-khilāfah jalāl al-wuzarā' tāj al-mamlakah wazr al-imāmah sharaf al-millah kafīl al-dīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn wa khāliṣatuh] (450, 452, 454/1058, 1060, 1062) A scribe who was a well-known mathematician and prose writer, he was brought into al-Yāzūrī's court to help him. After al-Yāzūrī's death he was asked on three occasions by al-Mustanṣir to become vizier. These vizierates were for very short periods, none exceeding five months.

Abū'l-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Ja'far al-Maghribī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-kāmil al-awḥad ṣafī amīr al-mu'minīn wa khāliṣatuh] (450-452/1058-1060) He had fled Egypt during al-Ḥākim's reign because his grandfather, father, and uncles were killed by that caliph. He subsequently came back from the Maghrib, where he had hidden, and joined the government of al-Yāzūrī. When al-Bābilī became vizier, he imprisoned Abū'l-Faraj as a suspect who had been a friend of al-Yāzūrī; but when al-Bābilī was dismissed, Abū'l-Faraj was named vizier by al-Mustanṣir. He remained in office for two years, after which he negotiated with the caliph to give him a position as head of a dīwān. He got his wish

_____

16 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Al-Fāṭimiyyūn fī Miṣr, p. 251.

and became head of dīwān al-inshā'. This was the first time that a vizier was offered a "demotion" and reinstated into the kuttāb cadre.[17]

'Abdallāh ibn Yahyā ibn Mudabbir [al-wazīr al-ajall al-'ādil al-amīr sharaf al-wuzarā' sayyid al-ru'asā' tāj al-aṣfiyā' 'izz al-dīn mughīth al-Muslimīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn] (453, 455/1061, 1063)
Twice vizier, but for very short periods, he was an Iraqi from a well-known family whose history is related by the chroniclers. Ibn Mudabbir was a learned Sufi. Unfortunately he died while in office and had little influence on events.

'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam [al-wazīr al-ajall fakhr al-wuzarā' 'amīd al-ru'asā' qāḍī'l-qudāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt majd al-ma'ālī kafīl al-dīn yamīn amīr al-mu'minīn] (453-454/1061-1062)
Born into a family of qāḍīs, he was the first in his family to become a vizier. His father was qāḍī in Tripoli (in Syria) but he moved to Egypt. 'Abd al-Karīm died five months after he took office.

Abū 'Alī Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakīm ibn Sa'īd [al-wazīr al-ajall qāḍī'l-qudāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt thiqat al-Muslimīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn] (454/1062)
He was vizier for only seventeen days, prior to which he was a qāḍī. Nothing is known about him except for his reputation for piety and religiosity.

---

17 Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-ishārah, p. 65.

Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Sadīd [al-wazīr al-sayyid al-ajall al-kāmil al-awḥad] (454/1062)

A Damascene who was a well-known writer and scribe, he was brought from Syria to become the vizier of al-Mustanṣir for six months only, after which he returned to his native land to become its governor.

Abū-Aḥmad Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakīm [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad sayyid al-wuzarā' majd al-aṣfiyā' qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt] (455/1063)

Twice vizier in the same year, but only in power for three and a half months, he alternated being between qāḍī'l-quḍāt and vizier. After his second vizierate, he left for al-Shām.

Abū-Ghālib 'Abd al-Ẓāhir ibn Faḍl ibn al'Ajamī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad al-as'ad tāj al-wuzarā' al-amīn al-mukīn sharaf al-kufāt dhū'l-mafākhir khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn] (455, 456, 465/1063, 1064, 1072)

Three times vizier, but for very short periods, he was in office the first time for three months, the second for thirty-four days, and in the first days of his third vizierate he was killed. His last vizierate came at a point when the caliphate was on the point of collapse. With famine and plague ravaging Egypt, and with the army stealing the goods of the ra'iyyah, no vizier was able to correct the situation.[18] When human beings engaged in

---

18 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 20; Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Iyās, Kitāb tārīkh Miṣr: badā'i' al-zuhūr fī waqā'i' al-duhūr (Cairo: Būlāq Press, 1311/1896), p. 61.

cannibalism, there was no room for a son of a dā'ī and a pious man to become vizier.

Al-Ḥasan ibn Kudaynah [al-wazīr al-ajall al-awḥad jalāl al-Islām ẓāhir al-imām qāḍī'l-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt sharaf al-majd khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn] (455-466/1063-1073)

Al-Ḥasan was five times vizier and six times qāḍī'l-quḍāt in ten years. He was a tyrant who inflicted pain on innocent men. For lack of better men to assume the vizierate under al-Mustanṣir, al-Ḥasan was invested with executive powers. He was the vizier when Badr al-Jamālī arrived in Egypt and personally struck him down.

Abū'l-Makārim al-Musharraf ibn As'ad al-Bābilī [wazīr al-wuzarā' al-'ādil khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn] (456, 457/1064, 1065)

Abū'l-Makārim was twice vizier of al-Mustanṣir. His vizierates were for short periods, one for two months and the other for less than two months.

Abū-'Alī al-Ḥasan ibn Abī-Sa'd Ibrāhīm ibn Sahl al-Tustarī [al-'amīd 'alam al-kufāt] (end of 456 -beginning of 457/1064)

He was vizier for ten days only, then asked to be relieved of his duties. Prior to his vizierate, he was secretary of the treasury. His father had been director of the affairs of al-Mustanṣir's mother. Ḥasan's family was known in Cairo as wealthy merchants whose holdings are described by al-Maqrīzī (Itti'āẓ, volume II) and by Ibn Muyassar (Tārīkh Miṣr).

Abū'l-Qāsim Hibat Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Ra'yānī [al-wazīr al-ajall sayyid al-wuzarā' tāj al-aṣfiyā' dhukhrat amīr al-mu'minīn] (457/1065)

An alien resident in Egypt, he was employed in its government and attained the vizierate twice, each time for ten days.[19]

Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn al-Anbārī [al-athīr kāfī'l-kufāt] (457/1065)

In office for less than one month, as all the other viziers of this era, he was unable to change existing conditions in Egypt. He was a Shāmī by origin and was employed as deputy head of the chancellery in al-Shām.

Abū-'Alī al-Ḥasan ibn Sadīd al-Dawlah [al-wazīr al-ajall tāj al-riyāsah 'alam al-dīn sayyid al-sādāt] (457/1065)

He spent only a few days as vizier. Because of the lack of respect shown by government employees and because of the state of affairs of the caliphate, he left the vizierate for al-Shām, where he remained until conditions in Egypt changed. He returned to Egypt only to die.

Abū-Shujā' Muḥammad ibn al-Ashraf [al-ajall al-mu'aẓẓam fakhr al-mulk] (457/1065)

A man of high integrity and tremendous wealth, he was the son of a vizier who had served the Buyid Sultan Bahā' al-Dawlah. The chroniclers of the time mention the family's

---

19 Al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah, fol 157r. Fatimid historians of the time have been unable to assign him a place in Egyptian society except in these terms: min al-ṭāri'īn 'alā Miṣr.

wealth. Abū Shujā' was vizier for only a few days. He left for Syria by sea but was intercepted by Badr al-Jamālī, the commander in chief of the Fatimid army, who killed him.

Abū'l-Ḥasan Ṭāhir ibn Wazīr [al-ajall al-wajīh sayyid al-kufāt nafīs al-dawlah ẓahīr amīr al-mu'minīn] (458/1066) After a few days as vizier, he left for Tripoli, Syria, his birth place. Prior to his vizierate, he was a scribe in dīwān al-inshā'.

Abū-'Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Abī-Ḥāmid [al-qadīr al-'ādil shams al-umam sayyid ru'asā' al-sayf wa'l-qalam tāj al-'ulā 'amīd al-hudā sharaf al-dīn ghayyāth al-Islām wa'l-Muslimīn ḥamīm amīr al-mu'minīn] (458/1066) He was a vizier for one day, after which he was dismissed and killed by al-Mustanṣir. He came from a rich family from Tannīs.

Abū-Sa'd Manṣūr ibn Zunbur [al-ajall al-awḥad al-makīn al-sayyid al-afḍal al-amīn sharaf al-kufāt 'amīd al-khilāfah muḥibb amīr al-mu'minīn] (458/1066) Abū-Sa'd was no different than his predecessors, the viziers who spent a few days or months in office. He was in the executive chair for only a few days, after which he fled because the army demanded their paychecks and he knew that the treasury was empty. He was a Christian in the service of the Fatimids, as was his father before him.

Abū'l-'Alā' 'Abd al-Ghanī ibn Naṣr ibn Sa'īd al-Dayf [al-
ṣādiq al-mu'min makīn al-dawlah wa amīnuha] (458-
466?/1066-1073)

According to Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Abū'l-'Alā' was an employee
of al-Yāzūrī when the latter was vizier. He was given a
wasāṭah vizierate with limited prerogatives until Badr
al-Jamālī was called to save Egypt and become vizier.
Ibn Muyassar, on the other hand, said that Abū'l-'Alā'
was only in office for a few days and that Ibn Abī
Kudaynah (mentioned above) was the vizier when Badr
arrived in Egypt.[20] Al-Maqrīzī spoke of Ibn Abī Kudaynah
too as having been the vizier for approximately one
year.[21] The history of the viziers between 4598 and 466
is quite confusing because many of them served such short
periods of time that some names might not have reached
us. Furthermore, many of the above-mentioned figures
served several times as viziers.

Abū'l-Najm Badr al-Mustanṣirī [al-sayyid al-ajall amīr
al-juyūsh sayf al-Islām nāṣir al-imām] (466-488/1073-
1095)

A complete biography of Badr is found in Chapter Three.

---

20 Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 54; Ibn Muyassar,
Akhbār Miṣr, p. 22.

21 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āẓ, II, 311.

REIGNS OF AL-MUSTA'LĪ BI'LLĀH (487-495/1094-1102)

AND AL-ĀMIR BI-AḤKĀM ALLĀH (495-524/1102-1130)

Abū'l-Qāsim Shahinshāh ibn al-sayyid al-ajall amīr al-juyūsh Badr al-Mustanṣirī [al-sayyid al-ajall al-afḍal sayf al-imām jalāl al-Islām sharaf al-ānām nāṣir al-dīn khalīl amīr al-mu'minīn] (487-515/1094-1121); known as Al-Afḍal.

He became vizier when his father became ill and for a year before his father died. Abū'l-Qāsim took the oath for al-Musta'lī, the youngest son of al-Mustanṣir, when the latter died in 487/1094). There was resistance to the acclamation of al-Musta'lī as caliph because he was young and because Nizār, who was the eldest, was bypassed by his father. Moreover, history has it that Nizār left the palace and went to Alexandria, where al-Afḍal followed him and was able to destroy him in battle and finally kill him. His death caused a split in the Ismā'īlī da'wah, whereby many believed that Nizār was the true imām.[22] During al-Musta'lī's caliphate, al-Afḍal sent several expeditions to al-Shām and to the Holy Land by sea and by land to ward off the Crusaders. During his vizierate, al-Musta'lī died and al-Afḍal found himself again in the position of taking the oath for al-Āmir bi-Aḥkām Allāh in 495/1102. He kept going to war against

---

22 Abū-'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Salāmah al-Quḍā'ī, Al-juz' al-awwal min kitāb nuzhat al-albāb, jāmi' al-tawārīkh wa'l-ādāb, London, British Library, MS Add. 23,285, fol 45v.

the Crusaders every year until he was killed by an unknown person in 515/1121.

Abū-'Abdallāh ibn al-Ajall Nūr al-Dawlah Abū-Shujā' al-Āmirī [al-sayyid al-ajall al-ma'mūn tāj al-khilāfah 'izz al-Islām fakhr al-ānām niẓām al-dīn] (515-522/1121-1128); known as al-Baṭā'ihī
Historians of the era praise him extensively as a generous man who was very just and kind to the ra'iyyah. A wise diplomat, he corrected the mistakes of some of his predecessors without much ado.[23] Thus he was loved and respected by friend and foe, so much so that the caliph al-Āmir bestowed on him a vizierate without restrictions (wizārat tafwīḍ) and prayers were said on his behalf in every pulpit, as if he were a caliph. The man was a lover of knowledge and surrounded himself with the learned men of his time, according to the sources. One of his greatest achievements was the census of Egypt. This census, Ibn Muyassar says, was "the first census taken and recorded in special lists which were called awrāq al-tasqī'. He created papers to travel inside and outside the country."[24] He also had an intricate system of espionage, using women as spies in order to learn

---

23 Anonymous, Kitāb jawāhir al-buhūr wa waqāyi' al-umūr wa 'ajāyib al-duhūr wa akhbār al-diyār al-Miṣriyyah wa mā warad fīhā min al-āyāt al-'aẓīmah wa'l-ahādīth al-sharīfah, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1819, fol 57r.

24 'Abdallāh Mukhliṣ, editor's introduction to Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah, p. 11.

about dissatisfied members of society and to try to
correct the situation where necessity dictated it.
Interestingly enough, al-Baṭā'iḥī was the one who
commissioned Ibn al-Ṣayrafī to write his history of the
viziers, Al-Ishārah ilā man nāla al-wizārah.. He
remained in office until al-Āmir decided to imprison him
and his brothers and finally to crucify them all in
522/1128. No-one seems to have known why he fell out of
favor with al-Āmir, although many chroniclers speculate
on it. It perhaps was the love of the ra'iyyah and the
powers that al-Baṭā'iḥī enjoyed which made al-Āmir decide
to get rid of him.

*[Between 519-524/1125-1129, until the end of
his reign, al-Āmir did not appoint any viziers]*

REIGN OF AL-ḤĀFIẒ LI-DĪN ALLĀH (524-544/1130-1149)

Abū-'Alī Aḥmad ibn al-Sayyid al-Ajall al-Afḍal Shāhinshāh
Amīr al-Juyūsh [wazīr al-sayf wa'l-qalam] (524-526/1129-
1131)
The son and grandson of viziers, he was not of the same
caliber as his father and grandfather. He enjoyed sports
and the easy life and was killed on his way to play ball
(al-la'b bi'l-kurrah).

Abū'l-Fatḥ Yanīs [amīr al-juyūsh] (526/1131)
In office for nine months, Abū'l-Fatḥ was a Christian
slave of al-Afḍal, and a strong personality who instilled
fear in the army in order to keep it under control. Al-
Ḥāfiẓ became afraid of him and thus saw to it that he was
poisoned.

*[Al-Ḥāfiẓ remained without viziers from 526
to 529/1131 to 1134, when he named his own son, Ḥasan,
as vizier and also had him poisoned]*

Abū-Muzaffar Bahrām al-Armanī [sayf al-Islām, tāj al-mulūk] (529-531/1134-1136)
For a full biography of Bahrām, see Chapter Three.

Riḍwān ibn al-Walakhshī [al-Afḍal] (531-533/1136-1138)
Prior to his vizierate, he was governor of Askalon. He
came to Cairo just when Bahrām had been thrown out of the
vizierate and he stepped into the position. Ibn al-
Walakhshī was noted for his reorganization of the dīwāns
and for employing Muslims instead of Christians in the
bureaucracy. Christians fled after Ibn al-Walakhshī
killed many of their number. Al-Ḥāfiẓ softened the
impact of these actions when he brought the ex-vizier,
Bahrām, and his relatives to live in the palace with him.
Then, fearful of Ibn al-Walakhshī's power, he instigated
the army against him. Ibn al-Walakhshī had to flee for
his life.

*[Al-Ḥāfiẓ remained without viziers until he
was killed in 544/1149]*

REIGN OF AL-ẒĀFIR BI-AMR ALLĀH
(544-549/1149-1154)

Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Masāl [al-sayyid al-ajall al-mufaḍḍal amīr al-juyūsh] (544/1149)
Najm al-Dīn was a well-known amīr who was quick to act on
purging the army of elements which were bound on having a
good time and pocketing their wages. His action prompted

Ibn al-Sālār, governor of Alexandria, to take the vizierate by force from Ibn Masāl and to kill him.

'Alī ibn al-Sālār [al-amīr al-muzaffar Abū'l-Ḥasan] (544-548/1149-1153)

Ibn al-Sālār was a vizier for three and one-half years. During his vizierate, he organized a successful expedition against the Crusaders, who were defeated in Jaffa, Akka, Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli. Had this campaign been a concerted effort with Nūr al-Dīn Zangī in Damascus, the Crusaders could well have lost all their holdings in the Holy Land. Ibn al-Sālār lost his life and his vizierate to his nephew, 'Abbās, who with Usāma ibn Munqidh (the famous memoir-writer of the period between the second and third crusades) had conspired against him.

'Abbās ibn Yaḥyā ibn Bādīs (548-549/1153-1154)

He served only a year as vizier. He had instigated his son to kill the caliph al-Ḥāfiẓ because the latter was his son's lover. Thinking that he might survive such an act, Ibn Bādīs remained in office for a short while until he had to run for his life.

REIGN OF AL-FĀ'IZ BI-NAṢR ALLĀH
(549-555/1154-1160)

Ṭalā'i' ibn Razzīk [al-sayyid al-ajall al-malik al-ṣāliḥ]
(549-556/1154-1160)

His vizierate was a substitute for a caliphate.[25] His
term in office was spent in wars against the Crusaders;
and his court was said to be the meeting place for
learned men.[26] He was a man who spent most of his time
in office devising means to lessen the power of the army
and the amīrs in order that he might impose his will on
both parties.

REIGN OF AL-'ĀḌID BI'LLĀH (555-567/1160-1172)

Razzīk ibn Ṭalā'i' [al-'ādil al-nāṣir] (556-558/1160-
1162)

He was a forgiving individual who exempted many persons
from paying taxes owed and who lowered fees on court
cases. He made a major effort to save the caliphate, but
to no avail.

Shāwar ibn Mujīr al-Sa'dī [amīr al-juyūsh] (558, 559-
564/1162, 1163-1168)

His vizierate came at a time when the Fatimid caliphate
had effectively ended, even though the caliph al-'Āḍid
was still ruling, in name, but without power. Shāwar's
vizierate was spent contending with the amīrs and those

---

25 Abū-Muḥammad 'Amārah al-Ḥakamī (al-Yamanī),
Kitāb fīh al-nukat al-'aṣriyyah fī akhbār al-wuzarā' al-
Miṣriyyah (Baghdad: al-Muthannā, 1962?), p. 34.

26 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

who had real power. He spent his second vizierate
fighting the Crusaders, who had landed on the shores of
Egypt; internally, he continued to fight with the amīrs
to consolidate his power. Unable to control either, he
called on Asad al-Dīn Shirkūh to come and help him repel
the wave of infidels. The latter did come to the rescue
and was given the vizierate of Egypt as a reward in
564/1168.

Dirghām ibn 'Āmir ibn Suwār al-Lukhamī [shams al-khilāfah abū'l-ashbāl] (558-559/1162-1163)

A Yemeni by birth, he became vizier by force when he and
Shāwar (see above) killed Razzīk ibn Talā'i'. He did not
last for more than nine months as vizier. The Crusaders
arrived in Egypt during his vizierate. Shāwar, an army
general, believed that his friend Dirghām could not ward
off the attackers, so he took over and became vizier for
the second time.

Asad al-Dīn Shirkūh (564/1168)

He was vizier for two months when he called on Salāh al-
Dīn, his nephew, to take over before he himself passed
away. Shirkūh was called to Egypt, as mentioned above,
to stop the Crusaders from taking over the country.
Salāh al-Dīn arrived in Egypt and became the vizier of
al-'Ādid until the latter's death in 567/1172. With the
end of the Fatimid caliphate, Salāh al-Dīn established
his own dynasty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscripts. The following abbreviations are used: B.L.
for the British Library (London); and B.N. for the
Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris).

Abū Shāmah, Shihāb al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ismā'īl.
     Azhar al-rawḍatayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn. B.L., MS
     Or. 24,015.

Aḥmad ibn Sa'd al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ghamrī al-'Uthmānī.
     Dhakhīrat al-i'lām bi-tawārīkh Miṣr fī'l-Islām min
     umarā' wa ḥukkām wa quḍāt qaḍā'ihā fī'l-iḥkām min
     fatḥihā al-Islāmī. B.L., MS Or. 6377; B.N., MS
     arabe 1850.

Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf al-Dimashqī al-Makkī. Akhbār al-duwal wa
     āthār al-uwal. B.N., MS arabe 4923.

Anonymous. Al-Kawākib al-bāhirah min al-nujūm al-
     zāhirah. Leiden: MS Or. 636.

Anonymous. Kitāb jawāhir al-buḥūr wa waqāyi' al-umūr wa
     'ajā'yib al-duhūr wa akhbār al-diyār al-Miṣriyyah wa
     mā warad fīhā min al-āyāt al-'aẓīmah wa'l-aḥādīth
     al-sharīfah. B.N., MS arabe 1819.

Anonymous. Kitāb al-kawākib al-bāhirah al-mukhtaṣar min
     al-nujūm al-zāhirah. Leiden: MS Or. 374.

Anonymous. Majmū' fīh qiṣṣat al-Iskandar wa mā fīhā min
     al-amr al-'ajīb wa qiṣṣat ahl al-kahf wa sīrat
     al-Nabī wa tawārīkh al-khulafā' wa'l-wuzarā' wa'l-
     mulūk wa'l-salāṭīn wa ḥikāyāt wa ash'ār wa fawā'id.

197

B.L., MS Or. 5928.

Anonymous. Nuzhat al-libāb jāmi' al-tawārīkh wa'l-ādāb.
B.L., MS Add. 23,285.

Anonymous. Sīrat al-Ḥākim. Tubingen: MS 43.

al-'Aynī, Maḥmud. Tārīkh dawlat banī'l-'Abbās wa al-
Ṭulūniyyīn wa'l-Fāṭimiyyīn. B.N., MS arabe 5761.

al-Azharī, 'Alī Nūr al-Dīn. Al-Nuzhah al-saniyyah fī
dhikr al-khulafā' wa'l-mulūk al-Miṣriyyah. B.N., MS
arabe 1815.

al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad. Kitāb
al-'ibar fī khabar man 'abar. B.N., MS arabe 5819.

_____. Tadhkirat al-a'immah wa'l-ḥuffāẓ, aw Kitāb
ṭabaqāt al-mashāyikh wa'l-ḥuffāẓ. B.N., MS arabe
5952.

Ibn 'Abd Allāh, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Naṣr. Al-Nahj al-
sulūk fī siyāsat al-mulūk. B.N., MS arabe 5954.

Ibn Abī al-Surūr, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad. Al-Kawākib
al-sāyirah fī akhbār Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah. B.L., MS
Or. 9973.

Ibn 'Asākir, Abū'l-Qāsim 'Alī ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Hibat
Allah. Tārīkh Ibn 'Asākir. B.L., MSS Add. 23,351-
23,353.

Ibn Aybak, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn ibn al-Ṣafadī. Tuḥfat dhawī'l-
albāb fī-man ḥakama bi-Dimashq min al-khulafā' wa'l-
mulūk wa'l-nuwwāb. B.N., MS arabe 5827.

Ibn Duqmaq, Ibrāhīm. Kitāb al-jawāhir al-thamīnah fī
sīrat al-khulafā' wa'l-salāṭīn. B.N., MS arabe
5762.

Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū'l-'Abbās
    Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā. Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-
    amṣār. B.L., MS Add. 24,348.

Ibn Ḥajar, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī. Raf' al-iṣr 'an
    quḍāt Miṣr. B.N., MS arabe 5893; Cairo: al-
    Maktabah al-Malikiyyah, MS 2115.

Ibn Ḥajar, Abū'l-Maḥāsin Jalāl al-Dīn Yūsuf. Al-Nujūm
    al-zāhirah bi-talkhīṣ akhbār quḍāt Miṣr wa'l-
    Qāhirah. B.L., MS Add. 23,360.

Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh, Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb
    fuṣūl al-muhimmah fī ma'rifat al-a'immah. B.N., MS
    arabe 5832.

Ibn Taghribirdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū'l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf.
    Ḥawādith al-duhūr fī maḍā al-ayyām wa al-shuhūr.
    B.L., MS Add.23,294.

Ibn Ẓāhir. Al-Faḍā'il al-bāhirah bi-maḥāsin Miṣr wa'l-
    Qāhirah. B.L., MS Or. 1285.

Ibn Zulāq 'Alī. Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍā'iluhā. B.N., MS
    arabe 1817.

Al-Isḥāqī, Muḥammad ibn al-Mu'tī. Laṭāyif akhbār al-
    uwal fī-man taṣarraf fī Miṣr min al-duwal. B.L.,
    MSS Add.23,881 and Or. 567.

Al-Kutubī, Muḥammad ibn Shākir. 'Uyūn al-tawārīkh.
    Istanbul: Topkapi Library, MS A-2922.

Mar'ī ibn Yūsuf al-Ḥanbalī. Kitāb nuzhat al-nāẓirīn fī
    tārīkh man wulliya Miṣr min al-khulafā' wa al-
    salāṭīn al-'ādilīn. B.N., MS arabe 5920; and B.L.,
    MS Add. 23,325.

Al-Musabbiḥī, Muḥammad ibn 'Ubayd Allāh. [Tārīkh al-
    Musabbiḥī]. Madrid: Escorial, MS 2-543-2. One

section published: <u>Al-juz' al-arba'ūn min</u> akhbār
Miṣr li'l-Musabbiḥī. Ed. W. Milward. Cairo:
Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1978.

Al-Quḍā'ī, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Salāmah.
<u>Mukhtaṣar fī al-tārīkh</u>. B.N., MS arabe 1490.

_____. <u>Kitāb tārīkh al-Quḍā'ī</u>. B.N., MS arabe
1491.

_____. <u>Al-juz' al-awwal min kitāb nuzhat al-albāb</u>,
<u>jāmi' al-tawārīkh wa'l-ādāb</u>. B.L., MS Add. 23,285.

Al-Ṣafadī, Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan ibn Abī Muḥammad 'Umar.
<u>Nuzhat al-malik wa'l-mamlūk fī mukhtaṣar sīrat man</u>
<u>wulliya min al-mulūk</u>. B.L., MSS Or. 6267, Add.
23,326.

Ṣāliḥ ibn Aḥmad. <u>Al-Waṣiyyah bi-rasūl Allāh</u>. Leiden: MS
Or. 7195.

Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn 'Alī ibn Yūsuf al-
Fīrūzī. <u>Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahā'</u>. B.N., MS arabe 5896.

Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, Abū'l-Muẓaffar Yūsuf ibn Qizughlī.
<u>Mir'āt al-zamān</u>. B.L., MS Add. 23,277 (A.H. 72-
149); B.L., MSS Or. 4618, 4619 (A.H. 218-279; 282-
460); Istanbul: Ahmet III, MS 2797 (fragment); B.N.,
MS arabe 5866; B.L., MS Or. 9258 (A.H. 480-513).

Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr.
<u>Ḥusn al-muḥāḍarah fī akhbār Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah</u>.
B.L., MS Add. 23,332; B.N., MS arabe 5871.

_____. <u>Tārīkh al-khulafā'</u>. B.L., MS Add. 7324.

Al-Talmasānī, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā, known as Ibn Abī Jumlah.
<u>Sakrdān mawlānā al-sulṭān</u>. B.L., MS Add 7319.

Al-Yāfi'ī, 'Alī ibn Sulaymān. <u>Mir'āt al-jinān</u>.
Istanbul: Topkapi Library, MS A-2970.

Printed Works. The following abbreviations are used for
frequently-cited journals: BSOAS (Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies), IJMES (International
Journal of Middle East Studies), JAOS (Journal of the
American Oriental Society), JESHO (Journal of the
Economic and Social History of the Orient), JRAS (Journal
of the Royal Asiatic Society).

Al-'Abbādī, Aḥmad Mukhtār 'Abd al-Fattāḥ. Fī al-tārīkh
    al- 'Abbāsī wa'l-Fāṭimī. Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍah al-
    'Arabiyyah, 1971.

Abū'l-Fidā', Ismā'īl ibn 'Alī (d. 732/1331). Mukhtaṣar
    tārīkh al-bashar. 4 vols. Cairo: n.p., 1325/1907.

Abū Sa'īd, Ḥāmid Ghunaym. Al-'Alaqāt al-'arabiyyah al-
    siyāsiyyah fī 'ahd al-Buwayhiyyīn. Cairo: Maktabat
    al-Shabāb, 1971.

Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Armanī. The Churches and Monasteries of
    Egypt. Akhbār min nawāḥī Miṣr wa aqṭā'ihā. Ed. and
    trans. B.T.A. Evetts. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
    1895.

Abū al-Salṭ, Umayyah ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz. Dīwān al-Ḥākim.
    Tunis: Dār al-kutub al-sharqiyyah, 1974.

_____. Al-Risālah al-Miṣriyyah. Ed. 'Abd al-Salām
    Hārūn. Cairo: n.p., 1951.

Abū Shāmah, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ismā'īl al-Maqdisī (d.
    665/1268). Kitāb al-rawḍatayn fī akhbār al-
    dawlatayn. Ed. M. Ḥilmy and M. Aḥmad. Cairo: n.p.,
    1956-1963.

Allouche, Adel. "The Establishment of Four Chief
    Judgeships in Fatimid Egypt." JAOS, 105 (1985):
    317-320.

Amedroz, H.F. "The Ḥisba Jurisdiction in the Ahkām
    Sulṭāniyyah of al-Māwardī." JRAS (Jan. 1916): 77-
    101; (April 1916): 287-314.

_____. "The Maẓālim Jurisdiction in the Ahkām
    Sulṭāniyyah of al-Māwardī." JRAS (July 1911): 635-
    674.

Ankori, Zvi. Karaites in Byzantium: the Formative Years,
    970-1100. New York: A.M.S. Press, 1968.

Anonymous. Nubadh min akhbār al-Barbar. Ed. E. Lévi-
    Provençal. Rabat: n.p., 1934.

Al-Anṭākī, Abū'l-Faraj Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd (d. after
    458/1066). Tārīkh Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd al-Anṭākī. Ed.
    L. Cheikho, B. Carra de Vaux, and H. Zayyāt. Beirut
    and Paris: n.p., 1909.

Al-Aʿẓamī, Muḥammad Ḥasan. Al-Ḥaqāʾiq al-khafiyyah ʾan
    al-Shīʿah al-Fāṭimiyyah wa'l-Ithnā ʿAshariyyah.
    Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-al-Taʾlīf
    wa'l-Nashr, 1970.

_____. ʾAbqariyyāt al-Fāṭimiyyīn. Beirut: Dār
    Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, 1960.

Al-ʿAẓīmī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥalabī (d. after
    556/1161). "Tārīkh al-ʿAẓīmī." Partial edition by
    Claude Cahen. Journal Asiatique (1938): 353-448.

Bacharach, Jere L. "African Military Slaves in the
    Medieval Middle East: the Cases of Iraq (869-955)
    and Egypt (868-1171)." IJMES, 13 (1981): 471-495.

Al-Baghdādī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf.

Al-Ifādah wa'l-i'tibār fī'l-umūr al-mushāhadah wa'l-ḥawādith al-mu'āniyah bi-arḍ Miṣr. Ed. and trans. S. De Sacy. Paris: n.p., 1810.

_____. Mukhtaṣar Tārīkh Miṣr. Ed. J. White. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1800.

Al-Baghdādī, 'Abd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir (d. 429/1038). Al-Farq bayn al-firaq. Ed. M. Badr. Cairo: n.p., 1910.

Al-Bakrī, Abū 'Ubayd 'Ubayd Allāh ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz (d. 487/1094). Al-Mughrib fī dhikr bilād Ifrīqiyah wa'l-Maghrib. Paris: n.p., 1955.

Al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn Jābir. Futūḥ al-buldān. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-'Arabiyyah, 1956.

Bar Hebraeus, Gregory Abū'l-Faraj (d. 1286). Tārīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal. Ed. Ṣalḥānī. Beirut: Catholic Press, 1959.

Barāniq, Muḥammad Aḥmad. Al-Wuzarā' al-'Abbāsiyyūn. Cairo: Al-Maṭba'ah al-Numūdhajiyyah, n.d.

Al-Barghūthī, 'Umar Ṣāliḥ. Al-Wazīr al-Yāzūrī. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1951.

_____. "A Ministry of Propaganda under the Fatimids." Journal of the Middle East Society, 1 (1947): 57-59.

Al-Barrāwī, Rashīd. Ḥālat Miṣr al-iqtiṣādiyyah fī 'ahd al-Fāṭimiyyīn. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, 1948.

Bianquis, Thierry. "'Abd al-Ğanī ibn Sa'īd, un savant sunnite au service des fatimides." Actes du XXIXe congrès international des orientalistes, 1975. Vol. I: Études arabes et islamiques, pp. 39-47.

_____. "Une crise frumentaire dans l'Égypte fatimide." JESHO, 23 (1979): 67-101.

_____. Damas et la Syrie sous la domination fatimide, 359-468 H./969-1076. 2 vols. Damascus: Institut français d'études arabes, 1984, 1989.

Binder, Leonard. "Al-Ghazali's Theory of Islamic Government." Muslim World, 45 (July 1955): 229-241.

Al-Bīrūnī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad (d. 440/1048). Al-Āthār al-bāqiya 'an al-qurūn al-khāliya. Leipzig: n.p., 1876.

Blachère, Régis. "La fondation du Caire et la renaissance de l'humanisme arabo-islamique au IVe siècle." Proceedings of the International Conference on the History of Cairo (March-April 1969). Cairo: n.p., 1971, pp. 95-96.

Breydy, M. Études sur Sa'id ibn Batriq et ses sources. Louvain: Peeters, 1983.

Brockelmann, Carl. History of the Islamic Peoples. Trans. Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann. New York: Capricorn Press, 1960.

Bryer, D.R.W. "The Origins of the Druze Religion: Chapter Four." Der Islam, 53 (1976): 5-27.

Cahen, Claude, Yusuf Raġib, and Mustafa Anouar Taher. "L'Achat et le waqf d'un grand domaine égyptien par le vizir fatimide Tala'i' b. Ruzzik." Annales Islamologiques, 14 (1978): 59-126.

Cahen, Claude. "L'Administration financière de l'armée fatimide d'après al-Makhzūmī." JESHO, 15 (1972): 163-182.

_____. "The Body Politic." Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization. Ed. G.E. von Grunebaum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, pp. 143-163.

_____. Makhzūmiyyāt: études sur l'histoire économique et financière de l'Égypte médievale. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977.

_____. "Les marchands étrangers au Caire sous les Fatimides et les Ayyubides." Proceedings of the International Conference on the History of Cairo (March-April 1969). Cairo: n.p., 1971, pp. 97-101.

_____. Pre-Ottoman Turkey. Trans. J. Jones-Williams. New York: Taplinger, 1968.

_____. "Quelques chroniques anciennes rélatives aux derniers fatimides." Bulletin de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 37 (1937-1938): 1-27.

_____. "Un traité financier inédit d'époque fatimide-ayyubide." JESHO, 5 (1962): 139-159.

_____. Turcobyzantina et Oriens Christianus. London: Variorum Reprints, 1974.

Canard, Marius. "Armenia." Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960- . Vol. I, 634-650.

_____. "L'Autobiographie d'un chambellan du Mahdi 'Obeidallah le Fatimide." Miscellenea Orientalia. Art. No. 5. London: Variorum Reprints, 1973.

_____. "La destruction de l'Église de la Resurrection par le calife Hakim et l'histoire de la

descente du feu sacré." Byzantion, 35 (1965): 16-43.

_____. "Fatimides et Burides à l'époque du calife al-Hafiz li-din-illah." Miscellenea Orientalia. Art. No. 7. London: Variorum Reprints, 1973.

_____. "L'Impérialisme des fatimides et leur propagande." Miscellenea Orientalia. Art. No. 2. London: Variorum Reprints, 1973.

_____. "Une lettre du calife Fatimite al-Hafiz (524-544/1130-1149) à Roger II." Miscellenea Orientalia. Art. No. 8. London: Variorum Reprints, 1973.

_____. "Notes sur les arméniens en Égypte à l'époque fatimite." Annales de l'Institut d'études orientales, 13 (1957): 143-157.

_____. "Un vizir chrétien à l'époque fatimite: l'arménien Bahram." Annales de l'institut d'études orientales, 12 (1954): 84-113.

Casanova, P. "La doctrine sécrète des fatimides d'Égypte." Bulletin de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 18 (1921): 121-165.

Chapira, B. "Un document judéo-arabe de la Guéniza du Caire." Mélanges H. Derenbourg. Paris: n.p., 1909, pp. 121-130.

Cohen, Mark R. Jewish Self-Government in Medieval Egypt: The Origins of the Office of Head of the Jews, ca. 1065-1126. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Cooper, R.S. "The Assessment and Collection of Kharāj Tax in Medieval Egypt." JAOS, 96 (1976): 365-382.

Cresswell, K.A.C. "The Founding of Cairo." _Proceedings_
    _of_ _the_ _International_ _Conference_ _on_ _the_ _History_ _of_
    Cairo (_March-April_ _1969_). Cairo: n.d., 1971, pp.
    125-130.

Diyāb, Ṣābir Muḥammad. _Siyāsat_ _al-duwal_ _al-Islāmiyyah_ _fī_
    ḥawḍ _al-baḥr_ _al-mutawassiṭ_ _fī_ _awā_ _'il_ _al-qarn_ _al-_
    thānī _al-hijrī_ _ḥattā_ _nihāyat_ _al-Fāṭimiyyīn_. Cairo:
    'Ālam al-Kitāb, 1973.

Dodge, Bayard. "The Fatimid Hierarchy and Exegesis."
    Muslim _World_, 50 (1960): 130-141.

Ehrenkreutz, A.S. "Economic Factors and the Caliphate to
    the Tenth Century." _Proceedings_ _of_ _the_ _XXVIIth_
    International _Congress_ _of_ _Orientalists_, _1967_, p.
    204.

Escovitz, J.H. "Vocational Patterns of the Scribes of
    the Mamluk Chancery." _Arabica_, 23 (1976): 42-62.

Fischel, Walter. "The 'Bait Mal al-Khassa:' A
    Contribution to the History of 'Abbasid
    Administration." _Proceedings_ _of_ _the_ _XIXth_
    International _Congress_ _of_ _Orientalists_, _1935_, pp.
    538-541.

_____. _Jews_ _in_ _the_ _Economic_ _and_ _Political_ _Life_ _of_
    Medieval _Islam_. New York: Ktav Publishing House,
    1969.

Fyzee, A.A.A. "A Chronological List of the Imams and
    Da'is of the Musta'lian Isma'ilis." _Journal_ _of_ _the_
    Bombay _Branch_ _of_ _the_ _Royal_ _Asiatic_ _Society_, N.S., 10
    (1934): 8-16.

_____. _Compendium_ _of_ _Fatimid_ _Law_. Simla: Indian
    Institute of Advanced Studies, 1969.

_____. Al-Nu'man Abu Hanifah: the Isma'ili Law of
Wills. London: H. Milford, 1933.

_____. "The Study of the Literature of the Fatimid
Da'wa." Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of
H.A.R. Gibb. Ed. G. Makdisi. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 232-250.

_____. "Three Sulaymani Da'is: 1936-1939." Journal
of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
N.S., 16 (1940): 101-104.

Gabrieli, F. "Le Caire de Nasir-i Khusrev." Revue de
l'occident musulman et de la méditerranée, 13-14
(1973): 357-360.

Gautier, Émile Félix. Le Passé de l'Afrique du nord; les
siècles obscurs. Paris: Payot, 1952.

Gibb, H.A.R. "Constitutional Organization: the Muslim
Community and the State." Law in the Middle East,
Volume I: Origin and Development of Islamic Law.
Ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert Liebesny.
Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1955, pp.
3-27.

_____. "The Foreign Policy of Egypt under the
Fatimids." Oostersch Genoots. in Nederland, 6de
Conq., 1929, pp. 17-18.

Goeje, M.J. de. Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahrain et
les Fatimides. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1886.

Goitein, S.D. "Bankers' Accounts from the Eleventh
Century A.D." JESHO, 9 (1966): 28-68.

_____. "Changes in the Middle East, 950-1150, as
Illustrated by the Documents of the Cairo Geniza."
Islamic Civilization, 950-1100. Ed. D.S. Richards.

Oxford: Cassirer, 1973, pp. 17-32.

_____. "The Exchange Rate of Gold and Silver Money in Fatimid and Ayyubid Times: A Preliminary Study of the Relevant Geniza Material." JESHO, 8 (1965): 1-46.

_____. A Mediterranean Society. Volumes I-IV. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967- .

_____. "New Light on the Beginnings of the Karim Merchants." JESHO, 1 (1958): 175-184.

_____. "The Origin of the Vizierate and its True Character." Islamic Culture, 16 (1942): 255-263, and 380-392.

_____. "Petitions to Fatimid Caliphs from the Cairo Geniza." Jewish Quarterly Review, N.S., 45 (1954-55): 30-38.

_____. "Sidelights on Jewish Education from the Cairo Geniza (Arabic Documents)." Gratzl College Anniversary Album. Philadelphia: J.P.S., 1971, pp. 83-110.

Gottheil, R.J.H. "A Distinguished Family of Fatimide Cadis (al-Nu'man) in the Tenth Century." JAOS, 27 (1906): 217-296.

_____. "Al-Hasan ibn Ibrahim ibn Zulak." JAOS, 28 (1907): 254-270.

Grohmann, A. "Ein Fatimidenerlass vom Jahre 415 A.H. (1024 A.D.) im Koptischen Museum in Alt-Kairo." Rivisti di Studii Orientali, 32 (1957): 641-654.

Al-Ḥākimī, Abū Muḥammad Amārah al-Yamanī. Kitāb fīh al-

nukat al-'aṣriyyah fī akhbār al-wuzarā' al-
Miṣriyyah. Vol. I ed. H. Dérenbourg. Baghdad: al-
Muthannā reprint, 1962.

Ḥamādah, Muḥammad Māhir. Al-Wathā'iq al-siyāsiyyah wa'l-
idāriyyah li-1-'uhūd al-Fāṭimī wa'l-Atabakiyyah
wa'l-Ayyūbiyyah. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah,
1980.

Hamdani, Abbas. "Byzantine-Fatimid Relations Before the
Battle of Manzikert." Byzantine Studies, 1 (1974):
169-179.

_____. "Evolution of the Organisational Structure
of the Fatimi Da'wah: the Yemeni and Persian
Contribution." Arabian Studies, 3 (1976): 85-114.

_____. The Fatimids. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing
House, 1962.

_____. "The Tayyibi-Fatimid Community of Yaman at
the Time of the Ayyubid Conquest of Southern
Arabia." Unpublished paper presented at the 186th
meeting of the American Oriental Society, March,
1976.

_____. "The Yamani-Isma'ili Da'i Hatim b. Ibrahim
al-Hamidi (d. 596/1199) and His Book Tuhfat al-
Qulub." Proceedings of the XXVIIth International
Congress of Orientalists, 1967, pp. 270-272.

Al-Ḥamdānī, Ḥusayn F. and Ḥusayn Sulaymān Maḥmūd, Al-
Ṣulayhiyyūn wa'l-harakah al-Fāṭimiyyah fī'l-Yaman.
Cairo: Maktabat Miṣr, 1305/1890.

Al-Ḥamdānī, Ḥusayn F. "A Compendium of Isma'ili
Esoterics." Islamic Culture, 2 (1937): 210-220.

_____. "The History of the Isma'ili Da'wat and its

Literature during the Last Phase of the Fatimid
Empire." JRAS (1932): 126-136.

_____. "The Letters of al-Mustansir bi'llah."
BSOAS, 7 (1933-35): 307-324.

_____. On the Genealogy of Fatimid Caliphs. Cairo:
American University in Cairo, 1958.

_____. "Some Unknown Isma'ili Authors and Their
Works." JRAS (1933): 359-378.

Ḥasan, 'Alī Ibrāhīm. Tārīkh Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī, Qā'id al-
Mu'izz li-dīn Allāh al-Fāṭimī. Cairo: Maṭba'at
Majāzī, 1933.

Ḥasan, Ḥasan Ibrāhīm. "Contributions to the Study of
Fatimid History in Egypt during the Last Twelve
Years." Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts
(Alexandria), 1 (1951): 129-140.

_____. Al-Fāṭimiyyīn fī Miṣr wa a'māluhum al-
siyāsiyyah wa'l-dīniyyah bi-wajh khāṣṣ. Būlāq:
n.p., 1932.

_____. Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah. Cairo:
Maktabat al-Nahḍah, 1958.

Ḥasan, Zakī Muḥammad. Kunūz al-Fāṭimiyyin. Cairo: n.p.,
1937.

Hitti, Philip K. History of the Arabs. 9th ed. London:
Macmillan, 1968.

Hodgson, M.G.S. "The Isma'ili State." The Cambridge
History of Iran. Volume V. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968, pp. 422-482.

_____. The Venture of Islam. 3 vols. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam (d. 860 or 871 A.D.). Futūḥ Miṣr wa

akhbāruhā. Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthannā, 1968.

Ibn al-Āthīr, 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī-l-Karam. Al-Kāmil
fī al-tārīkh. 14 vols. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1966.

Ibn Aybak, Abū Bakr ibn 'Ubayd Allah. Tārīkh Kanz al-
durar: al-durrah al-muḍī'ah fī akhbār al-dawlah al-
Fāṭimiyyah. Vol. VI, Pt. 2. Cairo: n.p., 1960.

Ibn Baṭrīq, Sa'īd (877-940 A.D.). Al-Tārīkh al-qā'im
'alā al-taḥqīq wa'l-taṣdīq. Ed. L. Cheikho.
Beirut: Catholic Press, 1908.

Ibn Duqmaq, Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn Aydamīr al-'Alā'ī
(d. 1407 A.D.). Kitāb al-intiṣār li-wāsiṭat 'iqd
al-amṣār. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijārī li-al-ṭibā'ah
wa'l-nashr wa'l-tawzī', 1966.

Ibn Ḥammād, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad. Akhbār mulūk banī-
'Ubayd wa sīratuhum. Ed. M. Vonder Heden. Algiers:
Jules Carbonel, 1927.

Ibn Iyās, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad (1448-1524). Badā'i' al-
zuhūr fī waqā'i' al-duhūr. Cairo: n.p., 1311/1894.

_____. Nashq al-azhār fī 'ajāyib al-aqṭār. Ed. L.
Langlès. Paris: Imprimérie Impériale, 1808.

Ibn Khallikān, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr. Wafayāt
al-a'yān wa anbā' abnā' al-zamān. 8 vols. Ed.
Iḥsān 'Abbās. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968-1972.

Ibn Māmātī, As'ad (d. 606/1209). Kitāb qawānīn al-
dawāwīn. Ed. Azīz Suryāl 'Aṭiyah. Cairo: Maṭba'at
Miṣr, 1943.

Ibn Miskawayh, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad (d. 421/1030). Tajārub
al-umam. Ed. H.F. Amedroz. Baghdad: Dar al-
Muthannā, 1965?

Ibn al-Muqaffa', Sawīris Usquf al-Ashmuniyyūn. Tārīkh

baṭārikah al-kanīsah al-Miṣriyyah al-ma'rūf bi-
siyar al-bay'ah al-muqaddasah. Vol. II, Pt. 2.
Cairo: n.p., 1948.

Ibn Muyassar, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī (d. 1278 A.D.). Akhbār
Miṣr. 2 vols. Ed. H. Massé. Cairo: Institut
français d'archéologie orientale, 1919.

_____. Choix de passages de la chronique d'Égypte:
sélection faite par al-Maqrizi en l'année 814 H.
Ed. Ayman Fu'ād al-Sayyid. Cairo: Institut fran-
çais d'archéologie orientale, 1981.

Ibn al-Qalānisī. Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq. Beirut: al-
Maṭba'ah al-Yasū'iyyah, 1908. Also, text ed. by
H.F. Amedroz. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1908.

Ibn Qutaybah, Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh ibn Muslim (d.
270/884). Kitāb al-imāmah wa al-siyāsah. 2 vols.
Cairo: n.p., 1344/1925.

Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, 'Alī ibn Munjib. Al-Ishārah ilā man nāla
al-wizārah. Ed. 'Abd Allāh Mukhliṣ. Cairo:
Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1924.

Ibn Ṭabaṭabā, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Ṭabaṭabā, known as
Ibn al-Tiqtaqa. Kitāb al-Fakhrī fī al-ādāb al-
sulṭāniyyah wa'l-duwal al-Islāmiyyah. Cairo: n.p.,
1317/1899.

Ibn Taghribirdī, Jamāl al-Dīn. Al-Nujūm al-zāhirah fī
mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhirah. Cairo: n.p., 1933.

Ibn Ẓāfir, Jamāl al-Dīn 'Alī (1171 or 72-1216 A.D.).
Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭi'ah. Ed. A. Ferre. Cairo:
Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1972.

Idrīs, Ibn al-Ḥasan (d. 1467). 'Uyūn al-akhbār wa funūn
al-āthār. Beirut: Dār al-Turāth al-Fāṭimī, 1973.

Imamuddin, S.M. "Administration under the Fatimids."
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 14
(1969): 253-269.

'Imārah, Muḥammad. 'Indamā aṣbaḥat Miṣr 'Arabiyyah;
dirāsah 'an al-mujtama' al-Miṣrī fī'l-'aṣr al-
Fāṭimī. Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabiyyah lil-
Dirāsāt wa'l-Nashr, 1974.

'Inān, Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh. Miṣr al-Islāmiyyah. Cairo:
Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1969.

Al-Ishāqī, Muḥammad al-Mu'tā ibn Abī'l-Fatḥ. Kitāb
Akhbār al-uwal fī-man taṣarraf fī Miṣr fī arbāb al-
duwal. Cairo: al-Maṭba'ah al-'Uthmāniyyah,
1304/1887.

Ivanov, V.A. Ibn al-Qaddah (the Alleged Founder of Isma-
ilism). Bombay: the Isma'ili Society, 1957.

_____. "An Ismailitic Pedigree." Journal and Pro-
ceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, N.S., 18
(1922): 403-406.

_____. Ismaili Tradition Concerning the Rise of the
Fatimids. London: H. Milford, 1942.

_____. "The Organization of the Fatimid
Propaganda." Journal of the Bombay Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Society, N.S., 15 (1938): 1-35.

Itrbek, I. "Die Slawen im Dienste der Fatimiden."
Archiv Orientalni, 21 (1953): 543-581.

Al-Jahshiyārī, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn 'Aydarūs (d.
331/942). Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa'l-kuttāb. Ed.
Muṣṭafā al-Saqqā. Cairo: n.p., 1938.

Jamāl al-Dīn, Muḥammad al-Sa'īd. Dawlat al-Ismā'iliyyah
fī Iran. Cairo: Mu'assasat Sijill al-'Arab, 1975.

Jenkins, M. "Western Islamic Influences on Fatimid
    Egyptian Iconography." Kunst des Orients, 10
    (1975): 91-107.

Al-Judharī, Abū 'Alī Manṣūr (d. 926 or 927 A.D.). Vie de
    l'ustadh Jaudhar (contenant sermons, letteres et
    rescrits des premiers califes fatimides). Algiers:
    J. Carbonel, 1958.

Juvaynī, 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā Malik. Kitāb-i Tārīkh-i
    Jihāngushāy. Tehran: Matbaat-i Majles, 1352 A.H.

Al-Kharbuṭlī, 'Alī Ḥusnī. 'Imād al-Dīn Idrīs, al-dā'ī
    wa'l-mu'arrikh al-Fāṭimī. Cairo: n.p., 1973.

Al-Kindī, Abū 'Umar Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf (897-961 A.D.).
    The Governors and Judges of Egypt. Ed. R. Guest.
    Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1912. Trans. of Kitāb al-
    imārah wa kitāb al-qudāt.

Al-Kirmānī, Ḥamīd al-Dīn (d. ca. 408 A.H.). Rāḥat al-
    'aql. Ed. Muḥammad Kāmil Ḥusayn and Muḥammad
    Muṣṭafā Ramaḍān. Cairo: n.p., 1953.

Klausner, Carla. The Seljuk Vezirate: a Study of Civil
    Administration. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
    University Press, 1973.

Knapp, B.L. "The Kaliph Hakim and History as a Cyclical
    Happening." Nineteenth Century French Studies, 5
    (1976-77): 79-93.

Lambton, A.K.S. "Aspects of Saljuk-Ghuzz Settlement in
    Persia." Islamic Civilization, 950-1100. Ed. D.S.
    Richards. Oxford: Cassirer, 1973, pp.   .

_____. "The Internal Structure of the Saljuq
    Empire." The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume V.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 203-282.

_____. "Quis Custodiet Custodes: Some Reflexions on the Persian Theory of Government." Studia Islamica, fasc. 5 (1956): 125-148; and fasc. 6 (1956): 126-146.

Lane-Poole, S. A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages. London: Frank Cass, 1968.

Lapidus, Ira. "Separation of State and Religion in Early Islamic Society." IJMES, 6 (1975): 363-385.

Lassner, Jacob. "Propaganda in Early Islam: the Abbasids in Post-Revolutionary Age." Israel Oriental Studies, 10 (1980): 74-85.

_____. The Shaping of Abbasid Rule. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Levi Della Vida, G. "A Marriage Contract on Parchment from Fatimite Egypt." Eretz Israel, 7 (1964): 64-69.

Lewis, Bernard. "Fatimiler ve Hindistan Yolu." Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuasi, 11 (1949-1950): 355-360.

_____. "An Interpretation of Fatimid History." Proceedings of the International Conference on the History of Cairo (March-April 1969). Cairo: n.p., 1971, pp. 287-295. Arabic version: "Ra'y fī tafsīr tārīkh al-Fāṭimiyyīn." Abhāth al-nadwah al-duwaliyyah li-tārīkh al-Qāhirah. 3 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1970. Volume I, 289-292.

_____. "Isma'ili Notes." BSOAS, 12 (1948): 597-600.

_____. The Origins of Isma'ilism; a Study of the
     Historical Background of the Fatimid Caliphate.
     Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940.

Madelung, W. "Fatimiden und Bahrain-Qarmaten." Der
     Islam, 34 (1959): 34-88.

_____. "Das Imamat in der Frühen Ismailitischen
     Lehre." Der Islam, 37 (1961): 43-135.

Magued, A.M. "La Fonction de juge suprême dans l'état
     fatimide en Égypte." Égypte Contemporaine, 50
     (1960): 45-56.

_____. Nuẓum al-Fāṭimiyyīn wa rusūmuhum fī Miṣr.
     Cairo: n.p., 1953-55.

_____. "L'Organisation financière en Égypte sous
     les Fatimides." Égypte Contemporaine, 53 (1962):
     47-57.

_____. "Le personnel de la cour Fatimide en
     Égypte." Annals of the Faculty of Arts of Ain Shams
     University, 3 (1958): 147-160.

_____. "De quelques jurisdictions fatimides en
     Égypte." Égypte Contemporaine, 52 (1961): 47-60.

_____. Ẓuhūr khilāfat al-Fāṭimiyyīn wa suqūṭuhā fī
     Miṣr; al-tārīkh al-siyāsī. Alexandria: Dār al-
     Ma'ārif, 1968.

Makarem, Sami N. "Al-Hakim bi-Amri Allah: an Essay in
     Historical Interpretation." Proceedings of the
     XXVIIth International Congress of Orientalists,
     1967, pp. 229-230.

Al-Makhzūmī, Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Uthmān. Minhāj fī
     'ilm kharāj Miṣr. Le Caire: Institut français
     d'archéologie orientale, 1986.

Mamour, Peter Hagop. Polemics on the Origin of the
Fatimid Caliphs. London: Luzac and Co., 1934.

Al-Manāwī, Muḥammad Ḥamdī. Al-Wizārah wa'l-wuzarā' fī'l-
'aṣr al-Fāṭimī. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1970.

Mann, Jacob. The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under
the Fatimid Caliphs. 2 vols. in one. New York:
Ktav, 1970.

_____. "Moses B. Samuel, a Jewish kātib in Damascus
and His Pilgrimage to Medinah and Mekkah." JRAS
(1919): 155-184.

Al-Maqrīzī, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad. Ighāthat al-ummah bi-
kashf al-ghummah. Cairo: Dār Ibn al-Walīd, n.d.

_____. Itti'āẓ al-ḥunafā' bi-akhbār al-a'immah al-
Fāṭimiyyīn al-khulafā'. 3 vols. Ed. Jamāl al-Dīn
al-Shayyāl. Cairo: n.p., 1967.

_____. Al-Khiṭaṭ al-Maqrīziyyah. Volume IV.
Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Nīl, 1326/1908.

Massé, H. "Ibn El-Çairafi. Code de la chancellerie
d'état (période Fatimide)." Bulletin de l'Institut
français d'archéologie orientale, 2 (1914): 65-120.

Massignon, L. "Fatima bint al-Husayn et l'origine du nom
dynastique 'fatimide.'" Proceedings of the XXIVth
International Congress of Orientalists, 1957, p.
368.

Al-Māwardī, 'Alī Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Miṣrī al-Baghdādī.
Adab al-wazīr al-ma'rūf bi-qawānīn al-wizārah wa
siyāsat al-malik. Cairo: Dar al-'Uṣūr, 1929.

_____. Al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah. Cairo: n.p., 1909.

Motzkin, Aryeh L. "Elijah ben Zecheriah; a Member of

Abraham Maimuni's Court." Revue des études juives, 128 (1969): 339-348.

Muir, William. The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall. Beirut: Khayats, 1963.

Musharrafah, 'Aṭiyyah Muṣṭafā. Nuẓum al-ḥukm bi-Miṣr fī 'aṣr al-fāṭimiyyīn. Cairo: n.p., 195?.

Muztar, A.D. "Dhimmis in an Islamic State." Islamic Studies, 18 (1979), 65-75.

Nadvi, Sulaiman. "The Origin of the Barmakids." Islamic Culture, 6 (1932): 19-28.

Nāṣir-i Khusraw. Safar-Nāmah. Tr. Yaḥyā al-Khashshāb. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1970.

Poznanski, S. "Moses b. Samuel of Safed, a Jewish Katib in Damascus." JRAS (1920): 97-99.

Al-Qadi, Wadad. "An Early Fatimid Political Document." Studia Islamica, fasc. 48 (1978): 71-108.

Al-Qalqashandī, Aḥmad ibn 'Alī (d. 821/1418). Ṣubḥ al-a'shā fī ṣinā'at al-inshā'. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1964.

Qazvīnī, Ḥamd Ollah Mostowfī. Tārīkh-i Gozide. Ed. and trans. Jules Gantin. Paris: J. Maisonneuve, 1903.

Rabie, Hassanein. "The Size and Value of the Iqṭā' in Egypt, 564-741 A.H./1169-1341 A.D." Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East. Ed. M.A. Cook. London: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp.

Al-Rāfi'ī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān. Miṣr fī'l-'uṣūr al-wusṭā min al-fatḥ al-'Arabī ḥattā al-ghazw al-'Uthmānī. Cairo: Dar al-nahdah al-'arabiyyah, 1970.

Raġib, Yusuf. "Un épisode obscur d'histoire fatimide." Studia Islamica, fasc. 48 (1978): 125-132.

Richards, D.S. "A Fatimid Petition and 'Small Decree' from Sinai." *Israel Oriental Studies*, 3 (1973): 140-158.

Al-Ruzrāwārī, Abū Shujā' Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 1095 A.D.). *Dhayl kitāb tajārub al-umam*. Cairo: Amedroz, 1916.

Al-Ṣābi', Hilāl ibn al-Muḥsin. *Kitāb al-wuzarā'*. Ed. A. Farrāj. Cairo: Dār aḥibbā' al-kutub al-'arabiyyah, 1958.

_____. *Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfah*. Baghdad: al-'Ānī, 1964.

Sayf-i Āzād, 'Abd al-Raḥmān. *Tarīkh-i khulafā-yi Fāṭimī*. Tehran: Nashriyyāt-i Idāre-yi Majallah-i Īrān, 1963.

Sha'bān, M.A. *Islamic History: a New Interpretation, 750-1055*. Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Al-Sharqāwī, 'Abd Allāh. *Tuḥfat al-nāẓirīn fī-man wulliya Miṣr min al-wulāt wa al-salāṭīn*. Būlāq: n.p., 1864.

El-Shayyāl, Gamāl al-Dīn. "The Fatimid Documents as a Source for the History of the Fatimids and their Institutions." *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, University of Alexandria*, 8 (1954): 3-12.

_____. *Majmū'at al-wathā'iq al-Fāṭimiyyah*. Cairo: Lajnat al-ta'līf, 1958.

Al-Sijistānī, Abū Ya'qūb Isḥāq ibn Aḥmad. *Kitāb al-iftikhār*. Beirut: American University of Beirut Library, xerox copy of manuscript, 1969.

Sourdel, Dominique. *Le vizirat 'abbaside de 749 à 936*

(132 à 324 H.). 2 vols. Damascus: Institut
français de Damas, 1960.

Stern, Samuel. "Cairo as the Center of the Isma'ili
Movement." Proceedings of the International
Conference on the History of Cairo (March-April
1969). Cairo: n.p., 1971, pp. 437-450.

_____. "The Early Isma'ili Missionaries in
Northwest Persia and in Khurasan and Transoxania."
BSOAS, 23 (1960): 56-90.

_____. "An Embassy of the Byzantine Emperor to the
Fatimid Caliph al-Mu'izz." Byzantion, 20 (1950),
239-258.

_____. "The Epistle of the Fatimid Caliph al-Amir
(al-Hidaya al-Amiriyya), its Date and its Purpose."
JRAS (1950): 20-31.

_____. "A Fatimid Decree of the Year 524/1130."
BSOAS, 23 (1960): 439-455.

_____. Fatimid Decrees: Original Documents from the
Fatimid Chancery. London: Faber, 1964.

_____. "Isma'ili Propaganda and Fatimid Rule in
Sind." Islamic Culture, 23 (1949): 298-307.

_____. "An Original Document from the Fatimid
Chancery Concerning Italian Merchants." Studii in
honore G. Levi Della Vida. 2 vols.

_____. Studies in Early Isma'ilism. Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1983.

_____. "The Succession to the Fatimid Imam al-
Amir. Oriens, 4 (1951): 193-255.

_____. "Three Petitions of the Fatimid Period."
Oriens, 15 (1962): 172-209.

Stillman, Norman A. "A Case of Labor Problems in
    Medieval Egypt." IJMES, 5 (1974): 194-201.

_____. "Joseph Ibn 'Awkal: a Jewish Communal Leader
    in Eleventh Century Egypt." The Eleventh Century.
    Ed. S. Ferber and S. Sticca. Binghamton, N.Y.:
    Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1970,
    pp. 39-50.

Stone, Lawrence. "Prosopography." Daedalus, 100 (Winter
    1971): 46-79.

Surūr, Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn. Al-Dawlah al-Fāṭimiyyah fī
    Miṣr, siyāsatuhā al-dākhiliyyah wa maẓāhir al-
    haḍārah fī 'ahdihā. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī,
    1970-1972.

_____. Al-Nufūdh al-Fāṭimī fī Bilād al-Shām wa'l-
    'Irāq fī'l-qarnayn al-rābi' wa'l-khāmis ba'd al-
    hijrah. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1964.

_____. Al-Nufūdh al-Fāṭimī fī Jazīrat al-'Arab.
    Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1959.

_____. Siyāsat al-Fāṭimiyyīn al-khārijiyyah.
    Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1967.

Al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. Tārīkh al-rusul wa'l-
    mulūk. Bulaq: n.p., n.d.

Tāmir, 'Ārif. Arba' rasā'il Ismā'īliyyah. Beirut: n.p.,
    1952.

_____. Al-'Azīz bi'llāh. Damascus: Dār al-Jīl,
    1980.

_____. Al-Manṣūr bi'llāh. Damascus: Dār al-Jīl,
    1980.

_____. Al-Mu'izz li-Dīn Allāh. Damascus: Dār al-
    Jīl, 1980.

_____. Al-Qā'im bi-Amr Allāh. Damascus: Dār al-Jīl, 1980.

_____. 'Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī. Damascus: Dār Dimashq, 1980.

Taqi, Syed Mohammed. "Ismailites: their Contribution in History." Proceedings of the Pakistan Historical Conference. 8th Session. Karachi: n.p., 1958, pp. 87-90.

Udovitch, A.L. "A Tale of Two Cities: Commercial Relations between Cairo and Alexandria during the Second Half of the Eleventh Century." The Medieval City. Ed. Harry Miskimin, David Herlihy, and A.L. Udovitch. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 143-162.

Vatikiotis, Panayotis J. The Fatimid Theory of State. Lahore: Orientalia, 1957.

_____. "Al-Hakim bi-Amrillah: the God-King Idea Realised." Islamic Culture, 29 (1955): 1-8.

_____. "A Reconstruction of the Fatimid Theory of State." Islamic Culture, 28 (1954): 399-409.

_____. "The Rise of Extremist Sects and the Dissolution of the Fatimid Empire in Egypt." Islamic Culture, 31 (1957): 17-26.

_____. "The Syncretic Origins of the Fatimid Da'wa." Islamic Culture, 28 (1954): 475-491.

Von Grunebaum, Gustav E. "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement." Proceedings of the International Conference on the History of Cairo (March-April 1969). Cairo: n.p., 1971, pp. 199-225.

Walker, Paul E. "A Byzantine Victory over the Fatimids."

<u>Byzantion</u>, 42 (1972): 431-440.

Wiet, G. "Un proconsul fatimide de Syrie: Anushtakin
Dizbiri (mort en 433/1042)." <u>Mélanges de
l'Université Saint Joseph</u>, 46 (1970-71): 383-407.

Wüstenfeld, H.F. <u>Geschichte der Fatimiden-Chalifen nach
arabischen quellen</u>. Göttingen: Dieterich, 1881.

Yūzbakī, Tawfīq Sulṭān. <u>Al-Wizārah: nash'atuhā wa
taṭawwuruhā fī al-dawlah al-'Abbāsiyyah</u>. Baghdad:
Maṭba'at al-Irshād, 1970.

Zananiri, Gaston. <u>L'Égypte et l'équilibre du Levant au
moyen age, 637-1517</u>. Marseilles: Les Cahiers du
Sud, 1936.

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG • BERLIN

K S

lieferbare Titel, Stand Juni 1990

Islamkundliche Untersuchungen

begründet von Klaus Schwarz;
herausgegeben von Gerd Winkelhane

6

138. Hamzeh'ee, M. Reza: The Yaresan: A Sociological, Historical and Religio-Historical Study of a Kurdish Community. 1990. ca. 410 S. (in Vorbereitung)

139. Migeod, Heinz-Georg: Die persische Gesellschaft unter Nasiru 'd-Din Šah. Mit einem Vorwort von Bert Fragner. 1990. ca. 450 S. (im Druck; erscheint August 1990)

140. Fliedner, Stephan: 'Ali Mubarak und seine *Hitat*. Kommentierte Übersetzung der Autobiographie und Werkbesprechung. ii, 364 S. (im Druck; erscheint Juli 1990)

(Nicht aufgeführte Bandnummern sind vergriffen.)

Islamwissenschaftliche Quellen und Texte aus deutschen Bibliotheken

herausgegeben von Klaus Schwarz
(Diese Reihe ist erschienen im Verlag aku, Bamberg; zu beziehen über Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin)

1. Winkelhane, Gerd und Klaus Schwarz: Der osmanische Statthalter Iskender Pascha (gest. 1571) und seine Stiftungen in Ägypten und am Bosporus. 1985. 361 S. . . . . 76.00 DM

2. Guellil, Gabriela Linda: Damaszener Akten des 8./14 Jahrhunderts nach at-Tarsusis *Kitab al-I'lam*. Eine Studie zum arabischen Justizwesen. 1985. 447 S. . . . . 86.00 DM

3. Matuz, Josef: Die Steuerkonskription des Sandschaks Stuhlweißenburg aus den Jahren 1563 bis 1565. Unter Mitwirkung von István Hunyadi. 1986. 395 S. . . . . 84.00 DM

4. Hoffmann, Birgitt: Persische Geschichte 1694–1835 erlebt, erinnert und erfunden. Der *Rustam at-tawarih* in deutscher Bearbeitung. 1986. 909 S. . . . . 136.00 DM

5. Schwarz, Klaus und Gerd Winkelhane: Hoga Sa'deddin, Staatsmann und Gelehrter (gest. 1599), und seine Stiftung aus dem Jahre 1614. 1986. 166 S. . . . . 44.00 DM

Islamkundliche Materialien

herausgegeben von Klaus Schwarz

4. Fragner, Bert: Repertorium persischer Herrscherurkunden aus der
    Zeit vor 1848. Publizierte Originalurkunden. 1980. 390 S. . . . . 76.00 DM

5. Schwarz, Klaus: Der Vordere Orient in den Hochschulschriften
    Deutschlands, Österreichs und der Schweiz. Eine Bibliographie von
    Dissertationen und Habilitationsschriften 1885–1978. 1980. 722 S. . . . . 174.00 DM

6. Zâkir Sükrî Efendi: Die Istanbuler Derwischkonvente und ihre Schei-
    che. Herausgegeben von M. Serhan Taysi. Mit einer Einleitung von
    Klaus Kreiser. 1980. 160 S. . . . . 48.00 DM

8. Oehring, Otmar: Bibliographie zum Recht und den Internationalen Be-
    ziehungen der Türkischen Republik. Titel in Fremdsprachen. 1982.
    xv, 233 S. . . . . 56.00 DM

9. Ayatollah Chomeini: Der Islamische Staat. Ins Deutsche übersetzt
    von Ilse Itscherenska und Nader Hassan. 1983. 188 S. . . . . 36.00 DM

(Bände 1–3 sind nicht mehr lieferbar.)

Studien zur Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der Türkvölker

herausgegeben von Georg Hazai

1. Wannig, Klaus-Detlev: Der Dichter Karaca Oglan. Studien zur türki-
    schen Liebeslyrik. 1980. 738 S. . . . . 94.00 DM

2. Prokosch, Erich: Studien zur Grammatik des Osmanisch-Türkischen
    unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Vulgärosmanisch-Türkischen.
    1980. 278 S. . . . . 54.00 DM

Sprachwissenschaftliche Ergebnisse der deutschen Turfanforschung

Faksimiles der Fragmente zu den von F.W.K. Müller und A. v. Gabain herausgegebenen Uigurica I–IV. Zusammengestellt und mit Einführung sowie vergleichenden Tabellen herausgegeben von Georg Hazai und Peter Zieme. Leipzig 1982. Quer-4°. 1983. 195 S. . . . . 294.00 DM

Materialien zur Afrikakunde

1. Maurer, Barbara und Klaus Schwarz: Hochschulschriften zu Schwarzafrika 1960–1978. Deutschland-Österreich-Schweiz. x, 226 S. . . . . 58.00 DM

Reprints

'Osmanzade Ta'ib Ahmed: *Hadiqat ül-vüzera* (Der Garten der Wesire). Mit den Fortsetzungen (zeyl) des Dilaver Agazade 'Ömer Efendi, Ahmed Gavid und Bagdadi 'Abd ül-Fettah Šefqat. Nachdruck der Ausgabe Istanbul 1854/1855. 1969. 296 S., broschiert. . . . . 42..00 DM

Mustafa Selaniki: *Tarihi Selaniki* (Die Chronik des Selaniki). Unveränderter Nachdruck der Ausgabe Istanbul 1281/1864. 1970. vii, 351, 26 S., broschiert. . . . . 78.00 DM

von Tischendorf, Paul Andreas: Das Lehnswesen in den moslemischen Staaten, insbesondere im Osmanischen Reiche, mit dem Gesetzbuche der Lehen unter Sultan Ahmed I. Leipzig 1872. 1982. v, 129 S., broschiert. . . . . 38.00 DM

10